Stenholtz v. Modica’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 29 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently December 2017 · most notably Carpenter v. City of Belle Fourche (2000), Janis v. Nash Finch Co. (2010)
2 federal appellate · 29 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Bartlett v. Gregg · Parham v. Dell Rapids Township in Minnehaha County · McConnell v. Pic-Walsh Freight Company · Orrison v. City of Rapid City · Norris v. CHICAGO, M., ST. P. & PR CO.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A legal cause is a cause that produces a result in a natural and probable sequence, and without which the result would not have occurred. A legal cause does not need to be the only cause of a result. A legal cause may act in combination with other causes to produce a result. The trial court's instructions regarding premises liability included the following: [Trial Court Instruction Number 18] The possessor of land owes an invitee the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for the invitee’s safety. [Trial Court Instruction Number 20] In general, an owner of land is not liable to an invitee for physical harm caused to them by an activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to the invitee. However, if the owner of land has reason to believe that the condition will harm the invitee despite its obviousness, the owner has a duty to warn the invitee regarding the condition or to take other reasonable steps to protect the invitee. The word "known” means that the invitee both knew of the existence of the dangerous condition, and also appreciated the probability and gravity of the danger posed by the condition. The word "obvious” means that the condition and the risk would be recognized by a reasonable person in the invitee's position, regardless whether the invitee subjectively recognized the danger.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“As a general rule, the possessor of land owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for his safety and is liable for the breach of such duty.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it. Such reason may also arise where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. In such cases the fact that the danger is known, or is obvious, is important in determining whether the invitee is to be charged with contributory negligence, or assumption of risk. (See §§ 466 and 496 D.) It is not, however, conclusive in determining the duty of the possessor, or whether he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.