Friday-Spivey v. Collier’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]n Heider v. Clemons, 241 Va. 143 , 400 S.E.2d 190 (1991) ... a deputy sheriff collided with a motorcycle as he was leaving a residence where he had just served judicial process. Heider argued “that, as a deputy sheriff who regularly and necessarily operated an automobile to perform his legal duty of serving judicial process, he was entitled to the sovereign immunity defense with respect to the operation of the automobile.” We disagreed, holding that Heider was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the circumstances of the case because “the simple operation of an automobile did not involve special risks arising from the governmental activity, or the exercise of judgment or discretion about the proper means of effectuating the governmental purpose of the driver’s employer.” In that case, the deputy sheriff was like any other person driving a car who “must make myriad decisions.” The duty of care in ordinary driving situations “is a ministerial obligation.” Collier distinguishes Heider in several respects. The deputy sheriff in that case had completed his governmental purpose and was leaving the scene without any urgency. In contrast, Collier was on his way to accomplish the governmental purpose of delivering the manpower and equipment necessary to rescue an infant locked in a car. Collier cites as examples of discretion and judgment his determination of the route to be taken and the maneuvering of the 40,000-pound pumper truck through traffic. Collier also notes that, unl”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fitzgerald v. Perry

2. “(1) the nature of the function the employee performs; (2) the extent of the governmental entity's interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by the governmental entity over the employee; and (4) whether the alleged wrongful act involved the exercise of judgment and discretion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Burns v. Gagnon

3. “(1) the nature of the function performed by the employee; (2) the extent of the state’s interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the employee; and (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Cleaves-McClellan v. Shah