¶1concurring specially.
¶2I concur fully with Division 1 and with the result reached in Division 2.1 write separately because I do not agree with all that is said in Division 2.
¶3The hospital submitted positive evidence that a sign was posted in the admissions area reciting that doctors were independent contractors. In concluding that factual issues exist as to whether a sign was indeed posted, the majority relies on the testimony of one witness that he did not recall seeing such a sign, in addition to the fact that “there was no testimony that either Cooper or his wife saw” a sign. This circumstantial evidence has no probative value against the positive, uncontradicted evidence presented by the hospital concerning the existence of a sign. See, e.g., Cannon v. Jeffries, 250 Ga. App. 371, 375 (551 SE2d 777) (2001). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, no factual issue exists as to the existence of a sign. The hospital has established this fact. Whether the sign was conspicuously posted, however, is a factual question that must be resolved by the jury.
¶4I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Ruffin joins in this special concurrence.