Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

266 Ga. 618

469 S.E.2d 195

96 FultonCountyD.Rep. 1613

Flournoy v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided April 29, 1996

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1996-04-29

Relies on Royals v. State · Strickland v. State · Shedden v. Stiles

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1996-04-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently March 2017

16 state decisions

80199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,

¶1concurring.

¶2I concur in the judgment, but write separately because I disagree with the Court of Appeals cases that exempt the photographic line-up forms from the continuing witness objection.2 In my opinion, the photographic identification forms should not be delivered to the jury for it to consider in reaching a verdict, unlike the actual photographic line-up, which may be delivered if properly admitted into evidence.

¶3Georgia courts allow litigants to object to a written statement as a “continuing witness” to avoid placing undue emphasis on written testimony.3 This objection prevents the writing from going out with the jury to be read and reread during its deliberations.4 Instead, the written testimony is treated like oral testimony that the jury hears only once from a witness.5 Applying this rule, we have held that trial courts should not provide to the jury any answers to interrogatories,6 written dying declarations,7 signed statements of guilt, “ ‘or other instruments of evidence depending for their value on the credibility of the maker.’ ”8

¶4Like the written testimony we have previously found subject to the continuing witness objection, the photographic identification forms introduced in this case are documentary evidence that rely on the maker’s credibility for their value. The witnesses signed a statement that “positively identified photo #5 as being the person who *620committed the offense of murder.” A handwritten note, “90% as shooter,” was added at the bottom of each form. These statements, if read and reread in the jury room, would speak more than once on the disputed issue of the shooter’s identity and unfairly elevate written testimony over similar oral testimony. Therefore, I believe that they should not go out with the jury during its deliberations when the defendant makes a proper objection.

Decided April 29, 1996.Stacy S. Levy, Nancy K. Peterson, for appellant.J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Tamar P. Stern, District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

¶5I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this concurrence.

¶6 See Samples v. State, 217 Ga. App. 509, 510 (460 SE2d 795) (1995); Parks v. State, 199 Ga. App. 736, 738-739 (406 SE2d 229) (1991); Kenney v. State, 196 Ga. App. 776, 777 (397 SE2d 131) (1990).

¶7Tibbs v. Tibbs, 257 Ga. 370, 370-371 (359 SE2d 674) (1987).

¶8 Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga. 637, 640 (49 SE 719) (1905).

¶9Thomason v. Genuine Parts Co., 156 Ga. App. 599, 601 (275 SE2d 159) (1980).

¶10Shedden, 121 Ga. at 639-640.

¶11Strickland v. State, 167 Ga. 452, 460-462 (145 SE 879) (1928).

¶12Royals v. State, 208 Ga. 78, 81 (65 SE2d 158) (1951) (quoting People v. Spranger, 145 NE 706, 710 (Ill. 1924)).

/266/ga/618 · .json · Public domain