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← 266 F.3d 442 - Stanford v. Parker

Stanford v. Parker’s Empirical Analysis

266 F.3d 442 · 2001

Citation profile

87
cited by 87 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
6
states following
September 2024
most recently cited

28 federal appellate · 2 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 87 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2024 · most notably United States v. Lighty (2010), Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr. v. Phillip Parker, Warden (2003)

28 federal appellate · 2 district · 8 state decisions

560200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Slack v. McDaniel · Bruton v. United States · Coleman v. Thompson · Gregg v. Georgia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 87 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[e]ven in a death penalty case, `bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient ground to warrant requiring the state to respond to discovery or to require an evidentiary hearing.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “a habeas petitioner is generally entitled to such a hearing if he alleges sufficient grounds for release, relevant facts are in dispute, and the state courts did not hold a full and fair evidentiary hearing.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Habeas petitioners have no right to automatic discovery. A district court has discretion to grant discovery in a habeas case upon a fact specific showing of good cause under Rule 6. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 , 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 515-16 (6th Cir.2000) ... The burden of demonstrating the materiality of information requested is on the moving party. See Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 813-15 (5th Cir.2000). The district court applied the correct legal standard in light of the evidence and the state court proceedings. The discovery sought by Stanford would not resolve any factual disputes that could entitle him to relief, even if the facts were found in his favor. To the contrary, Stanford’s requested discovery, when reviewed in light of the recently examined record, falls more in the category of a fishing expedition. We will not find that a district court erred by denying a fishing expedition masquerading as discovery.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.