Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

267 Ga. 120

475 S.E.2d 907

96 FultonCountyD.Rep. 3382

Murphy v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided September 23, 1996

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1996-09-23

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“is legitimately a civil sanction and does not constitute punishment.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cisco v. State

Relies on State of Ga. v. Alford · Thorp v. State of Ga. · 219 Ga. App. 474 - Murphy v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1996-09-23

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently January 2013

15 state decisions

100199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Hines, Justice.

¶1We granted certiorari to consider whether a forfeiture proceeding under OCGA § 16-13-49 constitutes punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis under the Federal Constitution.1 We conclude that it does not.

¶2Civil forfeitures generally do not constitute punishment under *121the Double Jeopardy Clause. The federal test to be applied in assessing a forfeiture statute is two-fold. The first inquiry is whether the proceeding is intended to be criminal or civil. The second is whether, by clearest proof, the proceeding is so punitive in fact that it may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature despite the intent that it be so. United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. _ (116 SC 2135, 135 LE2d 549) (1996). It is plain that a forfeiture proceeding under OCGA § 16-13-49 is intended to be a civil action. See OCGA § 16-13-49 (b) (3), (o) (3), (p) (4), (v), (w); see also Thorp v. State of Ga., 264 Ga. 712 (450 SE2d 416) (1994); State of Ga. v. Alford, 264 Ga. 243, 244 (2) (444 SE2d 76) (1994). While it is true that the statute has punitive aspects, its purposes are remedial by its express terms. OCGA §. 16-13-49 (z). Property subject to forfeiture under the Code section is that which is declared to be contraband, including property or its proceeds used or intended for use to facilitate violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, monies found in close proximity to such property, and weapons used to facilitate felony violations of narcotics laws. OCGA § 16-13-49 (d). The statute serves the nonpunitive goals, among others, of rendering illegal behavior unprofitable, ensuring that persons do not profit from their illegal acts, and removing from circulation forbidden merchandise and firearms unlawfully used or intended for illegal use. Ursery, 518 U. S. at _ (slip op. at 12). The forfeiture proceeding under the statute is legitimately a civil sanction and does not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2

Decided September 23, 1996.

¶3Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

¶4 Michael Murphy was indicted for criminal attempt to commit violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The State initiated an in rem forfeiture proceeding under OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) naming Murphy as a probable claimant. The complaint was styled, “State of Georgia vs. Sixteen Thousand And Sixty Dollars in United States Currency ($16,060.00).” By consent order, Murphy forfeited $12,045. He then filed a motion to enjoin his criminal prosecution on the basis that he had already suffered penalty by the forfeiture, thus barring the criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s denial of the motion, concluding that the civil forfeiture was not a proceeding putting Murphy in jeopardy. Murphy v. State, 219 Ga. App. 474 (465 SE2d 497 ) (1995).

¶5 The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is not at issue.

/267/ga/120 · .json · Public domain