Commonwealth v. Redmond’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`Can I speak to my lawyer? I can't even talk to [a] lawyer before I make any kinds of comments or anything?,' were not a clear and unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 57 Va. App. 566 - Stevens v. Commonwealth · State v. Andrew M. Edler

2. “The Supreme Court held in Miranda ... that the police must inform a suspect, who is subject to a custodial interrogation, of his right to an attorney and his right to have that attorney present during the interrogation. The police must explain these rights to the suspect before the interrogation begins. If a suspect waives his right to counsel after he has received Miranda warnings, the police officers are free to interrogate him, but if the suspect requests counsel at any time during the interrogation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney has been made available to the suspect or the suspect reinitiates the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-885 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); accord Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2354-55 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176-77 , 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207-08 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 , 111 S.Ct. 486, 489 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 , 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2394 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680-81 , 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2097-98 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 57 Va. App. 566 - Stevens v. Commonwealth · 52 Va. App. 230 - Zektaw v. Commonwealth

3. “Courts [are required] to “determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. As we have observed, “a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.” Although a suspect need not “speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,” he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attórney.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Malvo · 43 Va. App. 659 - Hilliard v. Commonwealth