Volume 268 — New York Reports

Plaintiff failed to establish negligence on the part of defendant, and the verdict on such issue is without evidence to support it. (Giménez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390; Glenn v. Oakdale Contracting Co., 257 N. Y. 497; Schmidt v. City of New York, 179 App. Div. 667; Zotto v. Merkel Bros., Inc., 229 App.

The discretion exercised by the Surrogate was not subject to review by the Appellate Division unless it found that there was an abuse of discretion. (Matter of Staiger, 249 N. Y. 229; Matter of' Selleck, 111 N. Y. 284; Day v. Donahue, 62 N. J. L. 380; People v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 418.) The Surrogate properly exercised the discretion reposed in him by section 278 of the Surrogate’s Court Act.

The moving papers fail to show a clear legal right to an order of mandamus. (Matter of Meehan v. Flaherty, 119 App. Div. 128; Chian verini v. Murray, 237 App. Div. 856; Walsh v. Patterson, 239 App. Div. 757; People ex rel., Hannan v. Board of Health, 153 N. Y. 513.) Section 25 of the Civil Service Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 7) is not intended to be enforceable in reference to non-competitive positions or those in the labor class.

The trial court had jurisdiction to take testimony of every fact and circumstance, including physical damage, affecting the market value of claimant’s remaining property resulting from the proper use for which the parcel was acquired, and to which it was put. (Matter of Rapid Transit R. R. Commrs. [Joralemon Si.], 197 N. Y. 81; Matter of City of New York [Lafayette Ave.], 118 Mise, Rep. 161; Evelyn Building Corp. v. City of New York. 257 N. Y. 501; South Buffalo Ry.

Plaintiffs’ actions to remove as clouds on title the quitclaim deeds were the proper and the only remedy for the plaintiffs to obtain redress for the deprivation of their riparian rights. (Remington Paper Go. v. O’Dougherty, 81 N. Y. 474; Ward v. Dewey, 16 N. Y. 519; Crooke v. Andrews, 40 N. Y. 547; Radcliff v. Rowley, 2 Barb. Ch. 23; Shaw v. Dwight, 27 N. Y. 244.) Riparian rights were possessed by the plaintiffs as upland owners.

<p>The act creating the Buffalo Sewer Authority violates the provisions of section 10 of- article 8 of the State Constitution in that it attempts by indirection to permit the bonded indebtedness of the properties of the city of Buffalo to exceed ten per cent of the assessed valuation thereof. (Newell v. People ex rel. Phelps, 7 N. Y. 9; Kenwell v. Lee, 261 N. Y. 113; People ex rel. Town of Pelham v. Village of Pelham, 215 N. Y. 374.) The statute is in direct violation of section 6 of article 1 of the State Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives the city of Buffalo of its property without due process of law and without just compensation. (People ex rel. Rodgers v. Color, 166 N. Y. 1; People ex rel. Yost v. Becker, 203 N. Y. 201.) The statute is unconstitutional for the reason that it violates section 2 of article 12 of the State Constitution. (Matter of Mayor of New York [Elm St], 246 N. Y. 72; City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429; Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96.) The city of Buffalo is deprived of the privilege of referendum as provided by section 412 of the city charter. (Local Law, No. 4,1927; Local Laws, 1932, p. 21.)</p> <p>Chapter 349 of the Laws of 1935 was not adopted in contravention of the provisions of section 2 of article 12 of the State Constitution. (Browne v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 96; Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110; Matter of McAneny, 232 N. Y. 377; Tenement House Department v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325; 203 U. S. 583; Health Department v. Rector of Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32; People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533; McGrath v. Grout, 171 N. Y. 7; Adler v. Deegan, 251 N. Y. 467; City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429; Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661.) The act does not affect the property, affairs or government of the city of Buffalo. (People ex rel. Simon v. Bradley, 207 N. Y. 592; Matter of Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 309; People ex rel. Central Trust Co. v. Prender-gast, 202 N. Y. 188; People v. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 202; People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; City of Worcester v. Worcester Con. St. Ry. Co., 196 U. S. 539; City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U. S. 394; MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 187 N. Y. 37.) The provisions of the act do not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution or section 6 of article 1 of the State Constitution. (City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429; Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N. Y. 164; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 322; Proprietors of Mt. Nope Cemetery v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 509; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 TJ. S. 161; Carson v. Brockton Sewerage Comm., 182 TJ. S. 398; Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 TJ. S. 516; Valley Farms Co. v. County of Westchester, 261 TJ. S. 155; Matter of Bronx Parkway Comm. v. Hylan, 119 Mise. Rep. 785; 206 App. Div. 688; 236 N. Y. 593.) The issuance of obligations by the Authority will not be in contravention of section 10 of article 8 of the State Constitution. (People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 528; Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661; Matter of McAneny, 198 App. Div. 205 ; 232 N. Y. 377; Matter of Bronx Parkway Comm. v. Hylan, 119 Mise. Rep. 785; 236 Y. 593; Smith v. Havens Relief Fund Society, 44 Mise. Rep. 594; 190 N. Y. 557; People ex rel. Simon v. Bradley, 207 N. Y. 592; Adams v. E. R. S. Institution, 136 N. Y. 52; Levy v. McClellan, 196 N. Y. 178; People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401.) No constitutional guaranty of the privilege of a referendum has been violated. (City Home Rule Law, § 21, subd. 2; Cons. Laws, ch. 76; Laws of 1933, ch. 782.)</p> <p>The Legislature had the constitutional power to create the Buffalo Sewer Authority. (Matter of Thirty-fourth St. R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 343; People ex rel. Simon v. Bradley, 207 N. Y. 592; People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; People v. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 202; People ex rel. Morrill v. Supervisors, 112 N. Y. 585; Matter of McAneny, 232 N. Y. 377; Astor v. Mayor of New York, 62 N. Y. 567; Matter of Bronx Parkway Comm. v. Hylan, 119 Mise. Rep. 785; 206 App. Div. 688; 236 N. Y. 593; People ex rel. Bd. of Commrs. v. Supervisors of Oneida County, 170 N. Y. 105; People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532.) The city of Buffalo will not become indebted within the meaning of section 10 of article 8 of the State Constitution by the issuance of bonds by the Buffalo Sewer Authority pursuant to chapter 349 of the Laws of 1935. (Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Penn. St. 65; Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544; Department of Water & Power v. Vroman, 218 Cal. 206; California Toll Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212 Cal. 298; California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7; State v. Regents of University of New Mexico, 32 N. M. 428; State ex rel. Kaufman v. Davis, 59 N. D. 191; Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222; Baker v. Carter, 165 Okla. 116; Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors, 176 La. 825; State v. Regents of University System of Georgia, 175 S. E. Rep. '567; Board of Regents of University of Arizona v. Sullivan, 42 Pac. Rep. [2d] 619; Silkman v. Board of Water Commrs., 152 N. Y. 327; New York University v. American Book Co., 197 N. Y. 294; Kleinstein v. Gonsky, 134 App. Div. 266.)</p>

<p>The defendant’s sole duty in the premises was to comply with the orders of the Public Service Commission. (Matter of Grade Crossings [N. Y. C. R. R. Co.}, 255 N. Y. 320; Matter of Grade Crossing Elitnination Act \Altamont], 234 App. Div. 129; Matter of International Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm,., 226 N. Y. 474.)</p> <p>The Legislature by section 53 of the Railroad Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 49) did not delegate to the Public Service Commission authority to permit the defendant to obstruct the public highway by erecting and maintaining in the center thereof its flashing highway crossing signal. (Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 224 N. Y. 60; Town of Albion v. Ryan, 201 App. Div. 717; Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City of New York, 199 App. Div. 315; Town of Waterford v. Brockett Lumber Co., 227 App. Div. 422; People ex rel. N. Y. R. Co. v. Public, Service Comm., 223 N. Y. 373; People ex rel. Municipal Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 224 N. Y. 156; McAneny v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 238 N. Y. 122; People ex rel. P. S. I. Transportation Co. v. Publis Service Comm., 262 N. Y. 39; Lantry v. Mede, 127 App. Div. 557; 194 N. Y. 544; State Board of Pharmacy v. Gasau, 195 N. Y. 197; Daly v. Haight, 170 App. Div. 469; 224 N. Y. 726; Matter of N. Y..& H. B. B. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; Psota v. L. I. B. B. Co., 246 N. Y. 388; Tinker v. N. Y., O. & W. B. B. Co., 157 N. Y. 312; Garvey v. L. I. B. B. Co., 159 N. Y. 323; Delaware, L. & W. B. B. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 158 N. Y. 266; United States v. Fischer, 2 Cranch, 358; People ex rel. City of New York v. N. Y. C. B. B. Co., 217 N. Y. 310.) The defendant was not relieved from the duty of properly lighting or otherwise illuminating the obstruction so that travelers lawfully using the highway might be warned of its existence. The question was one of fact for the jury and the jury has found the defendant negligent. (O’ Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N. Y. 423; Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 224 N. Y. 60; City of Mt. Vernon v. N. Y., N. H & H. B. B. Co., 232 N. Y. 309; Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360; Bailey v. Bell Telephone Co., 147 App. Div. 224; Gale v. N. Y. C. & H. B. B. B. Co., 76 N. Y. 594; McKinney v. N. Y. C. & H. B. B. B. Co., 66 App. Div. 207; 174 N. Y. 516; Delaware, L. & W. B. B. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 158 N. Y. 266; Stern v. International By. Co., 220 N. Y. 284; West v. City of New York, 265 N. Y. 139; Klepper v. Seymour House Corp., 246 N. Y. 85; Vande-waier v. N. Y. & N. E. B. B. Co., 135 N. Y. 583; Spitzer v. N. Y. C. B. B. Co., 211 App. Div. 332; Harriman v. N. Y. C. & St. L. B. B. Co., 253 N. Y. 398; Taylor v. City of Albany, 239 App. Div. 217; 264 N. Y. 539; Weis v. L. I. B. B. Co., 235 App. Div. 253.)</p>

<p>The amended bills in the nature of bills of interpleader fail to state a cause of action and are insufficient as a matter of law, since it appears that a prerequisite of such bills, viz., “ an independent ground for equitable relief,” is not present. (Dorn v. Fox, 61 N. Y. 264; Mohawk R. R. Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige, 384; Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538; Empire Engineering Corp. v. Mack, 217 N. Y. 85; McClellan v. Carland, 217 S. 268; Leavitt v. Dabney, 30 N. Y. Super. Ct. 350; Manning v. Manning, 1 Johns. Ch. 527; Johnson v. Crook, 12 Ch. Div. 639; Pouch v. Prudential Ins. Co., 204 N.Y. 281; Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382; Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74.) A trustee in bankruptcy may not be sued without the permission of the bankruptcy court. The pleadings herein exceed the permission granted and the court is, therefore, without jurisdiction. (Foss v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 Fed. Rep. [2d] 969; Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268.) The pleadings herein would raise issues triable without a jury; since the appellant trustee is entitled to a trial by jury the pleadings fail to state a cause of action. (Fass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 Fed. Rep. [2d] 969; Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U. S. 92; Clark v. Mosher, 107 N. Y. 118; Strauss & Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 203 App. Div. 361; Epstein v. Rockville Center Improvement Co., 164 App. Div. 177; Harrison v. Loeser & Co., 164 App. Div. 115; Empire Engineering Corp. v. Mack, 217 N. Y. 85.) The situation in which respondents find themselves results from their own actions, and a court of equity should not assist them to escape the consequences of their acts. (Cromwell v. American Loan & Trust Co., 57 Hun, 149; Irving Trust Co. v. Marine Midland Bank, 47 Fed. Rep. [2d] 907; Sherman Nat. Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. Rep. 256.)</p> <p>The fact that the stock, title to which was in dispute, was converted into cash pursuant to appellant’s written agreement that the sale was “ without prejudice ” cannot operate to destroy respondents’ right to equitable relief conceded to exist but for the sale. (Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N. Y. 326; Sherman Nat. Bank v. Shubert ■ Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. Rep. 256.) The facts stated in the amended pleading, which are identical with the facts upon which interpleader was allowed, are sufficient to authorize the maintenance of a bill in the nature of interpleader within the broad equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Sherman Nat. Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. Rep. 256; Irving Trust Co. v. Marine Midland Bank, 47 Fed. Rep. [2d] 907; Board of Supervisors v. Deyoe, 77 N. Y. 219; .Pouch v. Prudential Ins. Go., 204 N. Y. 281; Burns v. Lopez, 256 N. Y. 123; North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596; Schwarz v. Harris, 206 Fed. Rep. 936; Brown v. Pegram, 149 Fed. Rep. 515; Harris y. Be Paulina, 40 Ohio App. 57; Foss y. First Nat. Bank, 3 Fed. Rep. 185; Bissell y. Foss, 114 TJ. S. 252; Croshy y. Sproul, 17 Fed. Rep. [2d] 325; 22 Fed. Rep. [2d] 611; Royal Trust Co. y. Gardiner, 44 App. D. C. 570.) The amended pleading discloses an independent ground for equitable relief in addition to jeopardy of treble recovery and multiplicity of suits. (North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. y. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 TJ. S. 596; Peering y. Schreyer, 171 N. Y. 451; Lovett y. City of New York, 128 App. Div. 157.)</p>

The taken by the county to acquire the property for highway purposes was in conformity with statutory requirements. (Cons. Laws, ch. 25, §§ 148-150; Matter of Public Service Comm., 217 N. Y. 61; People v. Adirondack By. Co., 160 N. Y. 225; Matter of City of Buffalo, 189 N. Y. 163; People ex rel. Herrick v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Matter of Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60; People ex rel. Horten v. Prendergast, 248 N. Y. 215; Matter of City of Utica, 134 Mise.

The statements in the applications, being warranties, and having been shown on plaintiff’s proof to be false, the plaintiff cannot recover. (King v. Tioga County, 35 App. Div. 58; Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 243 N. Y. 385; Foot v. Mtna Life Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 571; Barteau v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.

The Municipal Court of the City of New York is a single court and under section 13 of the Civil Service Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 7) only “ one clerk and one deputy clerk ” of each court is in the statutory exempt class. (Matter of Meahl v. Ordway, 98 Mise. Rep. 394; Worthington v. London G. & A. Co., 164 N. Y. 81; Matter of Levy, 192 App. Div. 550; Degnon v. Cook & Wilson, 98 Mise. Rep. 251; Ress v. Gurinsky, 80 Mise.

Since the charges against the petitioner were adequate on their face and the procedure prescribed by law for the removal of the petitioner was followed by the defendant, the Appellate Division was without power to review the sufficiency of the evidence or the severity of the punishment prescribed by the defendant. {People ex rél. Kennedy v. Brady, 166 N. Y. 44; Matter of Brandt v. Cheshire, 239 App. Div. 845; Matter of Rosengarten v. Knapp, 236 App. Div. 743; People ex rel.

Assuming that the party to whom the overhead was to be “ satisfactory ” was the other party to the contract, nevertheless this provision of the contract was not illegal but valid, meant precisely what it said, and required that the other party be satisfied in fact as distinguished from what the referee might conclude it should reasonably have been satisfied with.

The Town Board had no authority to include the amount of outstanding certificates of indebtedness under “ estimated revenues ” in the 1934 tax levy. (L. 1933, ch. 96.) Paragraph b of subdivision 2 of section 112 of the Town Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 62), as construed by the Appellate Division, is invalid. (Dane v. Jackson, 256 U. S. 589; County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 Fed.

<p>There was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. (Hammond v. Hammond, 227 App. Div. 336; Demjanik v. Kultau, 242 App. Div. 255; Burkes v. Lieberman, 218 App. Div. 600; 245 N. Y. 579; Brianzi v. Crane Co., 196 App. Div. 58; White v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 220 N. Y. 131; Wicks v. Cowperthwait Co., 203 App. Div. 705; Ruppert v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 154 N. Y. 90.)</p> <p>There was ample evidence of negligence. (Bennett v. Edward, 239 App. Div. 157; Bolton v. Madsen, 205 App. Div. 180; Clark v. Traver, 205 App. Div. 206.)</p>

<p>The Mayor is given express statutory power of removal and a court is without authority to interfere with that power. (People ex rel. Jones v. Sherman, 66 App. Div. 235; People ex rel. Nichols v. Mayor, 19 Hun, 442; People ex rel. Burby v. Common Council, 85 Hun, 601; People ex rel. Shannon v. Magee, 55 App. Div. 195; People ex rel. Miller v. Ehnendorf, 57 App. Div. 340; People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582; People ex rel. Deal v. Williams, 51 App. Div. 102.) The Mayor’s jurisdiction is exclusive and there is no legal provision for calling in a substitute so that by his not acting it would prevent absolutely a determination of the proceeding. (Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Penn. St. 170; Matter of Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39; People ex rel. Shannon v. Magee, 55 App. Div. 195; Matter of Dunphy v. Kingsbury, 173 App. Div. 49.) The power of appointment carries with it the power of removal. (Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52; Matter of Shatter v. Moses, 266 N. Y. 413.) The President of the Common Council is without jurisdiction or authority to hear the charges and any determination made by him would be a nullity. (People ex rel. Liberty v. Cooke, 188 App. Div. 351; 229 N. Y. 613.)</p> <p>Section 20 of the city charter (L. 1911, ch. 870) clearly provides for a trial. (People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582.) The city charter provides for a hearing before the President of the Common Council. (People ex rel. Liberty v. Cooke, 188 App. Div. 351; 229 N. Y. 613.) The order of prohibition was proper. (People ex rel. 'Childs v. Extraordinary Trial Term, 228 1ST. Y. 463.) The rule that the Mayor has the sole power of removal only applies where there is no other person or officer qualified to act. (People ex rel. Hayes v. Waldo, 212 N. Y. 156; People ex rel. Pond v. Trustees, 4 App. Div. 399; People ex rel. Miller v. Ehnendorf, 57 App. Div. 340; 168 N. Y. 675; Wilcox v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 210 N. Y. 370.)</p>

The counterclaim, also pleaded as the second defense in defendant-respondent’s amended answer, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Matter of Burke, 191 N. Y. 437; Moore v. Eadie, 245 N. Y. 166.) The counterclaim as pleaded sets forth a good cause of action. (Flanson Realty Cory. v. Workers’ Unity House, Inc., 229 App. Div. 179; Matter of Burke, 191 N. Y. 437; Moore v. Eadie, 245 N. Y. 166; Matter of Fenster, 234 App.

Chapter 815 of the Laws of 1933 is invalid it is a special local law in its effect relating to the property, affairs or government of a specific city, and was not adopted in conformity with the provisions of section 2 of article XII of the New York Constitution. (People ex rel.

The contract of guaranty should be given a reasonable interpretation and all the provisions thereof should be given full effect and this can be done only by construing the power to revoke as terminating the continuing nature of the guaranty and preventing the guaranty applying to any new indebtedness, but not to the indebtedness already incurred, including “ renewals ” or “ extensions of time of payment of the then existing indebtedness.

<p>Section 278 of the Tax Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 60) is inapplicable in an action on a promissory note. (Cooper v. Gossett, 143 Mise. Rep. 165; 237 App. Div. 700; 263 N. Y. 491; Matter of Wylly, 210 Fed. Rep. 954; Bean v. Flint, 138 App°. Div. 846; Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379; Ambrosius v. Ambrosius, 167 App. Div. 244; People v. Levin, 119 App. Div. 233; People v. Hadden, 3 Den. 220; McManus v. Gavin, 77 N. Y. 36; Barron v. People, 1 N. Y. 386; Saxe v. Peck, 139 App. Div. 419.) Section 278 of the Tax Law is penal in its nature and hence is to be strictly construed. (Bose v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 167 App. Div. 691; Johnston v. Auburn & Syracuse Electric R. R. Co., 169 App. Div. 864; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; McCarthy v. International Ry. Co., 126 App. Div. 182.)</p> <p>Section 278 of the Tax Law, when pleaded, prevents a recovery in an action upon contract where the consideration is a stock transfer on which no tax has been paid. {Sheridan v. Tucker, 145 App. Div. 145; Phillips v. Grossman, 76 Mise. Rep. 497; Bean v. Flint, 204 N. Y. 153.) The statute is applicable in actions upon notes as well as in actions upon simple contract, where the facts appear and are pleaded. {Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N. Y. 392; Coral Gables, Inc., v. Mayer, 241 App. Div. 340; Bay Parkway Nat. Bank v. Shalon, 146 Mise. Rep. 431; Hoff ay v. Hershenstein, 232 App. Div. 149; Abrahamson v. Steele, 176 App. Div. 865; Bruyn v. Russell, 52 Hun, 17; 60 Hun, 280; Blanshan v. Russell, 32 App. Div. 103; Lincoln v. French, 105 U. S. 614; Matter of Matthews, 143 App. Div. 562.)</p>

<p>The complaint states a good cause of action. (Great Northern By. Co. v. Sunburst Co., 287 TJ. S. 358; Piper v. Hoard, 107 N. Y. 73; People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1; Fisher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 644; Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N. Y. 271; Murphy v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 225 N. Y. 548; Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156; Davidson v. Madison Corp., 231 App. Div. 421; 257 N. Y. 120; Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y. 186; Matter of Lawrence v. Village of Mamaroneck, 263 N. Y. 455; Cleveland v. Town of Lancaster, 239 App. Div. 263; 264 N. Y. 568; Barnet v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 222 N. Y. 195; Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N. Y. 244; People ex rel. D. & H. Co. v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1; People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N. Y. 86; Matter of Staten Island Edison Corp. v. P. S. Comm., 263 N. Y. 209; Matter of City of New York v. Prendergast, 202 App. Div. 308.) Where the question is one of unreasonable rates, initial determination by the Public Service Commission of such unreasonable ness is a necessary condition precedent to the commencement of an action at law to recover the overcharge. (Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Robinson v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 506; Murphy v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 225 N. Y. 548; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. La'Due, 128 App. Div. 594; Metzger v. New York State Rys., 168 App. Div. 187; Murray v. New York Tel. Co., 170 App. Div. 17; 226 N. Y. 590; City of New York v. New York Edison Co., 196 App. Div. 644; Erie R. R. Co. v. Kieser & Son Co., 216 App. Div. 500; Hunter, Inc., y. N. Y., N. H. H. R. R. Co., 97 Mise. Rep. 26; 179 App. Div. 52.) In the absence of a definite statutory procedure for the fixing and enforcement of reparation, the common law action survives. Jurisdiction may not be defeated or taken away by implication. Jurisdiction was not taken from the courts, but preliminary jurisdiction was in the first instance granted to the Public Service Commission to decide solely whether or not the rate was unreasonable. {Murray v. New York Tel. Co., 170 App. Div. 17; 226 N. Y. 590; Metzger v. New York State Bys., 168 App. Div. 187; City of New York v. New York Edison Co., 196 App. Div. 644; Hunter, Inc., v. N. Y., N. H. A H. B. B. Co., 97 Mise. Rep. 26; 179 App. Div. 52; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. B. Co., 236 U. S. 412; Oppen-heim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Guttag Corp., 265 N. Y. 292; Louisville A N. R. Co. v, Sloss-Sheffield S. A I. Co., 295 Fed. Rep. 53; Murphy v. N. Y. C. B. R. Co., 225 N. Y. 548; Ives v. Buffalo By. Co., 201 N. Y. 271; Matter of Grandview Dairy, Inc., v. Baldwin, 239 App. Div. 640; Al Baschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N. Y. 1.)</p> <p>The common law cause of action for the recovery of unreasonable charges collected by a carrier has been abrogated and supplanted by the provisions of the statute known as the Public Service Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 48). {Murphy v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 225 N. Y. 548; People ex rel. City of New York v. Nixon, 229 N. Y. 356; Matter of Dry Dock R. B. Co., 254 N. Y> 305; P. B. B. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U, S. 184; Texas A Pacific By. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Robinson v. B. A 0. R. R. Co., 222 TT. S. 506; Gurney Heater Co. v. N. Y., N. H. A H. B. R. Co., 264 Mass. 427; St. Paul Book A Stationery Co. v. Paul Gas Light Co., 130 Minn. 71; B. A O. R. B. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 IT. S. 481; B. A O. B. R. Co. v. La Due, 128 App. Div. 594; P. R. B. Co. v. Titus, 216 N. Y. 17; Texas A Pacific By. y. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; N. Y. C. <& H. B. B, B. Co, v. Shelmidine, 91 Mise. Rep. 226; Onondaga G. & C. Club v. Bailroad Co., 96 Mise. Rep. 213; N. Y. C. & H. B. B. B, Co. v. Smith, 62 Mise. Rep. 526; People ex rel. New York Steam Co. v. Straus, 186 App. Div. 787; 226 N. Y. 704.) The common law cause of action thus abrogated is not revived by the act of the Public Service Commission in declaring the filed tariff unreasonable and fixing a new rate for the future. (Murphy v. N. Y. C. B. B. Co., 170 App. Div. 788; 225 N. Y. 548; B. & O. B. B. Co. v. La Due, 128 App. Div. 594; P. B. B. Co. v. Titus, 216 N. Y. 17; Texas & Pacific By. v. Mugg, 202 TJ. S. 242; P. B. B. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184; Loomis v. Lehigh Valley B. B. Co., 208 N. Y. 312; Texas & Pacific By. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Gurney Heater Co. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. B. B. Co., 264 Mass. 427.)</p>

<p>The Statute of Frauds of the State of New York does not apply to plaintiff’s contract. (Deutsch v. Textile Waste Mfg. Co., 212 App. Div. 681; Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N. Y. 314; Goldstein v. Scott, 76 App. Div. 78; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz, 247 N. Y. 465; Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538; Fish v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 211 N. Y. 374.) The contract is not invalid under the common law of the State of New York. (Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379.) The written contracts are complete. (Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N. Y. 209; Deutsch v. Textile Waste Mfg. Co., 212 App. Div. 681.)</p> <p>The alleged contract purporting to provide for the sale of personal property of the value of more than fifty dollars over a period of five years is void and unenforceable, because the letter is not pleaded as a note or memorandum, and is not a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. (Personal Property Law; Cons. Laws, ch. 41, §§ 31, 85; Richardson v, Gregory, 219 App, Div. 211; 245 N. Y. 540; Richardson Press v. Vandergrift, 165 App. Div. 180; Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315; Brown v. N. Y. B. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 79; Franke v. Hewitt, 56 App. Div. 497; Savage v. Weigel, 128 Mise. Rep. 618; Poel y. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N. Y. 310; Schaefer v. Alvarez, 249 N. Y. 117; Ansorge v. Kane, 244 N. Y. 395.) The Statute of Frauds of the State of New York is applicable to the alleged contract. (Dung y. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494; Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379; Matthews v. Matthews, 154 N. Y. 288; Steinhart, 217 N. Y. 549; Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co., 8 Fed. Rep. [2d] 601; Daniels v. Rogers, 108 App. Div. 338; Duncan v. Wohl, South & Co., 201 App. Div. '737; Dearing v. McKinnon Dash & Hardware Co., 165 N. Y. 78; Taylor Co. v. Fansteel, 234 App. Div. 548; 261 N. Y. 514; Dow v. Way, 64 Barb. 255; Crawford v. Morrell, 8 Johns. 253.) Plaintiff failed to plead the Belgian law. (Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N. Y. 41; Cahill Iron Works v. Pemberton, 30 Abb. Pr. [N. C.] 450; Crash-ley v. Press Pub. Co., 179 N. Y. 27; Savage v. O’Neil, 44 N. Y. 298; Smith v. Compañía, 127 Mise. Rep. 508; 220 App. Div. 782; Cuba R. R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 TJ. S. 473; Seamans, v. Barentsen, 180 N. Y. 333.)</p>

In proceedings to condemn real propeity by eminent domain, the inchoate right of dower of the wife of the owner of the fee in said real property must be recognized and protected in the proceedings as against her husband and her interest in the award will be preserved to her.

The appellant was properly held on the risk. (.Dobroski v. Supreme Window Cleaning Co., 213 App. Div. 838; Manchuk v. Eiseriberg, 215 App. Div. 850; Benna v. Maio, 241 App. Div. 641.) The extension of the period of coverage was properly extended by the Industrial Board to include the time of the accident. (Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U. S. 132; Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N. Y. 549; Paul v. Travelers’ Ins.

The award, disregarding all factual evidence, rests upon guesses as to the profits of a business that had never begun to operate. (TV. C. B. B. Co. v. Maloney, 234 N. Y. 208; Hamilton v. Bailroad Co., 190 Penn. St. 51; Forest Preserve District v. Caraher, 299 Ill. 11; Kossler v. Bail-way Co., 208 Penn. St. 50; Cramer v. Grand Bapids Show Case Co., 223 N. Y. 63; Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. Rep. 96; Bliss Co. v. Buffalo Tin Can Co., 131 Fed.

<p>Defendant is liable to account to the plaintiffs for interfering with the plaintiffs’ contract wrongfully and in violation of his fiduciary obligations. (Gilder v. Davis, 137 N. Y. 504; Domini-cis, 251 N. Y. 305; Taneribaum v. Boehm, 202 N. Y. 289; Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N. Y. 124; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458; Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. B. R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58; Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 214 Mass. 507; Gower v. Andrew, 59 Cal. 119; David v. Hanley, 108 Ill. 39; Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380.) Resignation does not affect the disability of an agent from using special information and a special status acquired in the course of his employment adversely to his former employers. (Elco Shoe Manufacturers v. Sisk, 260 N. Y. 100; State v. Gautier, 108 Fla. 390; Robb v. Green, [1895] 2 Q. B. 315; Lamb v. Evans, [1893] 1 Ch. 218; Peoples Coat Supply Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div. 671; 224 N. Y. 727; Trice v. Comstock, 121 Fed. Rep. 620; Dennison v. Aldrich, 114 Mo. App. 700; Connelly v. Special Road & Bridge Dist. No. 5, 99 Fla. 450; Eoff v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378; Ringo v. Binns, 10 Pet. [U. S.] 269; Garinger v. Palmer, 126 Fed. Rep. 906; Carson v. Fogg, 34 Wash. 448; Smith v. Brotherline, 62 Penn. St. 461; Davis v. Smith, 43 Vt. 269.) Defendant, having failed fully to disclose to his principals the progress of the negotiations, and having thereby misled them, could not take advantage of his own default. (Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. 306; Blaunt v. Robson, 56 N. C. 73; Means v. Ross, 106 La. 175; Jensen v. Snow, 131 Me. 415; Visigraph Typewriter Mfg. Co. v. Spiro Mfg. Co., 122 Mise. Rep. 852; Selwyn v. Waller, 212 N. Y. 507.) Plaintiffs never waived any rights against defendant. (Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. Fox, Inc., 245 N. Y. 215.)</p> <p>The defendant incurred no liability to the plaintiffs for any part of the commissions he received, for a mere “ reasonable expectation ” of success in the transaction did not constitute an asset or property right of either the plaintiff or the defendant or of both. (Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 185 N. Y. 520; Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N. Y. 103; Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N. Y. 237; Matter of Saxon v. Erie R. R. Co., 221 N. Y. 179; Lawrenceville Cement Co. v. Parker, 29 N. Y. St. Repr. 864; 60 Hun, 586; 133 N. Y. 622; Sibbald v. Bethelehem Iron Works, 83 N. Y. 378; Goodman v. Marcol, Inc., 261 N. Y. 188; Hirsh & Schofield, Inc., v. Gusmer, 179 App. Div. 347; Peters Mineral Land Co. v. Hooper, 208 Ala. 324; Meeks v. Miller, 214 Ala. 684; Welch v. Holmes, 220 Mich. 584; Poy v. Allan, 231 Mich. 472; Omega Inv. Co. v. Woolley, 72 Utah, 474; Abbott v. Bean, 189 N. E. Rep. 435; Carson v. Wiley, 98 Wash. 476; Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 2 Fed. Supp. 971; Harris v. Morse, 54 Fed. Rep. [2d] 109.) An agent upon the termination of his employment is entitled to compete fairly with his former principal and use any skill or knowledge he acquired during that employment when in so competing he violates no confidences of his former principal and uses none of his trade secrets and may solicit the trade of the customers of his former employer. (Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U. S. 673; Clark Paper Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N. Y. 312; Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 IN’. Y. 1; Meeder v. Provident S. L. Assur. Society, 171 N. Y. 432; Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App. Div. 824; 210 N. Y. 529; Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715; Goldberg v. Goldberg, 205 App. Div. 435; Hirsh & Schofield, Inc., v. Gusmer, 179 App. Div. 347; 226 N. Y. 649; Levy v. Cosmos, 221 App. Div. 533; 248 N. Y. 622; Scott & Co. v. Scott, 186 App. Div. 518; American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229; Black v. Hunter, 169 Cal. 632.) Upon the termination of a fiduciary relationship, such as an agency or joint adventure, when there is no capital invested in the enterprise, the agent or any member of the joint adventure may thereafter recover and retain all commissions earned by him in consummating a transaction in which the former principal or former joint adventurer had been interested when the closing of the transaction is accomplished by his personal services rendered after the termination of the agency or joint adventure and he is not accountable to the former principal or joint adventurer in any respect for said commissions. {Mason v. Wing, 3 Abb. Dec. 210; Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458; First Nat. Bank v. Oallaudet, 122 N. Y. 655; Cassidy v. Hall, 97 N. Y. 159; Gordon Co. v. Garcia Sugars Corp., 241 App. Div. 155; Byrne v. Blaker Advertising Agency, Inc., 239 App. Div. 395; Mariner, Inc., v. Hughes, 235 App. Div. 143; Hutchinson v. Birdsong, 211 App. Div. 316; Hammond Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 259 N. Y. 312; Schantz v. Oakman, 163 N. Y. 148; Kennedy v. Porter, 109 N. Y. 526; Brady v. Powers, 112 App. Div. 845; 188 N. Y. 626; Scott v. Kevorkian, 222 App. Div. 177.) The unconditional acceptance of defendant’s resignation, containing no provision with respect to commissions that the defendant might thereafter earn, constituted a release of any possible claim that the plaintiffs might have had against the defendant for commissions thereafter earned by him in the lease transaction. (Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., 252 N. Y. 468; Eames Vacuum Brake Co. v. Prosser, 157 N. Y. 289; Worley v. Calculagraph Co., 87 Mise. Rep. 309; O’ Neill v. Howe, 9 N. Y. Supp. 746.) Plaintiffs are estopped by their unfair and inequitable conduct from now asserting any claim to the commissions recovered by the defendant. {City of Buffalo v. L. & W. R. R. Co., 190 N. Y. 84; Alsen A. P. C. Works v. Degnon Cont. Co., 222 N. Y. 34; Swedish-American Bank v. Koébernick, 136 Wis. 473; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Automobile Sundries Co., 273 Fed. Rep. 74; Gafford v. Globe Transfer & Storage Co., 71 Wash. 204; Realty Construction Co. v. Kennedy, 234 Mich. 490; Pittsburgh Const. Co. v. West Side Belt R. Co., 227 Penn. St. 90; Rogers v. Whitney, 91 Yt. 79; Sibley v. Ross, 102 Mich. 158.) Plaintiffs, in the event of reversal, should only be awarded so much of the money paid into court as represents one-half of the net amount received in settlement of the judgment after deducting all amounts paid to attorneys and counsel and for the other expenses of conducting the litigation, with such interest thereon as the City Chamberlain is required to allow, and not six per cent, as erroneously awarded by the trial court. (Levy v. Louvre Realty Co., 222 N. Y. 14; Campbell v. Eckington Co., 229 U. S. 561; Anderson v. Weber, 162 App. Div. 725; Saunders v. McDonough, 210 Ala. 208; Knudson v. George, 157 Wis. 520; Davidas v. Bradford, 129 Wis. 524.)</p>

<p>The plaintiff is not concluded by the judgment in the former action. (Borgos v. Price, 140 Mise. Rep. 287; Griff en v. Keese, 187 N. Y. 454; Frenkel & Go. v. U Urbaine Fire Ins. Co., 225 App. Div. 332; Kessler v. Fligel, 240 App. Div. 232; Brooklyn Nat. Bank v. Werblow, 235 App. Div. 625; Fulton v. Viane, 232 App. Div. 680; Robinson v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 64 Hun, 41; Bell v. Merrifield, 109 N. Y. 202; Schuykill Fuel Cory. v. Nieberg Realty Cory., 250 N. Y. 304.)</p> <p>The judgment in the California action is res adjudicóla as to the present action. (Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 263; Eissing Chemical Co. v. Peoyle’s Nat. Bank, 205 App. Div. 89; 237 N. Y. 532; Schuylkill Fuel Cory. v. Nieberg Realty Cory., 250 N. Y. 304; Pray v. Hegeman, 98 N. Y. 351; Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Philliys, 274 U. S. 316; Sielcken-Schwars v. American Factors, Ltd., 265 N. Y. 239; Craig v. Ward, 36 Barb. 377; 3 Keyes, 387; McTighue v. Arctic Ice Cream Suyyly Co., 20 Cal. App. 708.)</p>

<p>The courts will not grant an injunction to restrain a public officer from performing an executive duty involving his discretion. (Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423; Enterprise Sav. Assn. v. Zumstein, 67 Fed. Rep. 1000; Matter of Mac Ñamara, 128 Mise. Rep. 84; Matter of Kenney, 129 Mise. Rep. 708; Britton v. Ottinger, 222 App. Div. 663; People v. Holmes, 227 App. Div. 734; Matter of Hoyt, 233 App. Div. 826; 258 N. Y. 569; Commonwealth Management Corp., v. Bennett, 242 App. Div. 784; Royal Development Co. v. Bennett, 241 App. Div. 791.) The complaint fails to state facts sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought. (Matter of Hirschfield v. Craig, 209 App. Div. 555; 239 N. Y. 98; Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 231 App. Div. 595; 256 N. Y. 374; Davis v. American Society, 75 N. Y. 362; Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 App. Div. 242; 234 N. Y. 542; Biddles, Inc., v. Enright, 239 N. Y. 354; Bach-man v. Harrington, 184 N. Y. 458; Goldman v. Corn, 111 App. Div. 674; Uppercu v. Stevens, 160 App. Div. 918; Brighton-by-the-Sea, Inc., v. Rivkin, 201 App. Div. 726.)</p> <p>No unlimited power of examination of all of a citizen’s personal and business affairs is conferred upon the Attorney General by article 23-A of the General Business Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 29). (Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423; Matter of Davies, 168 N. Y. 89; Matter of Foster, 139 App. Div. 769; People v. American Ice Co., 120 App. Div. 234; People v. Foster, 204 App. Div. 295; 236 N. Y. 610; Hirschfield v. Hanley, 228 N. Y. 346; Matter of Hirschfield v. Craig, 239 N. Y. 98; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43; Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263; Silverthorne Dumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385; Coastwise Dumber & Supply Co. v. United States, 259 Fed. Rep. 847; Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298.) The courts may prevent by injunction an administrative or executive officer from acting in excess of his authority to the injury of the individual. (People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 390; Matter of Young, 209 U. S. 123; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnuliy, 187 U. S. 94; Santa Fe Pacific Co. v. Lane, 244 U. S. 492; Matter of Barnes, 204 N. Y. 108.) The complaint states a cause of action for an injunction. (Gilbert Paper Co. v. Prankard, 204 App. Div. 83; Moore v. Bonbright & Co., 202 App. Div. 281; Royle v. McLaughlin, 195 App. Div. 413; Sage v. Culver, 147 N. Y. 241; People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 390; Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; Matter of Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 Fed. Rep. 241; Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1029; Matter of Marcus, 139 Mise. Rep. 675; 255 N. Y. 630; People v. Pecoi, 239 App. Div. 772; 262 N. Y. 681; People v.- Horvatt, 142 Mise. Rep. 803.)</p>

Statutory provisions as. to speed and traffic signal lights have no application to fire apparatus when on the way to a fire. (Hubert v. Granzo, 155 N. W. Rep. 204; Balthaser v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 202 Pac. Rep. 37; Geary v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 84 App. Div. 514; 177 N. Y. 535; City of New York v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 90 App. Div. 66; 182 N. Y. 536; Farley v. Mayor, 152 N. Y. 222; Miner v. Rembt, 178 App. Div. 173.) There is no evidence establishing negligence.

A trustee is entitled to be reimbursed for necessary legal expenses and disbursements and it is immaterial that there are no provisions for such expenses in the instrument of trust. (Wood-ruff v. N. Y., L. E. & W. B. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 27; Matter of Maxwell, 218 N. Y. 88; Schoenherr v. Van Meter, 215 N. Y. 548; Downing v. Marshall, 37 N. Y. 380; Rensselaer & S. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 47 Yt. 146; Bissell v. Butterworth, 118 Atl.

The plaintiff’s acceptance of his new office having occurred after the effective date of chapter 78 of the Laws of 1932, the statute may be applied to him without contravening the rule against retroactive constructions. Public policy favors the liberal construction of statutes aimed to prevent double payments from public funds in times of depression.

The services of the persons complained of by the petitioner are legally utilized. (New York Constitution, art. 5, § 6.) A mandamus order directing discontinuance of the performance of an illegal practice or act by public officials is proper. (Matter of Reynolds, 202 N. Y. 430; People ex rel. Lempps v. Voorhis, 178 N. Y. Supp. 516; 185 App. Div. 939;-224 N. Y. 633; People ex rel. Conklin v. Boyle, 98 Mise. Rep. 364; 178 App. Div. 908; People ex rel.

<p>The sidewalk depression was of an insufficient depth to charge the defendant with negligence. (Eger v. City of New York, 206 App. Div. 718; 239 N. Y. 561; Butler v. Village of Oxford, 186 N. Y. 444; Smith v. City of Albany, 261 N. Y. 240; Stakel v. City of Batavia, 260 N. Y. 628; Bryant v. Village of Potsdam, 253 N. Y. 524; Lalor v. City of New York, 208 N. Y. 431; Terry v. Village of Perry,- 199 N. Y. 79; Gastel v. City of New York, 194 N. Y. 15; Moroney v. City of New York, 190 N. Y. 560; Hamüton v. City of Buffalo, 173 N. Y. 72; Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N. Y. 67; DePledge v. City of New York, 208 App. Div. 10.) Inasmuch as there was no sidewalk defect for which the defendant could be held hable, the defendant was under no duty to illuminate the sidewalk. (Daly v. Rector of Trinity Church, 188 App. Div. 280; O’Rourke v. Mayor of City of New York, 17 App. Div. 349; Andrews v. City of Elmira, 128 App. Div. 699; Van Wie v. City of Mount Vernon, 26 App. Div. 330; Eger y. City of New York, 206 App. Div. 718; 239 N. Y. 561; Vanderborg v. City of New York, 158 App. Div. 297.)</p> <p>The evidence presented questions of fact for the jury to determine. {Fordr-ham v. Gouverneur Village, 160 N. Y. 541; Terry v. Village of Perry, 199 N. Y. 79; Mullins v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 183 N. Y. 129; Durr v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 184 N. Y. 320; Weis v. Long Island R. R. Co., 235 App. Div. 253; 262 N. Y. 352; McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340.)</p>

act of the manager was not in the scope of his employment, and had no connection whatever therewith. (Oakes v. Marshall-W ells Hardware Co., 158 Wis. 165; Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N. Y. 219; Joel v. Morrison, 6 C. & P. 501; Rodgers v. Tobias, 225 S. W. Rep. 804; Smith v. Peach, 200 Mass. 504; Hough v. Leech, 187 Ark. 731; Smith v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 78 Hun, 524; Haack v. Fearing, 4 Abb. Pr. IN. S.] 297; Buchanan v. Western Union Tel.

<p>The provisions of the will show clearly that the testator intended to give to his widow personal property (other than cash or evidences of indebtedness) located or ordinarily kept at Mount Kisco, and thereby to confirm to her the title to the dwelling’s contents. (Kinkele v. Wilson, 151 N. Y. 269; Matter of Reynolds, 124 N. Y. 388; Matter of Pulis, 220 N. Y. 196; Matter .of Martin, 255 N. Y. 248; Matter of Rooker, 248 N. Y. 361; Salter v. Drowne, 205 N. Y. 204; Matter of Bump, 234 N. Y. 60.)</p> <p>It is the duty of a </p>

The new company, having acquired its stock after the Superintendent took possession of the bank, is not liable to assessment. (Chase v. Lord, 77 N. Y. 1; Pollard v. Bailey, 87 IT. S. 520; City of New York v. New York City Ry. Co., 193 N. Y. 543; Broderick v. Britting, 147 Mise. Bep. 363; Skinner v. Home Bank of Brooklyn, 190 App. Div. 187; Broderick v. Aaron, 284 N. Y. 368; Attorney-General v. North America Life Ins.

The facts and circumstances which would have been disclosed by reasonable inquiry at the times of receipt of the checks would have dispelled any presumption that there had been an unauthorized use of the funds of the corporation. (Martindale v. De Kay, 101 Mise. Rep. 728; 180 App. Div. 926; 224 N. Y. 585; Kepner Co. v. Hutton, 179 App. Div. 130; 226 N. Y. 674; Heig v. Caspary, 191 App.

The Public Service Commission in adopting its order charging costs to the respondent proceeded in the manner required by sections 18-a and 18-b of the Public Service Law (Cons. Laws, ch. -48) and according to due process of law. (New York, 0. & W. R. R. Co. v. Griffin, 235 N. Y. 174; Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 206 Wis. 589; People 'ex rel: N. Y. Elec.

Uncontroverted evidence not opposed to probabilities and not surprising or suspicious, is conclusive upon the trial court. v. Littauer, 162 N. Y. 569; Carióla v. Carióla, 131 Mise. Rep. 66; Gelbman v. Gelbman, 194 App. Div. 137.)

There was nothing defective or wrong about the driveway and wall in the rear of defendant’s premises. Defendant did not owe plaintiff any duty, did not violate any duty and is not fiable. (Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N. Y. 181; Sterger v. Van Sicklen, 132 N. Y. 499; Polemenakos v. Cohn, 234 App. Div. 563; 260 N. Y. 524; Walsh v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 145 N. Y. 301; Aubrey v. McCarthy, 217 App.

The gift to the American Academy in Rome was a gift to a charitable corporation for one of its corporate purposes and not an express trust of which the American Academy in Rome was merely trustee. (Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450; Matter of N. Y. 71; Bird v. Merklee, 144 N. Y. 544; Matter of Durand, 194 N. Y. 477; Corporation of Chamber of Commerce v^Bennett, 143 Mise.

Since appellants sold all their shares prior to the closing of the bank, they cannot be held liable as beneficial owners. (Broderick v. Aaron, 264 N. Y. 368; Richards v. Robin, 175 App.

The court had no authority to impose the sentence which it did. (People ex rel. Stokes v. Riseley, 38 Hun, 280; People v. Garter, 48 Hun, 165; People ex rel. Kane v. Sloane, 98 App. Div. 450; People ex rel. Devoe v. Kelly, 97 N. Y. 212; People v. Bork, 96 N. Y, 188; People ex rel. Tweed v. Lipscomb, 60 N. Y. 559; Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65; People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1; Penal Law, § 22; People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373; People v. McCann, 151 Mise.

The assessment became a lien when it was completed and confirmed. (Cons. Laws, ch. 64, §§ 113, 116, 280; Lathers v. Keogh, 109 N. Y. 583; Burr v. Palmer, 53 App. Div. 358.) The existence of the assessment was a risk against which the title company agreed to insure and respondent is Hable to appellant in the amount thereof.

The building and loan association in its corporate capacity was a proper and necessary party to the action. (Van Tuyl v. New York Real Estate Sec. Co., 153 App. Div. 410; 207 N. Y. 691; Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., v. Chinese Merchants’ Bank, 219 App. Div. 256; Matter of Bank of United States [Ostertag], 237 App. Div. 104; 262 N. Y. 463; Richardson v. Cheney, 146 App.

The uncontradicted evidence establishes that the agreement of June 1, 1933, is supported by consideration and it was error to deny the defendant’s motions to dismiss and to direct a verdict for the defendant. (Colvin v. Post Mortgage & Land Co., 225 N. Y. 510; Bliven v. Lighthouse, 231 N. Y. 64; Verity v. Ottinger, 223 App. Div. 344; Matthews v. Hubbard, 47 N. Y. 428; Laflar v. McCormick, 225 App. Div. 476; Smiley Steel Co. v. Schmoll, 200 App.

The trial court erred in ruling as matter of law that it was immaterial whether or not the ordinance was, as matter of fact, violated; that no causal connection between such violation, if any, and the accident could be found, as matter of fact; and in prohibiting a finding, as matter of fact, that the violation of the ordinance was not some evidence of the first link in the chain of concurrent proximate causes resulting in the death of plaintiff’s intestate.

<p>The deed of trust clearly provides by its terms for a distribution of the entire remainder to the appellants in equal parts. (Matter of Farmers Loan & Trust Co. {Durant), 231 N. Y. 41; Matter of Union Trust Co., 170 App. Div. 176; 219 N. Y. 537; Matter of Lawrence, 238 N. Y. 116; Matter of Mortimer, 147 Mise. Rep. 543; Matter of Pond, 133 Mise. Rep. 242; Matter of Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168; Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 325.) The deed of trust is barren of any evidence of an intent to distribute among issue per capita. (.Fleisch-man v. Furgueson, 223 N. Y. 235; Matter of Farmers Loan & Trust Co. [Durant], 231 N. Y. 41; Matter of Fanners Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168; Matter of Union Trust Co., 170 App. Div. 176; 219 N. Y. 537; Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 325; Petry v. Petry, 186 App. Div. 738; 227 N. Y. 621; Vincent v. Newhouse, 83 N. Y. 505; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93.)</p> <p>A direction to distribute among “ issue ” requires a per capita distribution unless a contrary intent appears in the instrument. (Matter of Silsby, 229 N. Y. 396; Soper v. Brown, 136 N. Y. 244; Schmidt v. Jewett, 195 N. Y. 486; Bisson v. West Shore B. R. Co., 143 N. Y. 125; Drake v. Drake, 134 N. Y. 220; Kernochan v. Whitney, 125 App. Div. 371; Chwatal v. Schreiner, 148 N. Y. 683; Rasquin v. Haitnersley, 152 App. Div. 522; Petry v. Petry, 186 App. Div. 738; Matter of Mann, 138 Mise. Rep. 42; Matter of Farmers Loan & Trust Co. [Durant], 231 N. Y. 41; Matter of Lawrence, 238 N. Y. 116; Matter of Flint, 118 Mise. Rep. 134; Matter of Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168; Matter of Carroll, 153 Mise. Rep. 649.) A direction to distribute among “ the respective issue, in equal parts ” imports a. per capita distribution. (Matter of Bailey, 124 Mise. Rep. 466; Matter of Moody, 122 Mise. Rep. 541; Matter of Trombly, 138 Mise. Rep. 220; Matter of Droney, 231 App. Div. 674; Matter of Verplanck, 91 N. Y. 439; Stevenson v. Lesley, 70 N. Y. 512; Matter of Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168; Bisson v. W. S. R. R. Co., 143 N. Y. 125.) The word “ issue ” must be given its normal meaning under the law existing at the time the deed of trust was executed. (Tier v. Pennell, 1 Edw. Ch. 354; Murray v. Bronson, 1 Dem. 217; Matter of Cornell, 5 Dem. 88; Post v. Horning, 6 N. Y. St. Repr. 716; U. S. Trust Co. v. Tobias, 21 Abb. N. C. 392; Drake v. Drake, 3 N. Y. Supp. 760; 56 Hun, 590; Matter of Mann, 138 Mise; Rep. 42; Matter of Corlies, 150 Mise. Rep. 596.)</p>

<p>The easements reserved gave to the respondent only the right to an entrance to the paved portion of the causeway, but gave it no right to cross the paved roadway by making left turns after the adoption by the Commission of the regulation. of Palisades Interstate Park v. 240 N. Y. 2; Ryan v. Preston, 59 App. Div. 97; Palmer v. Larchmont Electric Co., 158 N. Y. 231; Black-man v. Striker, 142 N. Y. 555; Lincoln S. D. Co. v. City of New York, 210 N. Y. 34; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 TJ. S. 88; People ex rel. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593; Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583; N. 0. Public Service y. New Orleans, 281 U. S. 682; Sauer v. City of New York, 180 JST. Y. 27; Miller v. State, 229 App. Div. 423.) The Commission’s regulation was reasonable. (Town of I slip v. Summers, 257 N. Y. 167; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251; Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 288; Ganly v. Steel Storage & Trucking Corp., 259 N. Y. 396; Carolina Ry. Co. v. Lincolnton, 33 Fed. Rep. [2d] 719; Commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park v. Lent, 240 N. Y. 1; Commonwealth v. Nolan, 189 Ky. 34; Cavanaugh v. Cerk, 280 S. W. Rep. 51; Cincinnati v. Baumgartner, 25 Ohio N. P. 20; Safee v. City of Buffalo, 204 App. Div. 561.) Respondent has failed to show any injury. (Delaware Hudson S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Palisades Park, 222 App. Div. 535; Miller v. State, 229 App. Div. 423; Sauer v. City of New York, 180 N. Y. 27; Tenement House Department v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325; Matter of McIntosh v. Johnson, 211 N. Y. 265; N. F. & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556.)</p> <p>The easements reserved gave respondent an effective right of way across the causeway from one side to the other. {Burke v. Metropolitan District Commrs., 159 N. E. Rep. 739; Pittsburg & S. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 182; Vickers v. Electrozone Co., 67 N. J. L. 665; Harper v. Hochstim, 278 Fed. Rep. 102; Williams v. Hathway, 6 Ch. Div. 544; American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 Fed. Rep. [2d] 886; Employers Liability Assur. Corp. v. Morrow, 143 Fed. Rep. 750.) The ordinance deprived respondent of its property without due process and without just compensation, and impaired the obligation of the contracts between respondent and the park commission. (,Saratoga State Waters Carp. v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429; United States v. Lynch, 188 U. S. 445: Story v. N. Y. Elevated By. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Waldorf-Astoria Hotel v. City of New York, 212 N. Y. 97; Detroit City By. Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634; Nichols v. Ann Arbor, 87 Mich. 361; Bandall v. Jacksonville St. B. B. Co., 19 Fla. 409; Williams v. City Electric Street By. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 556; Limburger v. San Antonio Bapid Transit, 30 S. W. Rep. 533; Beining v. N. Y., L. & W. B. Co., 128 N. Y. 157; Gallway v. Metropolitan Elevated B. B. Co., 128 N. Y. 132; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279; Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Brownlow v. O’Donoghue Bros., 276 Fed. Rep. 636.) The application of the ordinance to respondent’s land is unreasonable and causes continuing damage. v. City of New York, 188 N. Y. 58; People ex rel. City of Olean v. Western New York Traction Co., 214 N. Y. 526.)</p>

<p>No competent evidence was introduced by the executor to substantiate the alleged loan. (Leask v. Hoagland, 205 N. Y. 171; Phillips v. McCombs, 53 N. Y. 494; Lowery v. Erskine, 113 N. Y. 52; Griffin v. Train, 90 App. Div. 16; Marrow v. Moskowitz, 225 N. Y. 219; Gorton v. Lane, 208 App. Div. 833; Hutson v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 118 Mise. Rep. 795; Sumner v. Sumner, 128 Mise. Rep. 404; 221 App. Div. 760; Matter of Wendell, 121 Mise. Rep. 569; Flannery v. Van Tassel, 127 N. Y. 631; Truax v. Slater, 86 N. Y. 630; Slevin v. Wallace, 64 Hun, 288; 144 N. Y. 635; Linden v. Thieriot, 96 App. Div. 256; Gans v. Wormser, 83 App. Div. 505; Stickney v. Billings, 30 Hun, 304; Trim?ner v. Trimmer, 13 Hun, 182.) The court erred in allowing interest on said alleged loan and offset. {Matter of Socolow v. Murphy, 219 App. Div. 184.)</p> <p>The testimony introduced substantiates the findings of the Surrogate and the Appellate Division. (Matter of James, 148 Mise. Rep. 124.)</p>

There is no express or implied promise to give a hen to the plaintiff on any properties of any of the defendants; there are no words and no language from which any inference may be drawn of an intention to transfer existing rights to present or future property or funds to the plaintiff; nor are there any such equities pleaded or any fiduciary relations alleged which would justify the creation of any form of equitable lien or assignment known to the law.

The judgment in the 1916 action established lack of title in the Mechanicville and Fort Edward Railroad Company. (Donahue v. New York Life Ins. Co., 259 N. Y. 98; Roberts v. Baum-gotten, 110 N. Y. 380; Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N. Y. 114.) The 1916 adjudication was a judgment in rem, affirmative as to the Fitchburg’s title to the main line; negative as to the want of title in the Mechanicville and Fort Edward to the Stillwater Branch.

<p>The plaintiff is not a creditor of the Mechanicville and Fort Edward Railroad Company. (Greenleaf v. B.,F. & C. I. Ry. Co., 141 N. Y. 395; Archibald v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 157 N. Y. 574; Homestead Co. v. Valley R. R., 17 Wall. 153; National Bank of Ballston Spa v. Bd. of Supervisors, 106 N. Y. 488; Koehler v. Hughes, 4 Mise. Rep. 236; 73 Hun, 167; 148 N. Y. 507; City of Albany v. McNamara, 117 N. Y. 168; Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 487.) The plaintiff’s claim for moneys advanced to the Mechanic-ville and Fort Edward Railroad Company is both stale and barred by the statutes of limitation. (Matter of Neilley, 95 N. Y. 382; Calhoun v. Millard, 121 N. Y. 69; McKechnie v. McKechnie, 3 App. Div. 91; Matter of Straut, 126 N. Y. 201; Town of Mount Morris v. King, 8 App. Div. 495; 158 N. Y. 450; Kellogg v. Kellogg, 169 App. Div. 395; 224 N. Y. 597; Fletcher v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., 204 App. Div. 814; 236 N. Y. 671.)</p> <p>This dissolution action was properly instituted and maintained. (General Corporation Law, §§ 71, 72; Cons. Laws, ch. 23.) The plaintiff is a creditor of the Mechanicville and Fort Edward Railroad Company. (Marstaller v. Mills, 143 N. Y. 398.)</p>

<p>The judgment in the 1916 action is conclusive in this action. (Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N. Y. 212; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. Ill; Pringle v. Woolworth, 90 N. Y. 502; Matter of Delaney, 256 N. Y. 315; Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46.) One who as plaintiff has gone into court, invoked its jurisdiction and brought in such parties as were deemed proper, cannot complain that the court determined all the questions needful for a proper disposition of the case. (Hewitt v. Northrup, 75 N. Y. 506; Geneva Furniture Co. v. Karpen, 238 U. S. 254; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; People ex rel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263; Fisher v. Hepburn, 48 N. Y. 41; Matter of Youker, 217 App. Div. 347; Sumner v. Sleeth, 87 Iff. 500.)</p> <p>The judgment in the 1916 action is not res adjudicata here as to any of the matters purported to be decided therein for the reason that the court was without jurisdiction as to other matters, having found that the plaintiff was without capacity to sue. (Lewis v. O. N. & P. Co., 125 N. Y. 341; Parisi v. Hubbard, 226 App. Div. 380; People ex rel. Village of Chateaugay v. P. S. Comm., 255 N. Y. 232; Bell v. Merri-field, 109 N. Y. 202; Stowell v. Chamberlain, 60 N. Y. 272; McDonald v. Hygienic Ice & Refrigerating Co., 148 App. Div. 539; Russell v. Place, 94 TJ. S. 606; Clark v. Scovill, 198 N. Y. 279; Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. 232; First Nat. Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall. 609; Pendleton v. Russell, 144 U. S. 640; Rodgers v. Adriatic Fire Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34; Robins v. Wells, 1 Robt. 666; Herzberg v. Boiesen, 53 N. Y. Supp. 256; Brooks v. Boston R. R. Co., 211 Mass. 277; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281; Venable Bros. v. Southern Granite Co., 135 Ga. 508; Merritt v. Gate City Nat. Bank, 199 Ga. 147.) If the Mechanicville and Fort Edward Railroad Company had no corporate existence and could not be sued in dissolution, no judgment could be rendered against it and the cause of action here belongs to the successor trustee and may be asserted by him as such as well as in the corporate name. (General Corporation Law; Cons. Laws, ch. 23, § 29; People v. O’Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; De Martini v. McCaldin, 184 App. Div. 222; Heath v. Barmore, 50 N. Y. 302; RexfordFlats Bridge Co. v. Canal Board, 96 Mise. Rep. 272; McCulloch v. Norwood, 58 N. Y. 562; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384.)</p>

<p>The Mechanicville and Fort Edward Railroad Company has no capacity to sue because there is no such corporation. (Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N. Y. 114; Matter of Kings, Queens & Suffolk R. R. Co., 6 App. Div. 241; City of New York v. Bryan, 196 N. Y. 158; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384; Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co., 172 N. Y. 471; Matter of L. I. R. R. Co., 143 N. Y. 67; Day v. 0. & L. C. R. R. Co., 107 N. Y. 129; Matter of N. Y. & L. I. Bridge Co., 148 N. Y. 540; Matter of B., W. & N. Ry. Co., 72 N. Y. 245; 75 N. Y. 335; Brooklyn St. T. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 78 N. Y. 524; Farnham v. Benedict, 107 N. Y. 159; Matter of B., Q. C. & S. R. R. Co., 185 N. Y. 171.) The amendment made by chapter 552 of the Laws of 1932 to section 29 of the General Corporation Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 23) gives the Mechanicville and Fort Edward Railroad Company no standing to sue. (Heath v. Barmore, 50 N. Y. 302; Central City Sav. Bank v. Walker, 66 N. Y. 424; People v. O’Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; Matter of Friedman, 177 App. Div. 755; Central U. T. Co. v. Amer. By. T. Go., 198 App. Div. 303; 233 N. Y. 531; v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235; N. Y. & O. M. B. B. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N. Y. 473; v. Bosenfeld, 265 N. Y. 76; Feiber Bealty Corp. v. Abel, 265 N. Y. 94; O’Beilly v. U., N. & C. Stage Co., 87 Hun, 406; Isola v. Weber, 147 N. Y. 329; Morrison v. B. & O. B. B. Co., 177 App. Div. 613; Cunningham v. Glauber, 133 App. Div. 10; Security Trust Co. v. Pritchard, 201 App. Div. 142; Knickerbocker v. Grotton Bridge & Mfg. Co., Ill App. Div. 145; Matter of B., W. & N.B.B. Co., 75 N. Y. 335; Matter of B., Q. C. & S. B. B., 106 App. Div. 240; 185 N. Y. 171.)</p> <p>The plaintiff, the Mechanicville and Fort Edward Railroad Company, in the instant action sues under a statutory right. (Ward v. Petrie, 157 N. Y. 301; General Corporation Law, § 29.)</p>

<p>The appellants are not liable for an assessment. (Broderick v. Adamson, 148 Mise. Rep. 353; 243 App. Div. 692; Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521; Earle v. Carson, 188 U. S. 42; Whitney v. Butler, 118 U. S. 655; Richards v. Robin, 178 App. Div. 535; Hayes v. Schoemaker, 39 Fed. Rep. 319; Richards v. Ackerman, 175 App. Div. 746; Van Tuyl v. Scharmann, 208 N. Y. 53; Citizens Bank of Georgetown v. Robinson, 134 Wash. 66; Lucas v. Coe, 86 Fed. Rep. 972.)</p> <p>The mere delivery of the stock to the branch office of the bank was neither timely nor sufficient under section 120 of the Banking Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 2) to relieve defendants-appellants from liability. (Broderick v. Aaron-Sternlieb, 240 App. Div. 537; 266 N. Y. 506; Broderick v. McGuire, 119 Conn. 83; Broderick v. Adamson, 148 Mise. Rep. 353; Persons v. Gardner, 113 App. Div. 597; 188 N. Y. 571; Mahoney v. Bernhardt, 27 Mise. Rep. 339; 45 App. Div. 499; 169 N. Y. 589; People v. Merchants’ Trust Co., 187 N. Y. 293; Richards v. Scharmann, 97 Mise. Rep. 143; Parker v. Adams, 38 Mise. Rep. 325; Barnes v. Arnold, 23 Mise. Rep. 197; 169 N. Y. 611; Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27; Cook v. Carpenter, 212 Penn. St. 177; Broderick v. Aaron, 264 N. Y. 368; Johnson v. Underhill, 52 N. Y. 203; Mosler Safe Deposit Co. v. Guardian Trust Co., 208 N. Y. 524; Van Tuyl v. Robin, 160 App. Div. 41.)</p>

The act (L. 1935, ch. 842) sanctions the use of county moneys and the issuance of county bonds for other than county purposes. (N. Y. Const, art. 8, § 10; Sun Pub. Assn. v. Mayor, 152 N. Y. 257; Village of Kenmore v. County of Erie, 252 N. Y. 437; Markey v. County of Queens, 154 N. Y. 675; County of Albany v. Hooker, 204 N. Y. 1; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Matter of Chap?nan v. City of New York, 168 N, Y. 80; Smith v. Smythe, 197 N. Y. 457; Hesse v. Rath, 224 App.

Constitutional provisions prohibit the Superintendent of Insurance and the Mortgage Commission from any act divesting the certificate holders of their property rights. (People ex rel. Simpson Co. v. Kempner, 154 App. Div. 674; Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 194 N. Y. 212; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 79 L. Ed. 920; Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 TJ. S. 56; East Tennessee V. & G. Ry.

<p>The partners are jointly and severally liable. (Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611; Cons. Laws, ch. 39, §§ 24, 26, subd. 1; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613; Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y. 55; Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Go., 249 N. Y. 256; First Nat. Bank v. Far son, 226 N. Y. 218.) The partnership is hable. (First Nat. Bank v. Farson, 226 N. Y. 218; Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 256.) The partnership has a distinct and independent status from the individuals who make up the partnership. (Cons. Laws, ch. 39, § 20; Hathaway v. Clendening Co., 135 App. Div. 407; Liberty Nat. Bank v. Bear, 276 U. S. 215; Matter of Dumarest, 146 Mise. Rep. 442.) Section 24 of the Partnership Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 39) does not relieve the partnership of liability. CSchubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 256; Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202.)</p> <p>The partnership is not liable to the wife of a negligent partner. (Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 256; Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611; Cons. Laws, ch. 39, § 24; Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y. 55; Jacobs v. Maryland Casualty Co., 198 App. Div. 470; 234 N. Y. 622; Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N. Y. 175; Belleson v. Skil-beck, 242 N. W. Rep. 1; David v. David, 157 Atl. Rep. 755.)</p>

The hospital is not an insane asylum. Therefore, its location is not barred by the zoning ordinance. (People ex rel. Board of Charities v. N. Y. Soc. P. C. 161 N. Y. 233; 162 N. Y. 429; City of Rochester v. Rochester Girls’ Home, 194 N. Y. Supp. 236.) The attempt to exclude charitable institutions from residential districts is unconstitutional, arbitrary and void. (Women’s Kansas City St. Andrews Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 Fed.

The evidence sustained the cause of action alleged in the complaint so as to create a question of fact for the jury. (Bopp v. New York Electric Vehicle Transp. Co., 177 N. Y. 33; Kirwan v. American Lithographic Co., 197 N. Y. 413; Porges v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co., 203 N. Y. 181; Bergman v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 264 N. Y. 205; Jolliffe v. Miller, 126 App. Div. 763; 196 N. Y. 504; Stump v. Burns, 219 N. Y. 306; Morrison v. Metropolitan Tel.

The applications for mandamus are premature and the issues sought to be raised are not properly before the court at this time. (Matter of McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 401; People ex rel. Hotchkiss v. Smith, 206 N. Y. 231. The scheme of financing set forth in the local law is valid. (Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268.

<p>The decree of 1920 fully and finally adjudicated the rights, claims and interests of the respondents to the funds in question. (Staples v. Mead, 152 App. Div. 745; Matter of Von Bernuth, 127 Mise. 705; Kirk v. McCann, 117 App. Div. 56; Mangara v. City of Brooklyn, 98 N. Y. 585; Brackett v. Harvey, 25 Him, 502; Alt?nan v. Hofeller, 152 N. Y. 498; Matter of Hodgrnan, 140 N. Y. 421; Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56; Fitzgerald v. Topping, 48 N. Y. 438.) The right to recover not existing in 1920, the 1929 amendment (L. 1929, ch. 518) was not retroactive. (Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235; MacAffer v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 242 App. Div. 136; People ex rel. Collins v. Spicer, 99 N. Y. 233.)</p> <p>The decree of 1920 did not finally adjudicate the claim to the fund deposited with the State Treasurer. (Joseph v. Herzig, 198 N. Y. 456; Penny v. Dickerson, 85 N. Y. 345; Matter of Eisner, 129 Mise. Rep. 106; Jenkins v. Mollenhauer, 105 Mise. Rep. 15; 193 App. Div. 893; Matter of Peck, 131 App. Div. 81; Matter of Haggerty, 126 Mise. Rep. 769; Van Camp v. Fowler, 133 N. Y. 600; Matter of Eaton, 125 Mise. Rep. 629 ; 217 App. Div. 704; Matter of Rowe, 197 App. Div. 449 ; 232 N. Y. 554; Matter of Whitbeck, 22 Mise. Rep. 494; Matter of Hunt, 41 Mise. Rep. 72; Buhler v. Hubbell, 56 Hub, 450; Stannard v. Hubbell, 123 N. Y. 520; Matter of Watson, 144 Mise. Rep. 213; Sweeney v. Warren, 127 N. Y. 426; Fribourg v. Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank, 168 App. Div. 816; Brantingham v.' Huff, 43 App. Div. 414; Woolley v. Stewart, 169 App. Div. 678; 222 N. Y. 347; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 167 App. Div. 90; 224 N. Y. 429; McGillis v. McGillis, 154 N. Y. 532.) The fund in the hands of the State Treasurer, was “ not distributed on the first day of May, nineteen hundred and twenty-nine.” (Matter of Maltbie, 184 App. Div. 743; 226 N. Y. 641; Matter of Bergamini, 136 Mise. Rep. 118; Thomson v. Tracy, 60 N. Y. 174; Matter of Irving, 153 Mise. Rep. 807.) There was a right in 1920 in these next of kin, and the 1929 law was retroactive by express legislative terms and by the general principles of law that remedial statutes are retroactive. (Matter of Irving, 153 Mise. Rep. 807; Matter of Leslie, 92 Mise: Rep. 663; 175 App. Div. 108; Matter of Watson, 161 N. Y. Supp. 875; Matter of Peer, 138 Mise. Rep. 247; 232 App. Div. 872; Deuscher v. Cammerano, 256 N. Y. 328; Laird v. Carton, 196 N. Y. 169; Lazarus v. Met. El. Ry., 145 N. Y. 581; Matter of Bachmann, 151 Mise. Rep. 761; Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 218 N. Y. 18; Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122.)</p>

The provisions of the Election Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 17) in reference to certificates of nomination by independent bodies should be liberally construed so as to promote and not hinder the independence of voters at public elections. (Matter of Independence League Nominations, 51 Mise. Rep. 486] Matter of McClosky, 21 Mise. Rep. 365; Matter of Adams, 21 Mise. Rep. 396; Matter of Pool, 108 App.

The Supreme- Court ha? jurisdiction after a The Supreme Court had inherent jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of the State Constitution and the Election Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 17) to enter the order appealed from. (N. Y. Const, art. 6, § 1; Cons. Laws, ch. 17, §§ 330, 333; Matter of Hearst v, Woelper, 183 N. Y, 284; Matter of Wogan, 242 App. Div. 839.) The Election Law does not grant any power to the Supreme Court to conduct a general recount. (People ex rel.

Section 249 of the Election Law gives to the independent voters of New Castle the right to a separate row on the ballot and entitles the petitioner to have his name appear therein.