Shutt v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * in our review, we must also accommodate for possible unreasonableness of the fact finder’s verdict, otherwise our review would be but a sham and a useless exercise in futility. If the infer ence drawn by the trier of facts must rest upon speculation or conjecture, it cannot be drawn beyond a reasonable doubt, and we are required to set it aside. ‘It is not enough to sustain a conviction that the evidence, when given full faith and credit, may warrant a suspicion or amount to a scintilla.’ Baker v. State, (1956) 236 Ind. 55, 60 , 138 N.E.2d 641 .” Shutt v. State, (1977) Ind., 367 N.E.2d 1376, 1378 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. T.H. v. State of Indiana · Lynn v. State

2. ““It is not necessary for us to invade the exclusive province of the jury to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, because no reasonable man deliberating in the face of these established circumstances could exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, the hypothesis that the defendant was motivated by fear or anger, or both, when he struck the fatal blow. The inference of malice, therefore has been counterbalanced and reduced to a mere speculation. And if it is to rise again with sufficient force to stand as an inference or fact which could be found by a reasonable man, beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be supported by probative evidence aside from the use of the weapon itself.” Id., 267 Ind. at 130-131 , 367 N.E.2d at 1386 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. French v. State

3. ““If a sane man, without accident, justification, or any provocation, suddenly kill another, even a stranger, the act must be attributed to malice, because it could be accounted for upon no other hypothesis, based upon the laws governing the action of the mental and moral faculties of man. Such an act would evince a degree of depravity of heart, almost excluding the possibility of any higher moral feeling than malice against all mankind. But human experience will bear witness that provocation may excite a transport of passion, accompanied by a momentary intention to kill the dearest and most beloved friend, against whom no malice exists. And passion, upon sufficient provocation, tends to rebut the presumption of malice.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 177 Ind. App. 248 - Neff v. State