State v. Rizzo’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

131 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 133 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This court previously has acknowledged: [P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments.... In determining whether such [impropriety] has occurred, the reviewing court must give due deference to the fact that [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument.... Thus, as the state's advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state's case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.... Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or diverts the jury's attention from the facts of the case.... While the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used as a license to state, or to comment upon, or to suggest an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present matters which the jury ha[s] no right to consider.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Otto

2. “We disagree with the dissent of Sullivan, C. J., suggesting that, because the jury's determination is a moral judgment, it is somehow inconsistent to assign a burden of persuasion to that determination. The dissent's contention relies on its understanding of the reasonable doubt standard as a quantitative evaluation of the evidence. We have already explained in this opinion that the traditional meaning of the reasonable doubt standard focuses, not on a quantification of the evidence, but on the degree of certainty of the fact finder or, in this case, the sentencer. Therefore, the nature of the jury's determination as a moral judgment does not render the application of the reasonable doubt standard to that determination inconsistent or confusing. On the contrary, it makes sense, and, indeed, is quite common, when making a moral determination, to assign a degree of certainty to that judgment. Put another way, the notion of a particular level of certainty is not inconsistent with the process of arriving at a moral judgment; our conclusion simply assigns the law's most demanding level of certainty to the jury's most demanding and irrevocable moral judgment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Miller v. State

3. ““(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing' admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Colon