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← 265 U.S. 292 - United States ex rel. Chicago, New York & Boston Refrigerator Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission

United States ex rel. Chicago, New York & Boston Refrigerator Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission’s Empirical Analysis

265 U.S. 292 · 1924

Citation profile

43
cited by 43 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
February 2011
most recently cited

22 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 43 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2011 · most notably United States v. American Ry Express Co Southeastern Express Co (1924), Swarna v. Al-Awadi (2010)

22 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

1801924193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor · Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission · United States ex rel. Chicago, New York & Boston Refrigerator Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““If the car company is a carrier by railroad, it would seem to follow that sleeping car companies and express companies are likewise included within the words. Evidently, however, congress did not think so, since § 209 of the act contains special provisions in respect of these companies, which would have been entirely unnecessary if they had been so included. The contention that the car company, if not a carrier by railroad, is a ‘system of transportation’ and hence within the words of the statutory definition, may be readily disposed of. The phrase forms part of the definition: ‘a carrier by railroad or partly by railroad and partly by water, whose railroad or system of transportation is under federal control,’ etc. It is plain that the words ‘whose railroad or system of transportation,’ etc., are not to be read independently, but as qualifying the language immediately preceding; and they are to be taken distributively as though the clause had read ‘a carrier by railroad, whose railroad is under federal control, or, a carrier partly by railroad and partly by water, whose system of transportation is under federal control.” (p. 297.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[B]ecause words used in one statute have a particular meaning they do not necessarily denote an identical meaning when used in another and different statute”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “not a carrier by railroad, or, indeed, a common carrier at all”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.