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264 N.C. 701

142 S.E.2d 604

State v. Rinaldi

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided June 18, 1965

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1965-06-18

Relies on State v. McClain · State v. McClain

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1965-06-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently March 2008

21 state decisions

6019651970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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PARKER, J.,

¶1dissenting. The majority opinion holds that defendant is entitled to a new trial by reason of the admission in evidence over his objections and exceptions of testimony of the State’s witness Foushee tending to show that defendant was a'.sex deviate — the testimony is set forth in the majority opinion and is.not repeated here. The ma*706jority opinion holds that such evidence was incompetent, prejudicial to defendant, and entitles him to a new trial. The reason assigned is the general rule that in a prosecution for a particular crime, the State cannot offer evidence tending to show that the accused has committed another distinct, independent, or separate offense. S. v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364.

¶2In S. v. McClain, supra, this is stated: “The general rule excluding evidence of the commission of other offenses by the accused is subject to certain well recognized exceptions, which are said to be founded on as sound reasons as the rule itself. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 683. The exceptions are stated in the numbered paragraphs, which immediately follow.” Ervin, J., the writer of the opinion in this case, with his usual clarity and correctness, sets forth eight exceptions, most of which exceptions are supported by superplenary authority. In my opinion, taking into consideration the entire conversation between defendant and Foushee, all the evidence in respect to the relationship between defendant and Foushee, and all the attendant circumstances, this evidence is competent under Judge Ervin’s paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5. I vote to affirm the judgment below.

Shaep, J., concurs in dissent.
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