269 F. Supp. 2d 918 - DirecTV, Inc. v. Karpinsky’s Empirical Analysis
2003
Citation profile
1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1692A (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 876 · 47 U.S.C. § 605
Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Foman v. Davis · United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. · First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[N]o person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, (2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its destination, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, (4) to the master of a ship under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a subpena [sic] issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (6) on demand of other lawful authority. No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communi cation to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such communication (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having received any intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such communication was intercepted,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Although [the plaintiff] has pointed to two separate violations of the federal statute [the Wiretap Act], to receive damages, [the plaintiffs] claims must be for conduct which falls within the private right of action in § 2520. Section 2520 provides that any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of the statute may recover in a civil action from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate ... Therefore, even if [the plaintiff] showed that there is a material question of fact as to whether [the defendant] possessed equipment which it knew or reasonably should have known was designed primarily for surreptitious acquisition of communications under § 2512, [the plaintiff] must also create a question of fact as to whether communications were intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used ... In other words, a plaintiff does not have a private right of action against a defendant based on evidence that the defendant possessed surveillance equipment within the meaning of the statute. While proof of possession of equipment used to intercept oral communications could certainly be part of [the plaintiffs] proof that oral communications were intercepted, possession of equipment will not support a separate claim against [the defendant].”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statements irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.