State v. Hass’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The defendant, according to the prosecution, was standing within a few feet of the vehicle in which the witness and others were seated, pointing a rifle directly at them, and discussing the possibility of blowing their heads off. It should be no surprise to anyone if they were terrorized or considered themselves menaced. That is all that the law requires. Threats may be made by innuendo and the circumstances may be taken into account in deciding whether the words used constitute a threat.... “As we said in State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 654 (N.D.1976), “ ‘No precise words are necessary to convey a threat. It may be bluntly spoken, or done by innuendo or suggestion. ... A threat often takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it is spoken and words that are innocuous in themselves may take on a sinister meaning in the context in which they are recited_’” [Citations omitted.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Norton · State v. Zeno

2. ““No precise words are necessary to convey a threat. It may be bluntly spoken, or done by innuendo or suggestion. In re Burke, 9 O.C.D. 350 , 17 Cr.Ct.R., N.S., 315 (1899). A threat often takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it is spoken and words that are innocuous in themselves may take on a sinister meaning in the context in which they are recited.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Norton · State v. Gefroh

3. ““We believe that in certain instances the prosecutors and the courts should give serious thought to forego use of the same criminal act as a basis for both an independent prosecution for a substantive crime and as a basis for a revocation of probation or parole or sentencing a defendant who has been granted a deferred imposition of sentence. If, in all probability, the resulting sentences after revocation and conviction of a substantive crime will run concurrently or will not be materially increased, then the revocation proceedings should be delayed until after the substantive-crime violation has been disposed of, at which time it may be determined that it will not be necessary to conduct a revocation proceeding.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Gefroh