268 Mich. App. 440 - People v. Cox’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of my colleagues. The prosecutor withheld highly relevant exculpatory evidence that negated an element of the charged offenses. This evidence certainly would have affected the outcome of defendant’s trial. Accordingly, I would vacate defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial. Defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for engaging in sexual acts with a mentally incapable young man. Such conduct is prohibited to protect those “presumed to be incapable of truly consenting to the sexual act.” The complainant in this case was seventeen years old and, therefore, was otherwise able to engage in consensual sexual acts. During discovery, defendant requested from the prosecutor all potentially exculpatory information and the criminal history of all prosecution witnesses. Rather than make all the requested disclosures, the prosecutor indicated that the criminal history of the witnesses would only be provided upon court order. It was not until the week before sentencing that defense counsel learned that the complainant, who was allegedly mentally incapable of consenting to a sexual act, was mentally competent to enter a plea in an unrelated criminal action. Although the evidence involves the criminal history of a witness, the evidence is also clearly exculpatory and should have been disclosed by the prosecutor. A prosecutor, upon request, must provide a defendant with any known exculpatory i”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 698 F. Supp. 2d 918 - Cox v. Curtin

2. “Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of a discovery violation and suppression of evidence that the victim pleaded to a larceny charge, or, in the alternative, on the basis of the victim’s plea characterized as newly discovered evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that the fact that the victim entered a plea would have rebutted the prosecution’s theory that the victim was mentally incapable of consenting to sexual relations on the basis that a defendant must be deemed competent in order for a trial court to accept a plea. See People v. Kline, 113 Mich.App. 733, 738 , 318 N.W.2d 510 (1982). We note that the record contains no substantiated information regarding the victim’s plea other than that placed on the record at defendant’s sentencing hearing. Aside from the prosecutor’s unverified indication that the plea was to a charge of larceny involving less than $200, MCL 750.356a(2)(a), the record is devoid of information concerning the date of the plea, the charge or charges at issue, and whether it was a guilty plea or a no contest plea. The record indicates that at defendant’s sentencing hearing the trial court denied defendant’s motion to adjourn so that defense counsel could prepare a motion for a mistrial and advised defendant that the appropriate forum in which to address the issue was a motion for a new trial; however, defendant failed to preserve the issue by moving for a new trial in the lower court under MCR 2.611(A)(1)(f) or by movi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 698 F. Supp. 2d 918 - Cox v. Curtin

3. “Defendant next alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. We review de novo claims of prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v. Ackerman, 257 Mich.App. 434, 448 , 669 N.W.2d 818 (2003). However, defendant failed to object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct; therefore, they are unpreserved and our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Id. When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v. Callon, 256 Mich.App. 312, 330 , 662 N.W.2d 501 (2003). Further, the propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks depends on the particular facts of each case. Id. Prosecutors are free to argue the evidence and any reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, id., and “need not confine argument to the ‘blandest of all possible terms ....’” People v. Aldrich, 246 Mich.App. 101, 112 , 631 N.W.2d 67 (2001), quoting People v. Marji, 180 Mich.App. 525, 538 , 447 N.W.2d 835 (1989). Defendant argues that the following comments improperly appealed to the jurors’ civic duty and impermissibly denigrated his character: It’s the People’s theory that the Defendant is 30 years old, likes young boys, grooms them, manipulates them, does things in order to take advantage of them. * * * He’s one of the worst type of predators we have in our society; somebody who takes advantage of so”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 698 F. Supp. 2d 918 - Cox v. Curtin