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← 266 N.C. 45 - State v. Hollars

State v. Hollars’s Empirical Analysis

1965

Citation profile

93
cited by 93 later decisions
4
states following
December 2009
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 88 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 93 later decisions — most recently December 2009 · most notably State v. Johnson (1969), State v. Spencer (1972)

3 federal appellate · 88 state decisions

68019651970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Gideon v. Wainwright · State v. Lowry · State v. Patton · State v. White · Buggs v. Ford Motor Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 93 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Speedy is a word of indefinite meaning . . . Neither the constitution nor the legislature has attempted to fix the exact time within which a trial must be had. ‘Whether a speedy trial is afforded must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each particular case. . . . “Four factors are relevant to a consideration of whether denial of a speedy trial assumes due process proportions: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by defendant. . . . These factors are to be considered together because they are interrelated. . . .” ’ “The burden is on the accused who asserts the denial of his right to a speedjr trial to show that the delay was due to the neglect or wilfulness of the State’s prosecution. The right to a speedy trial is not violated by unavoidable delay nor by delays caused or requested by defendants. . . . (T)he right to a, speedy trial 'is not designed as a sword for defendant’s escape: but rather as a shield for his protection.’ “We must note . . . that the ever-increasing number of criminal cases is putting a heavy strain upon speedy trial. The flood of post conviction petitions . . . and the retrials which some of the petitions . . . have necessitated, have further burdened courts which were even then struggling to keep abreast of congested dockets.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “We do not approve a delay of two years in trying any defendant's case. * * * The combination of circumstances here * * * negate any wilful failure on the part of court officials to give defendant a speedy trial. Considering the reasons for the delay, the lack of prejudice to defendant from it, and his failure to demand a trial earlier, his Honor's ruling that defendant's right to a speedy trial had not been transgressed will not be disturbed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “The right to a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the courts and on the prosecution an obligation to proceed with reasonable dispatch. It has been said that the basic policy underlying the constitutional guaranty and the statutes enacted to implement it is to protect the accused from having criminal charges pending against him an undue length of time.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.