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267 S.W.2d 918

Polis v. Alford

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided May 5, 1954

Court of Appeals of Texas · decided 1954-05-05

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Judges are directed to cause, and attorneys and clerks are directed to use their efforts to cause all judgment, decisions, and orders of any kind to be reduced to writing and signed by the trial judge and the date of signing stated therein; but absence of any such showing shall not invalidate any judgment or order. “In determining the periods within which the various steps of an appeal must be taken, the date of rendition of a judgment or order shall be deemed to be the date upon which the written draft thereof was signed by the trial judge as stated therein.” (Emphasis added.) “This rule shall apply in determining the time within which to file a motion for new trial, notice of appeal, appeal bond or affidavit in lieu thereof, bills of exceptions, statements of fact in trial and appellate courts, transcript in appellate court, petition for writ of error if appeal is by writ of error, or other procedure in connection with appeal; but this rule shall not be construed as determining what constitutes rendition of a judgment or order in any other situation or for any other purpose. In event the date of signing of a judgment or order is not shown therein as required above, then the date of rendition shall be otherwise shown of record.””

quoted by 3 later decisions, including TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY v. Lane, Hedley Independent School District v. Doneghy

Relies on Bostwick v. Bucklin · Bostwick v. Bucklin

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1954-05-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently June 1997

15 state decisions

4019541960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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PER CURIAM.

¶1 The transcript and statement of facts were received by the Clerk of this Court on March 30, 1954. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the record was not filed within the time prescribed by Rule 386, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.- The question before us *919 ■relates to the date from which the sixty-day •period set forth in the rule mentioned •should be computed.

¶2 In reply to the motion to dismiss, appellant has submitted a supplemental transcript containing a corrected judgment.

¶3 The judgment contained in the original transcript recites that, “On this the 25th day -of January, A.D., 1954, came on to be heard upon regular setting and at a regular term •of this Court, the above styled and numbered cause for trial … It is indicated that such trial was had and concluded and judgment rendered on the day mentioned.

¶4 There appears below the judge’s signature to the judgment, this notation: “Entered: Feby. 3, 1954.”

¶5 This notation is not in substantial •compliance with Rule 306a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that when a judgment is “reduced to writing and signed by the trial judge and the date of signing stated therein”, such date may be taken as the date of rendition of judgment for the purpose of determining the periods within which the various steps of an appeal may be taken. The term “entered” is not synonymous with the word, “signed”, but has a definite fixed legal meaning and refers to the ministerial act of the clerk of a court in spreading the judgment upon the minutes. Bostwick v. Bucklin, 144 Tex. 375, 190 S.W.2d 818, and authorities therein cited.

¶6 However, the corrected judgment, contained in the tendered supplemental transcript, affirmatively shows by its recitals that such judgment was reduced to writing and signed by the trial .judge on February 3, 1954.

¶7 The corrected judgment is in substantial compliance with Rule 306a, and we have concluded to permit the filing of the supplemental transcript containing the same. As the commencement of the sixty-day period may pfoperly be computed from February 3, 1954, the date the judgment was reduced to writing and -signed by' the trial judge, the transcript and statement of facts-presented here on March 30,1954, was within the time prescribed by Rule 386, and the motion to dismiss is accordingly overruled.

¶8 Motion to file supplemental transcript granted.

¶9 Motion to dismiss appeal overruled.

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