Volume 267 — United States Reports

Held: that there was no cancellation as a matter of law, and that the stoppage of performance was an anticipatory breach. P. 15. 2. The Government’s right of cancellation, under the above statute, is continuing and not lost by delay in exercising it. P. 16. 3.

Held: (o) That New Mexico, upon her admission as a State, was bound by the previous recognition and adoption of the earlier location by the United States, her predecessor, and could' not be heard to disavow the boundary thus recognized. P. 41. (b) The effect of this recognition of the earlier location by the United States was not impaired by the temporary recognition of the later one by the General Land Office. Id. ...

Held: belonged to enemies. See Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 , 567; Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 , 245; Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51 , 56. Reporting to the President, February 22, 1919, (Senate Doc., vol. 8, pp. 9, 13) the Custodian said— “At the close of business on February 15, 1919, 35,400 reports of enemy property had been received.

Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), was a US Supreme Court case that held that the US President may pardon criminal contempt of court. Grossman had been convicted of criminal contempt but was pardoned by the President. The district court subsequently sent him back to prison.

Held: That the regulation is reasonable, and. within.the police power; it cannot be said to deprive the Insurance Company of property without due process of law. P. 129. (2) That it does not conflict with the Bankruptcy Act by providing for an unlawful preference. P. 130. 198 N. Y. S. 949 affirmed. ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of New.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that upheld the warrantless searches of an automobile, which is known as the automobile exception. The case has also been cited as widening the scope of search.

Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the application of ex post facto in the case where an object was legally purchased and possessed, but was then later banned by statute.

Held: that where a vessel is so. libeled, the penalty is $1,000, neither more nor less, for each alien landing from it in violation of the section. P. 221. Question certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals, in a ibel for violation of the Immigration-Act. See 292 Fed. 016 .

Held: is that where the evidence is undisputed, or of such conclusive character'that if a verdict were returned for one party, whether plaintiff or defendant, it would have to be set .aside in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, a verdict may and should be directed for-the other party.

Held: a demise; and that thé'United' States was. not entitled to make deductions from the owner’s monthly bills for loss of service caused by short crews, ill condition, delay in taking on supplies, and by the sinking of one of the boats, which was raised and repaired by the owner. P. 286. 68 Ct. Clms. 497, affirmed.

Held: That the war with Germany had ceased prior to October 30, 1919, and the purpose of the President’s order then issued was to meet an emergency incident to the miners’ strike — not to provide for the efficient, prosecution of the war. Also that seizure and use of the coal by the Director General ■rendered the United States liable for just compensation, measured by market value. And, further, that the.

George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Malloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the state statute under which the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) issued certificates of public convenience and necessity to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

Held: not to involve the jurisdiction of the District Court as a federal court, and not appealable directly to this Court, but to the Circuit Court of Appeals. P. 328. 3. When the District Court lacks jurisdiction as a federal court it is without power to impose costs on the plaintiff. P. 330. 292 Fed. 876 , returned to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Held: (а) That the defendant corporation did not thereby do business in North Carolina so as to be present there and suable in the federal court. P. 334.

Held: that the claimant had no cause of action to 'recover this amount from the United States under the Tucker Act, since the United States was under no express contract to pay the claimant and none was to be implied in fact. P. 340. 3.

Held: that a claim' of the railroad under § 3 of the Federal Control Act for a deficit in operating income, etc., previously incurred under federal control, was settled and released by the contract, and that allegations in. the company’s petition denying .this effect and intention were mere conclusions of law, not admitted by demurrer. P. 348. 2.

Held: That the preferred right of Creek citizens to inherit Creek allotted-lands applies not only to inheritance immediately from the original allottee but also in subsequent stages of devolution, so that where, .-an allotment made originally in the names of deceased Creek freed- , inen was inherited from -them by an heir .who was a Creek citizen,, upon her death it descended to her more remote kindred, who were Creek…

Held: (assuming.that the title passed,, establishing the relation of debtor and creditor,) that the purpose and'effect of-the special accounts were to' provide security for the United' States and that an equitable lien upon them existed in its favor, although not expressly reserved in the agreement. P. 393: 3.

Held: on these facts, that the United States was not entitled to priority of satisfaction out of the partnership assets, since the Act merely gave it priority,of, pay *413 ment out of the property of its debtor, and the rule was too well settled to be questioned that his interest in the partnership property was his share in the surplus after the partnership debts were paid, and that such surplus only was liable for his…

Held: that an agricultural lessee was not entitled under the act to compel a sale of the land covered by his lease in order that he might purchase it; and that the State was authorized, finding the tract valuable for oil and gas, to execute an oil and gas lease to other parties,,subject to the surface rights, of the agricultural lessee. Act of June 16, 1906, §§ 8, 10, c. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 .

Held: that § 4 is constitutional, since its purpose is merely to make more effective the regulation of § 3 and it applies only where the act of storing, concealing, etc., is a final step in the use of interstate (or foreign) transportation to promote the scheme of unlawfully disposing of the stolen vehicle and of withholding it from its owner. P. 439. 3.

Held: where the Government, having sold silk to'the claimant, did not ship it promptly, owing to an embargo placed on freight shipments of silk by the United States Railroad Administration, so that the claimant lost his' opportunity to resell at a profit. 58 Ct. Cls, 189, affirmed. *459 Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition upon demurrer. Mr. Raymond M. Hudson for appellant.

Held: That, where the contestee relinquished and the contestant made her homestead application within the time allowed and later died, her heirs were entitled, in prosecuting the application, to preference .over a stranger to the contest whose homestead application was made on the same day as the decedent’s.' P. 476'. 2.

Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a state may attach such conditions to a law license regarding whatever matters it believes to be necessary in order to make it a public good.