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← 269 Ga. 457 - Moore v. Ray

Moore v. Ray’s Empirical Analysis

1998

Citation profile

9
cited by 9 later decisions
1
states following
March 2013
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently March 2013

4 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

50199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia · Johnson v. State · Freeman v. State · CW MATTHEWS CONTRACTING COMPANY, INC. v. Collins

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he decision in Freeman, however, is no longer controlling for purposes of determining the Board’s authority to exercise parole power because of the amendment to the Georgia Constitution Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II ... approved in the November 1994 general election, and the passage of the Sentence Reform Act of 1994 ... which amended several sections of the Georgia code. Before the 1994 constitutional amendment, there existed the potential for conflict between the legislative prerogative of the General Assembly to establish crimes and prescribe punishment and the Board's constitutionally-derived power to grant clemency. With passage of the constitutional amendment in November 1994, the General Assembly now has clear authority to enact ‘general law approved by two-thirds of the members' which limits the Board’s power to grant clemency, and that limitation has a constitutional basis. The two additional areas where the Board’s authority now has been constitutionally limited are (1) minimum mandatory sentences for certain specified offenses and (2) life without parole for certain specified offenses. The potential for conflict which was presented by the Freeman decision has now been recognized and addressed by the electorate.... [N]ot only did the constitutional amendment breathe vitality into the criminal statutes which were passed by the 1994 General Assembly contingent upon ratification of the proposed constitutional changes, it expressly ratified and approved previously enacte”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814 , 817, 152 S.E. 76 (1930). The passage by the legislature of a statute providing for a sentence of life without parole, like the passage of legislation establishing the death penalty, does not impinge on the authority of the Board but, rather, renders the defendant ineligible for parole in the first instance. Freeman, 440 S.E.2d at 184 . 16 .Plaintiffs argue that Freeman is inconsistent with a prior Georgia Supreme Court decision in Charron v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 253 Ga. 274 , 319 S.E.2d 453 (1984). That decision, not”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.