Volume 269 — United States Reports

Held: inasmuch as the state courts were proceeding under state laws passed in response to a request of the Seneca Nation and which apparently for the greater part of a century had not been challenged as impeding the authority of the Federal Government, that it was peculiarly appropriate that the questions raised should be dealt with by those courts in the first instance, subject to review by this Court, and that a writ of…

Held: assuming that the house searched, which was the house of one A who had shortly before been arrested with others who were in the act of consummating a conspiracy to violate the Anti- .

Held: in substance: (a) The purpose of the Act of May 23, 1828, c. 70, 4 Stat. 284 , in confirming the land grant in controversy, was not to create a new right, but to recognize, in fulfilment of treaty obligations, a right conferred by Spain while the land was under her dominion; (b) As the grant contained a less acreage than a league square, the confirmation by that Act was subject only to a needed survey giving…

Held: a contract for the specific lots, without ;' warranty of quantity; and that plaintiffs, standing on the contract,, had no cause of action for the profits they would have made on resale if the quantities had been as listed. Affirmed. Error to a judgment of the District Court in favor of the United States, defendant in an action on a contract. Mr .Henry A. Alexander, for plaintiffs in error.

Held: That certain legacy taxes, assessed under § 29 of the Spanish War Revenue Act, were “imposed” prior to July 1, 1902, within the saving clause of the repealing Act, c. 500, § 7, 32 Stat. '96, although the.formal assessment by the Treasury Department was not made before that date. Cochran v. United States, 254 U. S. 387 . P. 109.

Davis v Alexander, 269 U.S. 114 (1925), is a US corporate law case, concerning the duties of parent corporations for actions of subsidiaries.

Held: in view of an interpretation by the New York Court of Appeals— 1. That the order of the Appellate Division was an order entered upon a decision which finally determined an action or special proceeding within § 588, paragraph 1, of the New York Civil Practice Act, and, -under that paragraph, because of the constitutional questions involved, was appealable as of right to the' Court of Appeals. P. 188. 2.

Held: that “ reserve funds ” does not embrace funds held by a fire and marine insurance company, as required by the New York Superintendent of Insurance, to cover accrued but unsettled claims for losses. McCoach v. Insurance Co., 244 U. S. 585 , followed; Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States¡ 251 U. S. 342 , explained and in part disapproved. P. 202. 58 Ct. Cls. 603, reversed.

Held: Where the net profits of a corporation, during the fiscal year in which dividends are paid, are sufficient to cover such dividends, the term “ most recently accumulated undivided profits ” applies to such current earnings, and the dividends must be deemed to have made from them and are subject .to the income' tax rates of that year, although, when the distribution was made, there were other funds, adequate to meet…

Held: that neither the delay of a year and upwards in filing such petition nor the subsequent delay in deciding it deprived the Commission of jurisdiction of the claim and let in the two year statute of limitations, there being then no rule limiting the time for filing the petition, and its entertainment under the circumstances being in accordance with the practice of the Commission. P. 228. 5.

Held: however, that as the Supreme Court by the constitution of the State had authority to review the judgments and decrees of the Court of Appeals by certiorari and no application had been made, therefor, the Court of Appeals could not be considered the court of last resort and a writ of error from this Court tó that would not lie. The same view was taken in Andrews v. The Virginian Railway Company, 248 U. S. 272 .

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court expanded and established key constructs of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process doctrine along with establishing the vagueness doctrine. It defined necessary requirements that are fundamental to any law, which, when lacking, are to be deemed void. The case was a dispute regarding Oklahoma state statutes, which, in essence vaguely required businesses to pay workers not less than the "current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed". The ruling determined that the standards set in place were unconstitutionally vague.

Held: that assessments so authorized and levied were special assessments for local improvements, not general taxes; (b) that a district so created could not be regarded as one created by the legislature, even though coincident in boundaries with two adjacent “commissioners’ precincts ”; (c) that the assessments were not legislative assessments. P. 403. 2.

Held: That the defective car was in use, though motionless; P. 409. (2)- The act of the brakeman was a coupling, not a repair, operation; P. 410.

Held: that where the taxpayer’s books, reflecting its income, were kept upon an “accrual” basis, i. e., by charging against income earned during the taxable period (1916) the expenses incurred in and attributable to the process of earning income during that period, and made its return upon that basis and not the basis of . actual-receipts and disbursements, it was permitted ■ under the statute, as correctly construed by a…

Held: That, upon the physical delivery of the certificates .by the lender, with full recognition of the right and authority of the borrower to'appropriate them to his short sale contract, and their receipt by the purchaser, all the incidents of ownership of the stock borrowed pass to the latter. ' P. 456.

Held: is just as essential to obtaining an injunction or an accounting of profits or damages under the patent laws as it is in an action on the case for damages at law. Indeed both the owner and the exclusive licensee are generally necessary parties in the action in equity.

Held: “ The act is in essence and on its face a complete regulation of boards of trade, with a penalty of 20 cents a bushel on all ' futures ’ to coerce boards of trade and their members into compliance.