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267 F.2d 900

Docket No. 13808.

Wooten v. Bomar

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided June 17, 1959.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1959-06-17

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“There seems to be a great misapprehension among prisoners in State penal institutions that a writ of habeas corpus in Federal Courts gives them an opportunity to have a general review of their original trials. This writ, powerful and important as it is, has its limitations. It is available to correct the denial of fundamental constitutional rights, but it may not be used to correct mere irregularities or errors of law. In other words, it may not be used as a substitute for error proceedings. This has been determined many times in this Court.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Allen v. Bannan

““The petitioner exhausted his remedy on appeal in the State courts of Tennessee, but he did not exhaust', the alternative remedy of habeas-corpus in those courts. * * * It is a well established rule of federal practice that such remedy must be exhausted as a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 224 F. Supp. 633 - Simmons v. Bomar

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Darr v. Burford · Ex Parte Hawk No - on Rule to Show Cause and Return · Johnson v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1959-06-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently March 1978

16 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

170195919601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Wilson Wooten, pro se.

¶2Henry C. Foutch, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief for appellee.

¶3*901Before McALLISTER and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, District Judge.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5This is an appeal from the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The appellant made application in that court for a writ of habeas corpus and was denied relief.

¶6The District Judge allowed the petitioner to appeal in forma pauperis, but denied his motion for a certificate of probable cause. For this reason counsel for appellee moved to dismiss. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Upon the authority of Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 77 S.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593, this motion is overruled.

¶7The petitioner seeks to raise a Federal question by reason of the admission of an alleged coerced confession into evidence at the trial.

¶8There seems to be a great misapprehension among prisoners in State penal institutions that a writ of habeas corpus in Federal Courts gives them an opportunity to have a general review of their original trials. This writ, powerful and important as it is, has its limitations. It is available to correct the denial of fundamental constitutional rights, but it may not be used to correct mere irregularities or errors of law. In other words, it may not be used as a substitute for error proceedings. This has been determined many times in this Court. Long v. Benson, 6 Cir., 140 F.2d 195; McCrea v. Jackson, 6 Cir., 148 F.2d 193; Plummer v. State of Ohio, 6 Cir., 195 F.2d 521; Bowman v. Alvis, 6 Cir., 224 F.2d 275; Anderson v. Bannan, 6 Cir., 250 F.2d 654.

¶9The petitioner herein had a review of his case in the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Wooten v. State of Tennessee, Tenn., 314 S.W.2d 1.

¶10According to the opinion of the Supreme Court, this question was passed on by the trial judge. The jury was excused, a hearing had on the question and a ruling made by the trial judge that the confession was voluntary and admissible. The Supreme Court sustained this ruling. It is, therefore, not a proper question to be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 78 S.Ct. 885, 2 L.Ed.2d 863.

¶11A further objection to this action in the federal courts is that the petitioner has not exhausted his remedies in the state courts.

¶12“An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.

¶13“An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

¶14The petitioner exhausted his remedy on appeal in the State courts of Tennessee, but he did not exhaust the alternative remedy of habeas corpus in those courts. Section 23-1801 et seq., Tennessee Code Annotated. It is a well established rule of federal practice that such remedy must be exhausted as a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572; Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761.

¶15For the reasons herein stated, the petitioner’s application was properly dismissed and the judgment of the District Court is hereby affirmed.

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