Early v. Early

¶1dissenting.

¶2I dissent because the majority’s opinion leads to a result contrary to the intent and purpose of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.

¶3When interpreting a federal statute, it is important to avoid unreasonable results or results that are wholly inconsistent with the drafter’s intent.2 The majority’s opinion ignores this principle by elevating the Act’s literal language over its intent and allowing an unreasonable result. Now one party has unfettered discretion to avoid jurisdiction in his state of residence and to force separate actions in two states for custody and support for the same child.

¶4Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the Child Support Act was not intended to create a “right” to litigate child support orders in the jurisdiction of the order’s origin. Rather, the legislative history of the Act reveals that the intent is to prohibit a state from modifying a support order “unless the recipient of child support payments resides *419in the State in which the modification is sought.”3 This intent is frustrated by allowing the recipient parent to avoid jurisdiction in the state of his or her residence when the payor parent has consented to jurisdiction in that state. Additionally, the Act seeks to “discourage continuing interstate controversies over child support in the interest of greater financial stability and secure family relationships for the child.”4 The majority’s reliance on the literal language of the Act encourages an interstate controversy in this case by forcing dual actions in California and Georgia over custody and support for the same child. Furthermore, the added time and expense of maintaining dual actions in two states cannot promote the interest of the child.

¶5The intent and purpose of the Act would be fulfilled by affirming the trial court’s decision to decline jurisdiction in this case.