Volume 27 — Federal Cases

Debt. This ease was submitted by Mr. Parks, U. S.Dist. Atty. (the successor of Mr. Holmes, U. S. Dist. Atty., who died pending the proceedings). and by Mr. Hobbs, for defendant, upon the following statement of facts: The defendant [Samuel A.] Morse, was appointed collector of the customs for the district of Passamaquoddy on the - day of June, 1836, and entered upon the duties of his office, July 2, 1836.

The United States through their attorney offered evidence tending to prove that the goods charged in the indictment to have been stolen were stolen in the state of Maryland, that after being so stolen they were •brought into the county of Alexandria in the District of Columbia by the person who stole them, and that they were after being so brought into said county received by the prisoner in said county with knowledge on his part that they were stolen, whereupon, the…

Indictment under section 1 of the act of March 3, 1855 (10 Stat. 715). The case was, that the defendant [David H. Morton] was duly appointed master of an American vessel, in a port of the West Indies, on the death of the former master, and brought thence to the port of Boston certain passengers in excess of one to every two tons of the vessel.

The defendant was indicted for obstructing and hindering a deputy collector in the exercise of the duties of his office. Mosely is a dealer in leaf tobacco and cigars, and the deputy called at his store to inquire respecting certain boxes of cigars taken in that day, May 16, 1871, some of which he was informed by the drayman were not stamped.

The prisoner [Reuben Moses] was tried upon five indictments, three of which were for counterfeiting the notes of the bank of the United States, of different denominations, and the other two for having in his possession bank notes of different denominations, engraved and printed after the similitude of notes issued by the said bank, with intent to use them in forging the notes of the said bank.

This was a bill in equity, filed on behalf of the United States, under their priority acts, praying that certain property assigned by their debtor against whom they had obtained judgment, to two of the other defendants, might be subjected to the execution of the complainants, or that the assignees might pay over to them the proceeds of such property.

Indictment [against Btenry Moulton], founded on the crimes act of 1790, c. 36, § 16 [1 Story’s Laws, 83; 1 Stat. 112, c. 9]. Held: that bank notes, in an indictment for larceny, might be described as goods and chattels. In the chancery court in England, at first view, apparently different opinions have been entertained upon the question, whether money or bonds ought to be considered as goods.

<p>Case No. 15,831.</p> <p>Limitation of Actions—President’s Proclamation—End of War—Federal Courts in Georgia.</p> <p>1. The suspension of the statute of limitations provided for by the act of congress, approved June 11, 1864 (13 Stat. 123), did not continue in Georgia after the proclamation of the president, of April 2, 1866 [14 Stat. 811].</p> <p>[Cited in Stoughton v. Hill, Case No. 13.501;</p> <p>Amy v. City of Watertown, 22 Fed. 420.]</p> <p>2. The fact that no term of the United States court for the Northern district of Georgia was held until September 10. 1866, and no clerk of thai court appointed until that date, did not continue the suspension of the statute until that time.</p>

In the United States ■ district court, Monday, July 9, the trial of George Mountjoy, of the firm of Mountjoy & McGinniss, of Rahway, for making fraudulent returns to the United States assessor, was resumed. [For prior proceeding, see Case No. 15,678.]

<p>Case No. 15,832.</p> <p>Witnesses—Competency — Free-Born Negroes.</p> <p>Free-born negroes, not subject to any term of servitude by law, are competent witnesses in all cases. Color alone is no objection to a witness.</p> <p>[Followed in U. S. v. Douglas, Case No. 14,-988.]</p>

[This was an indictment against John Mul-vaney for opening a letter addressed to another, which had been in custody of a mail carrier, etc.]

The defendant was indicted under the act of congress of April, 1790, c. 9, § 22 [1 Stat. 117], for resisting the deputy marshal when serving two writs of capias ad respondendum upon him, to wit, one for eleven dollars and eleven cents for the duty due upon a still; and the other for two hundred dollars, for penalty alleged to have been incurred under one of the revenue laws of the United States.

This was a bill in equity, brought- by the United States against the defendants [Washington Munroe and Elijah Loring] as assignees of Samuel Langton, to enforce their right of priority of payment of debts out of the effects of Langton, assigned to the defendants for the payment of his creditors. The cause was brought to a hearing upon the bill, answers and evidence.

[This was a claim by Daniel Murphy and others for San Francisco de Las Llagas, six square leagues in Santa Clara county, granted February 3, 1834, by José Figueroa to Carlos Castro. Claim filed February 9, 1852. Confirmed by the commission August 22, 1854, and by the district court October 22, 1855 (case unreported), containing 22,979.66 acres.]

Claim for four leagues of land in Sacramento county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States. [This was a claim by James Murphy for the rancho Casadores, granted December 22, 1844, by Manuel Micheltorena to Ernest Rufus. Claim filed August 14, 1852.

<p>Claim for one league of land in Santa Clara county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.</p> <p>[This was a claim by Bernard Murphy for the rancho La Polka, granted January 19, 1833, by José Figueroa to Ysabel Ortega; claim filed February 17, 1852; confirmed by the commission August 15, 1854,—containing 4,166.78 acres.]</p>

Indictment [against Francis Murray] under the statute, for stealing a watch, the property of Ben Brady, and a ten dollar bank-bill of the bank of-, and twenty dollars in silver. objected to evidence being given as to the bank-note, it not being larceny to steal a promissory note, or bond, &c., and cited Morris’ Case, 1 Leach, 468; 8 Coke, 33a, b; 4 Bl. Comm. 234. Mr. Mason cited no authorities but argued generally.

Moses Myers and John Myers, trading under the firms of Moses Myers & Son, and John Myers & Co., being largely indebted to the United States, for duty bonds, with Richard Drummond as their surety, by two several deeds, dated respectively in October, 1819, and March, 1820, conveyed all their property, whether real or personal, in possession and in action, to William B. Lamb and Richard Drummond, surety as aforesaid, in trust, to receive the debts due to them, and to sell and…

Action of debt Plea of conditions performed. This was an action of debt against the late firm of M. [Myer] & E. [Ezekiel] Myers, as distillers of spirits, in the second district of Virginia, and their sureties [William Loftin Williams, Solomon Benjamin, and William W. Myers], It was brought for the recovery of $47,800 claimed for taxes due and unpaid, as shown by an assessment of the commissioner of internal revenue.

In the case of United States v. John Myers, George Snyder, and John Voight, indicted for conspiring and combining to and actually resisting a United States revenue officer, GILES, District Judge, delivered his decision upon the prayers offered on behalf of the defence. The prayers were as follows: First.

This was an indictment [against Jacob E. Myers] for violating the 9th clause of section 5132 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The case is heard on a motion to quash the indictment. The grounds of the motion are set forth in the judge’s decision.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.] [This was an action brought in the district court by the United States against Edward Mynderse, to recover penalties. The cause is now heard on a writ of error.]

<p>Case No. 15,850a.</p> <p>INTERNAL REVENUE — BONDS — NON-COMPLIANCE with Statutort Requirements—Validity — Distiller’s Bond.</p> <p>[1. A bond in favor of the United States, which is extorted by a public officer under color of his office, but which contains conditions different from those prescribed by statute, is void.]</p> <p>[2. Where a bond running to the United States and procured by a public officer is sued upon, and it is not alleged in the pleadings that it was illegally exacted or obtained by such officer under color of his office, the same will be presumed to have been given voluntarily.]</p> <p>[3. Where a bond voluntarily given for the benefit of the Umted States contains obligations in excess of the requirements of the statute under which it is obtained, it may be valid to the extent of the obligations which are directed to be taken by the statute, and void as to the excess, provided that the excessive conditions are separable from the others. If they are not separable, the whole bond is void.]</p> <p>[Cited in U. S v. Humason, Case No. 15,421.]</p> <p>[4. A distiller’s bond given under the 39th section of the internal revenue law of July 1, 1862, and which contained obligations and conditions not required by that section, held, void in toto, though voluntarily given, it appearing that the obligations in excess of the statutory requirement were not separable from those which were in accordance with the statutory provisions.]</p>

<p>[This was' a suit b,v the United States against Edward Mynderse and Charles X). Mynderse.]</p>

<p>[This was an information against David J. Nagle and others. Heard on motion to quash.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,853.</p> <p>Criminal Evidence—Keeping House op III Fame.</p> <p>Upon an indictment for keeping a house of ill fame, evidence of the ill fame of the defendant herself, cannot be given.</p>

[This was a claim by José Augustin Nar-vaez for San Juan Bantista, two square leagues, in Monterey county, granted March 30, 1844, by Manuel Micheltorena to J. A. Narvaez. Claim filed February 27, 1852; rejected by the commission November 15, 1853; confirmed by the district court July 15, 1855. Case unreported. It is now heard upon objections to the survey. Vanderslice & Clark-son and Branham & Lewis, intervenors.]

The case was submitted on the following facts agreed: This was an action of assump-sit to recover the sum of $1,048.25 in coin, with interest from Dec. 4, 1865, the time when payment of said sum was demanded of the defendants [Nathaniel C. Nash, Spaulding & Co.] by the United States.

<p>Case No. 15,858.</p> <p>Slave Trade—Statutes.</p> <p>History and construction of the statutes in ¡•elation to the slave trade. Act March 22, 1794 [1 Stat. 347], is still in force.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,857.</p> <p>Slave—Punishment for Larceny.</p> <p>A slave, convicted of larceny in Alexandria county, is to be sentenced to be burnt in the hand and whipped.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,860.</p> <p>Internal Revenue Act—Manufacture and Sale of Cigaks.</p> <p>[Where cigars are made in the back part of a room, and sold in the front part thereof, the back part is to be regarded as a manufactory, and no cigars can be removed therefrom to the front part without first branding and stamping them.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,861.</p> <p>Counterfeiting—Selling Spurious Notes.</p> <p>1. Under a statute which punishes one who shall “utter” or “pass” spurious notes, knowing them to be such, with intent to defraud, and which does not in terms require that they be uttered as true or genuine (Act June 30, 1864; 13 Stat. 221, § 10), a defendant may be convicted of uttering or passing, upon proof that he sold and delivered the notes as spurious notes to another person with intent that they should be passed upon the public as genuine.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Painter, 67 Mo. 87. Distinguished in State v. Watson, 65 Mo. 120.)</p> <p>2. The words “uttering” and “passing,” used of notes, do not necessarily import that they are transferred as genuine; the terms include any delivery of a note to another for value, with intent that it shall be put into circulation as money.</p> <p>3. The fact that other provisions of statute exist which expressly provide a punishment for selling spurious notes, does not prevent convicting a defendant under an indictment for passing, uttering, and publishing such notes, upon proof that he sold them as spurious, with intent that the purchaser should cause them to he put in circulation as genuine.</p>

Debt for $7.000 against Thomas Nelson and Samuel Myers, surviving obligors of John Archer, Thomas Nelson, and Samuel Myers.

<p>Information for cutting timber on the public land in violation of section 2461 of the Revised Statutes.</p>

Indictment against the defendant [George E. Netcher], master of the ship Cornelia, of New Bedford, for maliciously and without justifiable cause, leaving one Thomas Turner, a seaman of the said ship, on shore in a foreign port, called Coupang, in the Dutch Island Tima, in the Chinese seas, contrary to the 10th section of the crimes act of 1825, c. 276 [3 Story’s Laws, 2001; 4 Stat. 117, c. 65]. Plea, not guilty.

<p>Case No. 15,865.</p> <p>Shipping—Regulations—Penalties—How Recovehable.</p> <p>This was a libel in rem filed against the vessel, and in personam against the captain and owners, to enforce, the penalties of the act of 1848, passed in reference to passenger vessels.</p>

Jacob New and Adolph New were put on trial under an indictment against them as accessories after the fact to a robbery of the post-office by one Lewis Stern, who took out of the office a letter addressed to “L. Stein,” containing various valuable coupons, and which afterwards came into the possession of the defendants.

This was an indictment, found by the .grand jury at the last term, and to which the respondents pleaded not guilty. The indictment alleged, that there was a river in the state of Massachusetts, called the “ Acush-net,” which was navigable, and in which the :sea ebbed and flowed with its tides, running by and forming the port of New Bed-ford, a port of entry on the one side, and the port of Fairhaven, a town lying on the ■opposite and eastern side thereof.

The evidence for the prosecution showed that the defendant was in charge of the office at a hotel called the Bingham House; that Fields Cook, a Baptist minister, from Alexandria, Va., a man of color, applied for accommodation, and was refused a room by defendant; that Cook left and returned and was allowed to sit in a side room all night; that some eighteen other persons were admitted to rooms during the night.

The defendant, upon application of the marshal of Indiana, alleging that Newcomer was indicted in that district, had been arrested upon a warrant issued by the district judge, the Honorable H. V. WILLSON, and now R. F. Paine, Esq., district attorney, moved the judge to issue a warrant removing the defendant to Indiana for trial, and to sustain said motion offered in evidence a capias in the usual form, issued from the district court of Indiana, directing the marshal to…

<p>[This was an action at law by the United States against J. P. Newmark.]</p>

These were applications for writs of mandamus, to be addressed to the mayor and administrators of the city of New Orleans, comprising the common council thereof, commanding them to levy and collect a tax sufficient to pay the principal of certain bonds issued by the city in the year 1854. The return made by the respondents showed the following to be the facts: In the year 1854, the general assembly of the state of Louisiana authorized the city of New.

This case came before the court on a demurrer by the defendant to the second, fourth and sixth of the causes of action stated in the complaint, and a demurrer by the United States to the second defence set up in the defendant’s answer.

<p>Case No. 15,873.</p> <p>Intekxal Revenue—Lbgact Tax.</p> <p>Under section 124 of the act of June 30, 1S64 (13 Stat. 285), and section 125 of that act, as amended by section 9 of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 14Ó), the United States sued a trustee under the will of a person who died in 1868, to recover a legacy tax of one per cent, on a sum of money which the trustee received and held in trust under the will for F., on the ground that F. had become entitled, in 1875, to the possession and enjoyment of such sum. By section 3 of the act of July 14, 1879 (16 Stat. 256). the taxes on legacies were repealed on and after October 1. 1870. saving taxes "assessed or liable to be assessed, or accruing” under former acts. It appearing that F. had not, on October 1. 1S70. become entitled, under the will, to the possession or enjoyment of. or to the beneficial interest in, any of the principal sum of said money, it was held that the tax sued for liad not accrued to the United States before October 1, 1870, and could not be recovered.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,874.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Districts — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. § 733. which is a re-enactment of the 41st section of the act of June 30. 1864 (13 Stat. 239). as amended by the 9th section of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. Ill), and which provides that ‘'taxes accruing under.any law providing internal revenue may be sued for and recovered, either in the district where the liability for such tax occurs or in the district where the delinquent resides.” a suit will not lie to recover such tax in a district other than that in which the tax accrues or that in which the delinquent resides, although he may be found and served with process therein.</p>

This was an indictment [against Daniel Nicholson and others], under section 5513 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, against three commissioners of election appointed under the state law to conduct an election for member of congress, state, parish and ward officers, in one of the wards of Caddo parish, in the state of Louisiana. The charge of the court can be understood without any recital of the facts.

Indictments were found by the grand jury of the district court for the March term against Lindsey Nickerson. Jr., one of the owners, and Hezekiah Taylor, the late master, of the schooner Silver Spring, charging each of them with perjury in having sworn falsely in matters to which an oath was required by the statute of July 29, 1813, in order to obtain the bounty or allowance on the said schooner Silver Spring, for the fishing season of 1853.

<p>Case No. 15,879.</p> <p>Government Property — Power to Sell -r Af-firmance of Tortious Sale.</p> <p>1. Under the 3d section of the 4th article of the constitution of the United States, no property belonging to the United States can be disposed of except by the authority of an act of congress.</p> <p>2. The war department has no authority, express or implied, to sell the public property put under its management and superintendence; nor is any such power vested, in the treasury department.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Ames, Case No. 14,441.]</p> <p>3. A commandant of an arsenal of the United States sold a quantity of lead, belonging to the United States and placed in the arsenal, to the defendants, but afterwards, by a fraudulent collusion with the defendants, converted the sale into a loan of the lead to a third person, who was in a few months to return it to the arsenal, the defendants -guaranteeing its return. On a suit by the United States for the price of the lead, held,—that the commandant was a mere agent for safe keeping, and that the sale by him was a tortious act, and the subsequent loan void; but that as no agent or department of the United States had power to sell originally, they could have no power to waive the tort and affirm the sale for the United States, as in eases of individuals; and that as the treasury department had no such authority to sell, their directing the suit to be commenced was not an affirmance of the sale.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,880.</p> <p>Pekjukt — Pause Bankrupt Schet>ci,e — Oath — Power to Administer.</p> <p>1. An intentional omission to place a part of his property on a.schedule, in an application under the bankrupt act, which he swears to, as containing a true account of all his effects, is perjury, under the act of congress.</p> <p>2. A deputy clerk, being authorized to act, the same as the principal, has a right to administer oaths in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Evans, 2 Fed. 152.]</p> <p>3. Such oaths are presumed to be administered in the presence of the court, and by virtue of its authority.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. Evans, 2 Fed. 152.]</p> <p>4. The act of 1825 [4 Stat. 115], in relation to perjury, being a general law. applies to all subsequent cases which come within it.</p>

The 905 packages are claimed by D. M. B. Brown, who also claims 172 of the 272 caddies. The remaining 100 caddies are claimed by Gen. E. B. Brown. The value of the tobacco and machinery involved in the case is estimated at about $15,000. W. H. Powell, the inspector whose name has been frequently mentioned in the progress of the case as having attempted to defraud the government, is in Canada, where, it is stated, he fled from justice.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was an appeal from a sentence of the district court of the Southern district of New York. A part of the goods libelled, had been condemned, and a part restored in the district court [case unreported], and both the libellants and claimant appealed from the decree.

<p>Case No. 15,885.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Illegal Importation-—Removal prom Vessel.</p> <p>1. The act of July 18, 1806 [14 Stat. 178], applies to all dutiable goods, wares and merchandise, and, under the provisions of section 44 of this act, their irregular importation forfeits the goods and subjects the importer to fine or imprisonment</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Jordan, Case No. 15,498.]</p> <p>2. The construction is too liberal which treats the wharf as constructively a part of the vessel; and the removal of dutiable goods from the vessel to place them upon the wharf or dock, subjects them to the hazard of seizure and forfeiture.</p>

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.] An information was filed by the United States attorney against nine trunks and one bag, containing principally silks alleged to be subject to duty as imports, and which were imported into the United States on board .the steamship Russia, and landed without the permit of the collector or naval officer of the port, and without payment of duty; whereby, under the fiftieth section of the act of…

<p>Case No. 15,887.</p> <p>Forfeitures—Violation of Tariff Laws—Intent to Defraud—Admiralty Practice.</p> <p>1. A violation of the requirement in Schedule D of the act of 1870 (Rev. St. § 2504 [16 Stat. 256]), that “wines, brandy, and other spirituous liquors imported in bottles shall be packed in packages containing not less than one dozen bottles,” does not subject liquors not so packed to forfeiture, for there is no statute declaring such a forfeiture, and a constructive forfeiture is not justified except in eases of the most urgent necessity.</p> <p>2. To entail a forfeiture, it is not sufficient that there has been a violation of law by means of the thing sought to be forfeited, but there must have been such a violation as will bring it directly under the letter of the law declaring the forfeiture.</p> <p>3. The act of June 22. 1874, § 16 [IS Stat. 189], which makes the finding of an intent to defraud a prerequisite to forfeiture of goods, though in terms restricted to cases in which issue of fact is joined, may nevertheless be considered applicable to suits in rem. in admiralty, even when there is no answer or appearance; since the admiralty practice is adapted to protect the rights of the absent owner.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the decree of this court was affirmed. 8 Fed. 485.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,889.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Stamping and Branding Casks—Forfeiture.</p> <p>1. Wholesale dealers are bound to “cause” their casks to be stamped and branded in the eases which come under sections 25 and 47 of the act of Jiily 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 136, 144).</p> <p>2. A knowing and wilful failure to comply with section 25 will cause a forfeiture of the goods by virtue of section 96, because no other penalty or punishment is anywhere provided for such failure. Otherwise with a neglect of the requirements of section 47, because that section provides a penalty for a breach thereof.</p> <p>[Cited in TJ. S. y. 4,800 Gallons of Spirits, Case No. 15,153: U. S. v. 1,412 Gallons Distilled Spirits, Id. 15,960.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The parties having reformed the pleadings, the claimant filed a second demurrer, and on the hearing of the cause, the demurrer was sustained on both counts. Case No. 15,-890.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,890.</p> <p>Internad Revenue—Unstamped Packages.</p> <p>The forfeiture of distilled spirits by section 57 of the act of July 20, 1868 [15 Stat. 150], is general, and that section imposes a penalty for a violation of section 25 in case the unstamped packages contain more than five gallons.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,891.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Entries as Passengers’ Baggage-Forfeitures.</p> <p>Where dutiable merchandise was imported as passengers’ baggage, but no attempt was made by the owners and consignees to have it passed as such, and the owner, without knowledge of the seizure by the officers of customs, offered the goods, with correct bills of lading and moneys, for entry at the custom house, held, that such goods were not forfeitable either under the 50th section of the act of March 2, 1799 [1 Stat. 6G5], the 1st section of the act of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 742], or the 4th section of the act of July 18, 1866 [14 Stat. 179].</p>

<p>Case No. 15,892.</p> <p>Forfeiture—Possession of Propertv—Seizure —Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Jurisdiction to proceed by information for the condemnation of property forfeited under the revenue laws, depends upon the possession of the property, actual or constructive.</p> <p>2. Property was seized, as forfeited for a violation of the internal revenue laws. Before any information was filed, the property was bonded, under section 48 of the act of June 36. 18(14, as amended by section 9 of the act of July 13, 1806 (14 Stat. Ill), and surrendered. An information was then filed against the property, counting on a violation of the said 48th section, and also of section 26 of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 154). On the trial, in the district court, there was a verdict for the claimant on the count based upon the said 48th section, and a verdict for the United States condemning the property, on the count based upon the said 26th section: Held, that the verdict of condemnation could not be sustained, because, when the information was filed, the property was not, actually or constructively, under seizure, as respected proceedings for a violation of the said 26th section.</p> <p>3.Nor was the difficulty remedied by the fact, that, after the information was filed, the property was reseized, and then taken possession of by the marshal, on a monition founded on the information, and then bonded by its owner.</p>

This was an action on a distiller’s bond dated 26th day of August, 1S69, and containing the usual conditions.

The plaintiffs brought an action of debt in the court below against the defendant [M. M. Noah] as sheriff of the city and county of New-York, for the escape of one Joseph Wilson, a prisoner committed to his custody on a capias ad satisfaciendum, at the suit of the plaintiffs.

[This was an indictment against Augustus P.. Noblom, Henry Peychaud, R. H. Shannon. and others, charging them with conspiring to defraud the government.]

The defendant [Isaac Norris] was convicted of manslaughter upon an indictment for the murder of John Doyle, on the 17th of May, 1807, and a question arose whether, on a common-law indictment, the statutory punishment can be inflicted. The judgment of THE COURT was that he pay a fine of twenty dollars, and be imprisoned for twelve calendar months, including this day (June 26, 1807), and stand further committed until his fine and costs should be paid.

<p>Case No. 15,897.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Smuggling from Canada — Manifest.</p> <p>1. An indictment for smuggling goods from Canada into the United States, charging that the goods were brought in without an invoice, and without the payment of duties, cannot he maintained under the 19th section of the act of August 30, 1842 (5 Stat. 565).</p> <p>2. Such importations are governed by the act of March 2, 1821 (3 Stat. 616), which requires only the delivery to the collector of the verified manifest of goods imported from an adjacent foreign territory and the payment of the duties.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,900.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Confessions—Offences against Postal Laws.</p> <p>1. Confessions to be excluded from the jury, must have been made by the prisoner under some hope of advantage, or extorted by some apprehension of danger. Some of the modern eases in England, have perhaps, been carried further than the reason of the rule requires, in refusing to admit, as evidence, the confessions of the prisoner.</p> <p>[Cited ir U. S. v. Stone, 8 Fed. 255.]</p> <p>2. Each case must be governed by its own circumstances.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Stone, 8 Fed. 254.] ■</p> <p>3. Under the 21st section of the post office law of 1825 [4 Stat. 102], no one can be convicted who is not employed in the post office department.</p> <p>4. Some evidence is necessary of the genuineness and value of bank notes, charged to have been stolen out of a letter.</p> <p>5. Taking the notes greatly aggravates the offence, and the taking must be charged and proved, as a substantive part of the offence.</p> <p>6. To constitute the offence it is not necessary that the letter stolen should have been taken out of the post office building.</p> <p>7. To convict a person of stealing a letter, &c., who is employed in the department, such employment must be distinctly alleged and proved.</p>

This was a trial on an indictment [against Jacob Nunnemacher and others] for removal of distilled spirits from a distillery to a place other than a distillery warehouse, and for conspiracy.

Motion to quash indictment. It is alleged in the first count of the indictment that the defendants [Jacob Nunnemacher and others], on the 18th day of December. 1874, did remove and did aid and abet in the removal of 3500 proof gallons of distilled spirits on which the tax then due and owing to the United States, and required by law to be paid, had not been paid, from the distillery of Christian Guenther, where said distilled spirits had theretofore been distilled, to a place…

The indictment is under section 3892 of the Revised Statutes, and charges that in said district, defendant, on April 11, 1877, “did unlawfully take a certain letter, then and there directed to one Isaac Baughman, Quincy, Ohio, from the post-office at Quincy, in said district, the said letter not then and there containing any article of value, and before the same had been delivered to the person to whom it was as aforesaid directed, with a design then and there to obstruct…

The four defendants [Alfred Nye and three others] were put on their trial for the offence of endeavoring to make a revolt, on an indictment found under second section of the act of March 3, 1835 (4 Stat. 776). The evidence showed that they were regularly shipped for a voyage from Boston to East Florida, in the brig Leghorn.

This case came up on a motion in behalf of the United States, for a new trial, the court, on the trial, having directed a verdict for the defendant [David Obermeyer].

The defendant [Thomas M. O’Brian] was indicted under the act of February 5, 1867, § 1 (14 Stat 383), for selling to Hines & Eaves, bankers in Leavenworth, a check drawn by the pay-master of the army of the United States, upon the assistant United States treasurer of New York, with a forged indorsement of the name of the payee thereon, with the intent by the said act prohibited.

This was an indictment under section 42 of the internal revenue act of July 13, 1866 [14 Stat. 98], against Luke O’Brien, William H. Hooper, and others, charging the defendants with executing and signing a false and fraudulent distillers’ bond. When the case was called, the defendant’s counsel who appeared only for the principals, moved for a separate trial as to them, which was consented to on the part of the government.

<p>[This was an. indictment against Timothy O’Callahan for passing counterfeit money. Heard on motion to quash.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,911.</p> <p>Verdict—Parties— N ew Trial—Conditions.</p> <p>In an action of assumpsit by the United States against O. and K. and B.. K. pleaded the general issue severally, and O. and B. joined in their plea. The cause of action was joint and several. At the trial, the plaintiffs made no claim against B. The jury were instructed by the court that B. was entitled to a verdict. The jury found a verdict against O. and K., but made no finding as to B. Before judgment was entered, all the defendants moved in arrest, and to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was irregular because the issue as to B. was not found: Held, that if the plaintiffs should discontinue the suit as to B., judgment would be entered against O. and K.; that, on such discontinuance, the motion would be overruled; and that, if a discontinuance was not entered, or an amendment not made, B. would be entitled to a new trial, but not the other defendants.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,914.</p> <p>Slavery—Importation—Presumption op Freedom—Forfeiture.</p> <p>1.The United States district attorney for this district, filed a libel in rem against the bark Ohio, to have her declared forfeited, for having brought into the United States a colored person from a foreign port or place, in violation of the 1st section of the act of congress of the 20th April. 1818 (3 Stat. 450).</p> <p>2. The provisions of this act were not intended to apply to a case where a colored person, born and reared within the United States, sails to a foreign port or place on board of an American ship and returns to a port of the United States.</p> <p>3. And where it appears from evidence, that the negro boy came on board of the vessel in the port of Baltimore in the capacity of a servant, and that he had for several years resided in New Jersey or New York, in the family of the master of the ship, the presumption is that he was free, notwithstanding the declaration of the custom officer, that the master claimed him as his slave.</p> <p>4. In no event can this libel in rem for a forfeiture be sustained, since it does not appear from evidence, that the master, even if he brought the colored boy in question from a foreign port or place, did so on board this particular vessel.</p>

The following are the principal sections of the act of congress of February 8, 1793 (1 Stat. 305), which have been cited with reference to the proceedings in this suit: Section 1: “That ships or vessels, enrolled by virtue of ‘An act for registering and clearing vessels, regulating the coasting trade, and for other purposes,’ and those of twenty tons and upwards, which shall .be enrolled after the last day of May next, in pursuance of this act and having a license in force,…

<p>Case No. 15,916.</p> <p>Offences against Postal Laws—Embezzlement —Indictment.</p> <p>1. An averment, in an indictment, under the 12th section of the act of July 1. 1864 (13 Stat. 337), for embezzling and destroying a letter containing money, which had come into the possession of the defendant as dead-letter clerk in the post-office at New York, that the letter was intended to be conveyed by post, and that it was a letter addressed and directed to a person named, at Philadelphia, is not an averment that the letter was intended to be conveyed by post from New York to Philadelphia.</p> <p>2. It is not necessary to aver, in such indictment, that the letter embezzled was intended to be conveyed to any particular place, an averment that it was intended to be conveyed by post being sufficient.</p> <p>[Approved in L. S. v. Laws, Case No. 15,579.]</p> <p>3. Nor is any averment as to the ownership of the money necessary, in such indictment.</p>

This was a complaint against the defendant, as postmaster of Lynn, for opening a letter, which contained only scrawls and incoherent nonsense, without signature, and was addressed to one Barker, of Lynn, who, it appeared, lived in that place. The letter was dropped into the Lynn post office.

2 [This action was brought to recover the sum of $100, alleged to be due the United States from the defendant, as a special tax for engaging in the business of a lottery dealer. It was commenced October 17, 1867, and tried by the court, without the intervention of a jury.

Indictment [against Francis Orneara] for rescue of W. Aubrey, and assault and battery upon Abercrombie, the constable. Under the act of assembly of Virginia of December 26, 1792 (Old Revised Code 287), disturbers of religious worship may be restrained by a justice present Abercrombie was ordered by Mr. Hoffman, a justice who was present, to take Aubrey into custody. He had also a warrant from Mr. Faw, another of the justices.

[This was a libel against the steamer Ona-chita for an attempt to violate the blockade, etc.] This vessel was captured, at sea, by the United States steamer Memphis, on Oct. 14, 1862. She was chased from 6 a. m. to 3 p. m., and in the chase threw overboard her entire cargo.

<p>Case No. 15,921.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Seizure—Forfeiture.</p> <p>Section 68 of the excise act of June 30, 1864 [13 Stat. 218], confers no authority for the seizure of distillery and lot on which situate or for subjecting such real estate to decree of forfeiture.</p>

<p>Thomas Simons, Asst. U. S. Dist. Atty.</p> <p>Edwards Pierrepont, for claimant.</p>

This was a libel of information by the-United States, upon a seizure by the officers of the customs, for an alleged fraudulent importation from France.

<p>Case No. 15,924.</p> <p>Deposition—Objections to Competency of Witness—Customs Seizube—Ixquiby as to Accident ob Mistake.</p> <p>1. Objections to the competency of the witness should be made at the time of taking a deposition under the 30th section of the judiciary act [1 Stat 88], if the party attend, and the objections are known to him, in order that they may be removed. Otherwise, he will be presumed to have intended to waive them.</p> <p>[Cited in Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 160.]</p> <p>2. But the objection may be made at the time of reading the deposition, if the facts constituting the objection were not known to the party when it was taken.</p> <p>3. Where goods are seized as forfeited, under the act of the 20th of April, 1818 [3 Stat. 433], for being entered at the custom house differently from the invoice, the inquiry cannot be made at the trial, whether such difference proceeded from accident or mistake, the question being referred exclusively to the secretary of the treasury.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Platt, Case No. 16,054a.]</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Bussell, 59 Mich. Ill, 26 N. "W 310. Cited in brief in Wood v. Helmer, 10 Neb. 65, 4 N. W. 968.]</p> <p>4. Nor has the collector a right to make such inquiry on the seizure of goods under this act.</p> <p>5. The provision in the act of the 2d of March, 1799 [1 Stat. 627], allowing such inquiry to be made by the court or collector, is impliedly repealed by the act of 1818, rules of construction as to the repeal of statutes by implication.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Twenty-Five Cases of Cloth, Case No. 1G.5G3; U. S. v. Gates, Id. 15,191; U. S. v. The Cuba, Id. 14,898.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,925.</p> <p>' Customs Duties — Process — Se'izure — Attachment Of Property in Custody of Collector.</p> <p>1. A libel of information was filed against goods, to forfeit them for alleged violation of the revenue laws, and process was issued to the marshal, commanding him to attach the property and detain it in his custody. The marshal returned, that he had been unable to attach- the property and to detain it in his custody, and an alias monition was .issued to him. On the record in the cause, and an affidavit showing that the goods had been, previous to the filing of the libel, seized by the collector of the port of New York, and remained in his custody, and that a certificate to that effect had been issued to the marshal, an application was made, on behalf of the United States, for an order that the alias monition be modified, so as to conform to the provisions of the 31st section of the act of July IS, 1860 (14 Stat. 18(1). Held, that the provisions of the 4th section of the act of May 8, 1792 (1 Stat. 277), requiring the marshal to take custody of all goods seized by any officer of the revenue, were abrogated by the 31st section of the act of July 18, 1866 (14 Stat. 186).</p> <p>[Cited in Re Two Hundred and Fifty Tons' of Salt, 5 Fed. 220.]</p> <p>2. The 9th admiralty rule of the supreme court, in view of the provision of the act of I860, was not applicable to the case, it being a case, in the language of that rule, ‘’otherwise provided for by statute.”</p> <p>3. The alias monition would, therefore, be modified, so that it should command the marshal to attach the property by leaving with the collector, or other person having the property in custody, a copy of the monition and a notice requiring such collector or other person to detain such property in custody until the further order of the court respecting it.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,927.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Importation' of Indecent Articles—V erdict—Package.</p> <p>1. If a verdict finds facts not put in issue by the pleadings, it is so far nugatory.</p> <p>2. By Statute 1857, c. 63 [11 Stat. 168], if an invoice or package' of imported goods contains some articles which are indecent, or obscene, and others which are not, the whole are liable to forfeiture. The indecent or obscene articles are to be destroyed, and the others to be sold.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Males, 51 Fed. 43.]</p> <p>3. An information was filed against one case of stereoscopic slides, alleging them to be indecent and obscene, and praying that they might be condemned and destroyed, and the general issue was pleaded. The jury found that a part of the slides imported in the case were indecent, and that the rest were neither indecent nor obscene.</p> <p>4. Under such pleadings, only those found to be indecent can be condemned, and the residue must be acquitted.</p> <p>5. If a verdict find that two kinds of slides were in the same case, it is not a finding that they were in the same package.</p>

This was an information against certain property described as one copper still, one copper column, one mixing tub, one dumping tub, one alcohol tub, and other property of a similar character, seized at the rectifying house of the South Side Re-distilling Company, on July 2, 1877.

<p>Case No. 15,929.</p> <p>Forfeitures—Information—Averments—Illicit Distillation.</p> <p>1. An information under the Internal Revenue Law claiming a forfeiture of a distillery, and things connected with it, for a violation of that law, must describe with reasonable certainty the things on which a judgment of forfeiture is asked. It is not sufficient to describe them as “all the boilers, stills, and other vessels used in the distillation of spirits, and all the distilled spirits—being about twelve barrels—now in the distillery owned by Samuel W. Walts.”</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Fifteen Barrels of Distilled Spirits, 51 Fed. 423.]</p> <p>2. A pleading on a statute is not required to negative an exception in a proviso to it.</p> <p>3. An information of this kind must aver that the property sought to be adjudged forfeited, was used in the illicit distillation charged, or (being spirit) was the product of such distillation.</p> <p>NOTE. That, in pleading, it is not necessary to negative a proviso in the statute, consult The Mary Merritt [Case No. 9.222], opinion by Drummond, J. Com. v. Fitchburg Railroad Co.. 10 Allen, 189; Matthews v. State, 24 Ark. 484; Kline v. State, 44 Miss. 317. As to particularity, consult U. S. v. Scott [Case No. 16,241], and U. S. v. Prescott [Id. 16,084].</p>

<p>Case No. 15,930.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Forfeiture—Evidence— Record—Testimony of Accomplice.</p> <p>1. Where in a proceeding for the forfeiture of property, under the internal revenue statutes, on the ground of fraud, the information In different counts avers several frauds, under different sections of the statute, a verdict of forfeiture will be sustained, if there is one count setting forth a fraud, within the words of any one of the sections.</p> <p>2. An accomplice in the commission of the frauds charged, is a competent witness, but his testimony is to be received with great caution; and a jury should hesitate to basé a verdict upon it, unless corroborated by other reliable testimony.</p> <p>3. The record of a court of competent jurisdiction in a case between the same parties, involving the same property, and prosecuted for the same object as the second suit, is conclusive of the facts appearing in it.</p> <p>4. But where, ns in this case, the proceeding is for the forfeiture of a distillery, and numerous articles of property pertaining to it, specified in the information, for fraudulent distillation, a record proving the forfeiture of spirits from the same distillery, for alleged frauds, by the decree of another court, is not conclusive evidence of the frauds charged in this information.</p> <p>5. But such'record is admissible to the jury as a circumstance strengthening the presumption of the frauds charged in this case; and also as corroborative of the witnesses- testifying for the United States, who were accomplices in the commission of the frauds.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,931.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Refilling Foreign Casks with Domestic Spirits.</p> <p>[Section 12 of the act of March 1, 1879 [20 Stat. 342], when read in connection with sections 11 and 13, shows a plain intention that the exterior of the package shall in all cases unmistakably indicate the nature of the contents; and therefore it is unlawful to refill with domestic tax-paid spirits any casks in which foreign spirits have been imported, even where the brands, stamps, and marks required by law have been removed.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An application was subsequently made for a reconsideration of the above decision. Judge Hoffman expressed his belief in the correctness of the above opinion. Case No. 15,280.] _</p>

[This was a libel of forfeiture against one hempen cable and one hempen hawser, which were seized by the collector because they were not entered on the manifest of the vessel.]

<p>Case No. 15,932.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Costs or District Attorneys and Clerks.</p> <p>In suits brought to enforce forfeitures under the customs revenue acts, the district attorney of the United States is entitled to tax, as costs, two per cent, on the amount of proceeds realized under execution, in accordance with the 11th section of the act of March 3, 1803 (12 Stat. 741), and the clerk is entitled to tax the one er cent, on such proceeds allowed him by the st section of the act of February 26, 1853 (10 Stat. 161). notwithstanding the passage of the 2d section of the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. 18Gj, repealing all provisions of law under which moieties of fines, penalties or forfeitures under the customs revenue laws, or commission thereon, are paid to officers of the United States.</p>

This was an action to forfeit the goods on the ground that they were fraudulently undervalued on entry at the custom-house here with intent to evade the payment of duties. The wool was imported from Cape Town, in March, 1860, by the firm of Siffken and Ironsides. It was invoiced by them at 10 per cent, sterling, per Dutch pound, making about 20 cents per pound English.

<p>Case No. 15,932b.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Forfeiture for Undervaluation—Repeal of Statutes—Criminal Intent.</p> <p>[1. Section 66 of the act of March 2. 1799 (1 Stat. 677). and section 4 of the act of May 28, 1830 (4 Stat. 409), which provide for the forfeiture of goods invoiced below their actual "cost,” are still in force (1861), and have not been modified by subsequent legislation so as to require the invoice to be according to the “value” in the place of purchase, instead of actual cost. The cases, however, in which the actual cost is to be stated, are perhaps limited to purchases in the open market in the ordinary course of trade, thus excluding cases of purchase under circumstances calculated to depress the price below the market value.]</p> <p>[2. To entail a forfeiture for undevaluation, under these sections, there must be a concurrence of undervaluation, and intent to evade the payment of duties; and hence there can be no forfeiture of a bale of wool of superior grade and value, which was included, by mistake, with a shipment of bales of a lower grade, and invoiced at the same price with them.]</p>

The facts of the case were substantially as follows: The tea was shipped in May, 1SG1, by Russell & Co., of Shanghae, on board the ship Dora, bound to New York, and was consigned to Edmund Davenport & Co., of Richmond, Virginia. In October, 1801, the vessel arrived in this city, and the tea was seized here by the collector of the customs. Messrs.

[Error to the district court of the United States for -the district of Rhode Island.] Libel of information in rem, by the United States attorney, against 146,650 clapboards [Israel Meritt, claimant], seized by James Shaw, Jr., collector of the port of Providence, in this district. Trial in the district court by jury.

<p>Case No. 15,934.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Forfeiture—Illegal Distillation.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,935a.</p> <p>Foreign Statutes—How Proven.</p> <p>[The statutes of England may be proven by the printed publications thereof obtained from the queen’s printer.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,936.</p> <p>New Trial — Verdict against Evidence — Forfeiture for Violation of Internal Revenue Laws.</p> <p>A verdict in favor of the defendant, in a suit for forfeiture of goods for violation of the internal revenue laws, will not be set aside as against the evidence, though as to a small part of the goods proceeded against, the court entertains no doubt that upon the evidence the verdict is wrong.</p>

<p>Case No.15,937.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Informers — Judgment Power of Court to Modift after Term.</p> <p>1. Where upon an information of forfeiture for violation of the internal revenue laws, a judgment has been entered, distributing the proceeds in the registry in accordance with the rights of different parties, as found by the court, the judgment cannot be modified or altered by the court after the close of the term. Any errors in the proceedings, not merely formal, must be corrected by proceedings in the appellate tribunal; and even at the suggestion of the treasury department, the court cannot alter or change its records.</p> <p>2. Informations were filed against several lots of whiskey for violations of the internal revenue acts. By order of court the several cases were consolidated, and upon the trial a verdict was found in favor of the government, Feb. 28, 1870, for the value of the whiskey for which the claimant had given bond. Pénding a motion for a new trial, the claimant by an arrangement with the department, paid into the registry the sum of $12.221.07, instead of the value assessed at $27,781.31, and on May 27. 1870, the motion for new trial was overruled and judgment entered. In one of the cases the former collector was entered as informer, and in another, one Hunter was found to be the first informer, and the order was made for the payment of the money in the registry of the court to the collector, to be by him distributed in conformity with the judgment of the court on Sept. 28, 1S7C.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,938.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Forfeiture—Trial bt Jurt —Proceeding in Rem.</p> <p>1.In a proceeding in the district court of the United States against property seized as forfeited under the internal revenue laws, to which a claim is interposed, the claimant has a constitutional right to a trial by a jury.</p> <p>2. Congress has no power by legislation to provide for any other mode of trying a case, in which the right of trial by jury is secured by the constitution.</p> <p>3. The provision of the statute, declaring that “the proceeding to enforce said forfeiture of said property shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem,” is not to be construed as authorizing a trial on strict admiralty rules, and without the intervention of a jury.</p>

[These were libels of information against one hundred and thirty-three casks of distilled spirits, and two packages of distilled spirits; Funkenstein & Co., claimants.]

Libel of information under the act of congress, July 13, 1861 [against one hundred and twenty-nine packages, W. H. Probasco, claimant].

The libel in this case alleged that Collector Schell, in September last, at the city of New York, seized as forfeited to the United States, the 126 bales of padding impprted into the port of New York, subject to duties and entered; that an invoice was produced and left with the collector; that upon an examination and appraisement the packages and invoice were found to have been made up with intent, by faise valuation, extension and otherwise, to evade and defraud the revenue…

<p>Motion to strike out a count from a libel of information.</p>

Libel of information [against one hundred barrels of cement; Hicks & Cocke, claimants] for violation of the 5th section of the act of congress approved July 13th, 1S61.

<p>Case No. 15,944.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Distillery Frauds — Commissioner’s Reoulations.</p>

These four lots of whiskey, amounting in all to two hundred barrels, were seized in Boston and informed against under section 45 of the statute of July 13, 1866, c. 184 (14 Stat. 163), and, after default, were condemned and sold. Against the proceeds of sale seven persons filed petitions as informers.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] Hearing upon a writ of error. This cause was a proceeding in rem commenced in the United States district court for the Eastern district of Missouri, against one hundred barrels of distilled spirits, to enforce a forfeiture for violations of internal revenue laws.

<p>The government has an appeal to the supreme court at Washington, the amount involved being over $7,000.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,949.</p> <p>Bribery—Indictment—Scienter.</p> <p>An allegation that the defendant knowingly offered to give O. a bribe to vote, the said O. being then under twenty-one years of age, held to mean that the defendant knew O. was under age when he offered him the bribe.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,950.</p> <p>Costs—To What Limited.</p> <p>1. The act of February 26, 1853 [10 Stat. 161], repealed all antecedent legislation of congress on the subject of costs, and changed the existing usages and practice of courts therein, and limited costs to the specific appointments of that statute.</p> <p>2. The taxation of costs according to former statutes, and the former usage and practice of the court for services not mentioned in the statute, disallowed. The opinion of the attorney general of the United States, contra, not followed.</p>

The questions presented for the decision of the court arise upon the demurrer of claimants [Bowling & Reed] to the information filed by the district attorney upon the part of the United States.

This was an information against certain personal property seized for a violation of the internal revenue laws. The property consisted of two stills and their appurtenances and some whiskey, and also of a dwelling-house and a lager beer saloon and a brewery and its appurtenances, the whole being enclosed in one enclosure by a high board fence. The stills and their appurtenancés and the whiskey were condemned by default.

<p>[This was an information of forfeiture, under the internal revenue laws, against one still boiler, etc.]</p> <p>It was heretofore decided in this case that the informer’s share should he calculated on the gross proceeds of the forfeiture and not on the net proceeds after payment of costs, according to the practice that has hitherto obtained. See One Still [Case No.. 10,034]. The district attorney obtained leave to re-argue the question, and the judge has now rendered his decision on the re-argument.</p>

[Persons who make, by the same process and machinery which distillers use. alcoholic vapor, but do not condense this vapor into spirits or alcohol, and have no machinery adapted to that purpose, but who, on the contrary, conduct it into a large vessel containing a mixture of water, vinegar, and yeast, with which it instantly mingled, are not “distillers.” either within the meaning of the 21st or 23d sections of the act of July 13, 1866. or the 16th section of the act of…

<p>Case No. 15,957.</p> <p>Confiscation Acts — Wak of the Rebellion — Seizure of Cotton—Proclamation of Amnesty —Judicial Notice — Cessation of Hostilities.</p> <p>1. The president’s proclamation of pardon and amnesty issued Dec. 25, 1868, removed the guilt from parties who had sold, given, purchased, or acquired cotton with intent that the same should be used in aiding or abetting the insurrection, and thereby relieved the property itself from being a lawful subject of prize and capture under the act of August 6, 18G1 (12 Stut. 319).</p> <p>2. The courts will take judicial notice of the fact that the hostilities of the late Civil War ceased and peace was restored by the surrender of the last armies of the Confederacy west of the Mississippi in May, 1805.</p> <p>[This cause was carried, on writ of error, to the circuit court, where the decree of this court was reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. Case No. 15,958.]</p>

[Error to the circuit court of the United States for the Western district of Tennessee.] [The information in this cause charged— First, that the cotton had been sold or given with the intent of aiding in the insurrection; and second, that the cotton had been purchased in and was being transported from, a state in insurrection, to a loyal state, thus forfeiting the cotton to the United States, according to act of congress of July 13, 18G1 (12 Stat. 255).

<p>Case No. 16,960.</p> <p>Inteknai, Revenue Laws — Forfeitures — Construction1 of Statutes.</p> <p>1. The provision of the 96th section of the internal revenue act of July 20, 1868 (15 Stat. 104), “that, if any distiller, rectifier, wholesale liquor dealer, compounder of liquors, or manufacturer of tobacco or cigars, shall knowingly and wilfully omit, neglect or refuse to do, or cause to be done, any of the things required by law in the carrying on or conducting of his business, or shall do anything by this act prohibited, if there be no specific penalty or punishment imposed by any other section of this act, for the neglecting, omitting, or refusing to do, or for the doing or causing to be done, the thing required or prohibited, he shall pay a penalty of §1,000, and, if the person so offending be a distiller, rectifier, wholesale liquor dealer, or compounder of liquors, all distilled spirits or liquors owned by him, or in which lie has any interest, as owner, * * * shall be forfeited to the United States,” does not authorize such forfeiture of spirits or liquors to be imposed for a violation of the 45th section of the same act, for the reason that a specific penalty or punishment is imposed by the 45th section for a violation of the 45th section.</p> <p>2. A statute which is of doubtful or double meaning, should not be construed in its harshest possible sense, when persons to whom it applies may have been led to trust in a less severe construction of it, but one equally satisfying its terms.</p> <p>3. Apart from the consideration last stated, the construction of the act, above stated, is deemed the most natural and to best conform lo the intention of congress and the design of the act.</p>

[Libel of information by the United States to condemn 1,756 shares of the capital stock of the Great Western Railroad Company of Illinois. Heard on motion by the United States to strike the answer, claim, and appearance interposed on behalf of Leroy M. Wiley, on the ground that said claimant was at the time of the making of the motion, and ever since the breaking out of the Rebellion had been, residing in Alabama.]

[Libel of information by the United States to condemn 1,756 shares of the capital stock of the Great Western Railroad Company of Illinois. A motion by the United States to strike out the answer, claim, and appearance interposed in behalf of Leroy M. Wiley was granted. U. S. v. One Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty-Six Shares, Case No. 15,960a. Heard on motion by the United States to strike out the answer and claim interposed in behalf of the Great Western Railroad Company.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel of information, filed in the district court, by the United States, against 1,756 shares of the capital stock of the Great Western Railroad Company of Illinois, a corporation created under the laws of the state of Illinois, praying its condemnation, as having been the property of one Leroy M. Wiley, and as being forfeited to the United States.

<p>Case No. 15,964.</p> <p>New Trial — Customs Laws — Examination of Goods.</p> <p>1. Grounds upon which a court of common law may grant a new trial.</p> <p>2. It seems that the proper construction of the act of 1799, c. 22, § 67 (1 Stat. 677), requires that each package shall be examined by a custom-house officer in the presence of two merchants, and that, to constitute such presence, the merchants must be in such a situation as to be able to witness such examination, and to see and testify to a part at least of the contents of each package.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,962.</p> <p>Customs Laws—Seizure fok Undervaluation— Amount of Bond.</p> <p>[In bonding merchandise seized by the collector for alleged undervaluation, the amount of the bond should equal the appraised value of the goods, -and the collector cannot require a bond covering the appraised value plus the amount of the duties.]</p>

[This was an information containing several counts against 1.291 bales of tobacco seized while on storage in an United States bonded warehouse, and alleged to be forfeited to the government because entered by means of a false invoice, and other false and fraudulent practices and appliances, under section 1, act March 3, 1SG3, c. 76 (12 Stat. 737).

<p>Case No. 15,966.</p> <p>Internal Revenue Raws—Forfeitures—Recti-fiers and Wholesale Dealers— Book Entries.</p> <p>1. Where a rectifier and wholesale liquor dealer, acting under section 26 of the revenue act of July 13, 1866 [14 Stat. 9S], entered in the prescribed books certain spirits bought and received by him, and the names of the manufacturers or rectifiers thereof marked on the barrels, as the persons from whom purchased, instead of the names of the actual vendors— held, he had not complied with the requirements of the law in so doing, and had incurred the forfeiture denounced by said section, from which the court had no power .to relieve.</p> <p>2. The forfeiture denounced by said section applies only to the spirits, apparatus, and articles in the possession of the offender at the time of the act or neglect whereby forfeited, and not to such as he might thereafter acquire and be found in his possession.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.]</p> <p>Libel of seizure for violation of the navigation and intercourse acts of 15th of May, 1820, e. 122, and of 1st of March, 1823,. c. 150 [3 Story’s Laws, 1893 (3 Stat. 740, c. 22)] . against an open boat and her tackle and lading. The information alleged, (1> that this was a boat or vessel, owned wholly, or in part, by British subjects, and that she came and arrived by sea, from some part of the province of New Brunswick, within the port of Eastport; (2) that sundry goods, not of the growth and manufacture of the United States, comprising the boat load, were shipped and waterborne on the waters of the Bay of Passamaquoddy, for the purpose of being exported into New Brunswick in said boat, &c. not being a vessel of the United States. The facts, as proved, were as follows. The boat was under five tons in bur-then, and was without a deck, and had on board, at the time of the seizure, 28 barrels of tar and pitch, with which she was bound from Eastport to St. Andrews, in New Brunswick. She had do custom-house papers on board at the time of the seizure, and it did not appear, that such papers had at any time been taken out for her. She was owned by British born subjects, who, with their families, had resided and been domiciled at Eastport for several years; and her home was admitted to be at Eastport. The goods on board were claimed by Joseph C. Noyes, a citizen of the United States, residing at Eastport. [The district court decreed a restoration of the goods. Case No. 10,549.]</p> <p>The first inquiry is, whether this boat is included within the class of vessels excluded from the United States by the act of May 15, 1820. The word “vessel,” as applied to maritime affairs, is understood to mean any vehicle used for transportation on the water; and if the word is used in the act according to its common acceptation, the act clearly excludes boats owned by British subjects, from our waters. And if such is the sense in which the word is used in the laws of the United States generally, it may safely be-concluded to have been so used in this act. In the first registry act of September 1, 1789, c. 11 (Brozen’s Ed.) [1 Stat. 55], the language used is, “ship or vessel,” to designate all water-craft; and when it is intended to exclude any of the small craft, a limitation is made by stating the tonnage. In section 22, it is provided, that “the master or owner of every vessel of less than twenty tons and not less than five tons”—“shall cause the name of such vessel to be painted,” &c. In the coasting act of February IS, 1793, c. 52 [1 Story’s Lawrs, 2S3 (1 Stat. 305, c. 8)], §§ 1, 4, 0, “ships or vessels,” of less than twenty tons, are spoken of; and in section 20, “ships or vessels” of more than five tons; and in the 37th section is a provision, that the act shall not extend to boats or lighters of a specific class, thereby implying, that it does extend to other boats and lighters. In the collection act of March 2, 1799, c. 12S, § 92 [1 Story’s Laws, G56 (1 Stat. 697, c. 22)], foreign merchandise is required to be imported on “ships or vessels” of less than thirty tons, except in certain districts, thereby implying, that such importation in those districts may be made in “ships or vessels” of less tonnage without limitation. In the act of July 29, 1813 [3 Stat. 49], granting “allowances to certain vessels employed in the fishery,” section 5, “ship or vessel” is used, and the limitation established by the tonnage. In the 0th section, “boat or vessel” is used, and the limitation is made by the tonnage. And so in sections 7 and 8, “vessel” and “ship or vessel” are the terms used. It is believed the term “vessel” is used in the laws of the United States, as including all water-craft, and that a limitation is expressed where one is intended. Where the language of a statute is plain, courts will never look after the motives of the lawgiver, or the objects intended to be effected; they do so only where the language is obscure or contradictory, or where from some other cause the mind is left in doubt, whether the statute embraces the case. Believing that this statute is neither doubtful nor obscure, but that it determines clearly, that vessels of all classes from New Brunswick, owned by British subjects, are excluded from our waters under penalty of forfeiture; the propriety of arguing whether a particular class, to wit, boats, come within the evils intended to be remedied by the statute, is not admitted; but while it is not admitted, such an inquiry is not to be feared. The object of Great Britain seems to have been, to give to her own subjects the navigation and trade to her colonies in the West Indies. The object on our part, to counteract that policy and prevent the intended effect of it. The British, by excluding us from the West Indies. hoped to secure for themselves “the long voyage” from these provinces, or from our country to the West Indies. The' United States hoped, by excluding all these provincial vessels from our ports, to operate as strongly against their navigation, as their own laws were calculated to operate in its favour. Whatever, therefore, would tend to depress and injure their shipping interest, and to deprive them of the fruits they intended to reap, would be in furtherance of the policy of this government. Hence we should expect to find our government extending the exclusion as far as it might lawfully do. It could not extend the exclusion beyond the provincial vessels, without a violation of the commercial convention of 1815. And it has done what would be expected of it. It has not stopped at the exclusion of British West India vessels, but has excluded all her provincial vessels without discrimination. To limit the exclusion to a particular class of these vessels, would be doing less than this government had a right to do, and less than her counteracting policy required should be done. And just so far as a limitation of the exclusive system is made, so far the British shipping remains uninjured, in the enjoyment of the advantages intended to be extended to it by the British laws. If a distinction is to be made in the classes of vessels excluded, and not excluded, by what rule is the court to be guided in making it? What shall be the tonnage of those not excluded? Will the court look into a foreign statute book to fix this rule, and so make the rule change, as foreign legislation varies? Can any limitation be adopted, confining the operation of the statute to British subjects domiciled abroad? Such a construction would be contrary to our whole system of navigation as exhibited in the registry and coasting acts; and would give all the trade to British built vessels, changing only the domicil of the owners. Suppose at the passage of the act of 1820, amendments had been offered, limiting the act to vessels navigating according to the regulations of the British plantation trade; or to vessels documented as British vessels; or to vessels with decks; can one doubt that each of these propositions would have made a material alteration in the act, and would have required and received very grave deliberation before it had been adopted? “De minimis non curat lex” cannot be applied to the boat navigation; it would be out of place.</p> <p>On what is believed to be another erroneous construction of the statute, is founded an objection to the sufficiency of the first allegation in the libel. The words “shall enter or attempt to enter” the ports of the United States, are supposed to mean something more than coming within those ports. It is not perceived what other meaning can be attached to them, unless they require an entry at the custom-house. Such a construction would make congress declare, that British vessels should be excluded from our ports, and yet might come within them and do as they pleased, if they would avoid the custom-house. On a careful examination of the act it will be perceived, that the coming “by sea” is applied to the vessels of Lower Canada only, and the reason of it is obvious; Lower Canada being the only place mentioned in the act where arrivals in any other mode, to any extent, could be expected.</p> <p>In relation to the second allegation in the libel it may be remarked, that the exports by the act of March 1, 1823, § 5, are limited to “any vessel of the United States or any British vessel,” navigated, as prescribed, to the enumerated ports. By the (3th section, the act “so far as the same shall apply” to the intercourse “in British vessels, shall cease to operate in their favour,” on the president’s issuing his t proclamation,—and by the proclamation it has so far ceased to be operative, and no farther. The act, then, remains in force to require exports “in any vessel of the United States” to be made to the enumerated ports; and to prohibit exportation in vessels, not vessels of the United States, by confining the exports to vessels of the United States. To adopt any other construction, is to erase the words “in any vessel of the United States,” and read the act as if those words had never had place in it. But why is there such language used in the other section, that the president’s proclamation shall cause the act to cease so far as respects British vessels, if nothing was intended to be regulated but British vessels? Why was not the act in terms suspended entirely, if such was the intention? Why such pains-taking, in the language of the act. to exclude the very result now contended for, if nothing was intended by it? Although the policy of confining exports to our own vessels, and in those, to certain enumerated ports, may not be seen; the inquiry is not whether the policy is wise, but whether congress has so enacted. Judicial tribunals do not assume the responsibility of erasing certain parts of a statute, because the wisdom of its provisions is not seen. Great might be the alterations in statutes, if such a rule were adopted.</p> <p>The navigation of the United States, in the sense in which it comes into view by international regulations, is defined by the early acts of congress. What shall be deemed vessels of the United States, is determined by the provisions of our registry and coasting laws; settling how they shall be constructed, documented, owned, and manned, to entitle them to privileges of that national description, and discriminating the rates of tonnage established in their favour against foreign vessels. The lowest scale of tonnage, coming within the description of vessels of the United States, in the terms of their navigation acts, is five tons. Nothing in the provisions of the act for regulating the coasting trade and fisheries (section 37) extends to any boat or lighter not masted, or not decked (open), employed in the harbour of any town or city. The colonial intercourse, sought for by the government of the United States, is not capable of being carried on in vessels of a description inferior to what are legally denominated “vessels of the United States,” and against which the measures of British legislation are directed. The actof 1820 is onlypointed against British vessels arriving by sea. There is nothing in any of the respective provisions of Great Britain or the United States, that looks to a conflict of boat navigation. There has been no controversy on that subject; no measure for retaliation on our part existed in the English system. Such light boats are not recognized in the respective registry or enrolment acts, and navigation laws, of either power, more than birch canoes or timber rafts. They are not required to be built, owned, or navigated in any particular manner; they are not subject to tonnage duties; nor reached by any provisions of national policy. The allegation in the first article in the information certainly is, that this boat was a British vessel, within the meaning of the act of 1820. What sort of British vessel was contemplated by the policy of the acts of 1818 and 1820? The answer is, those that were protected and set apart, by the policy of the English navigation and plantation system, for the engrossment of the commercial intercourse between her American dependencies, and the United States. The act of 1818 touched, if I may so say, the very pupils of the British system. It bore immediately on British vessels, which had directly “cleared out” from, or circuitously touched at, any port or place in the British dominions, from which our navigation was excluded. It forbid their entering or attempting to enter the ports of the United States, under forfeiture of vessel and cargo. And every British vessel which should duly “enter” our ports, and take on board productions of the United States, was required to “give bond” (pursuing the pattern of the English plantation provision,—28 Geo. III. c. 6, § 3). also (act of navigation,—St. 12 Car. II. c. 18, § 19), to land them without any part of the British dominions from which our vessels were debarred by the British laws of navigation. There is nothing in all these provisions, that relates to the regulation of boats. The act of 1818 is defined to be a “non-intercourse, in British vessels, with ports closed, by British laws, against the vessels of the United States.” Documents 19th Cong. (2d Sess. 1826) No. 2, p. 43; Letter of Mr. Adams to Mr. Rush, June 23. 1823. The supplementary act of 1820, was intended to arm and invigorate the act of ISIS. It applied a special interdict to British vessels; vessels owned wholly or in part by British subjects; coming or arriving by sea from any part of the British dominions in this hemisphere. It prohibited their entry, or attempting to “enter,” under pain of forfeiture, as before; and bonds were again required of British vessels duly entered, not to discharge articles of the produce of the United States shipped on board, for exportation, in any of the prohibited places. The 3d section prohibited importation into the United States from any of the foregoing British dependencies, of any articles not produced therein, specially. This act established “a non-intercourse in British vessels with all the British American colonies, and a prohibition of all articles” except the produce of each colony respectively imported directly from itself. Documents of Congress, ut supra.</p> <p>By the act of 1823, congress suspended the provisions of the acts of ISIS and 1S20, in respect to certain British colonial and provincial ports, and authorized importation in certain British vessels, coming directly therefrom, of colonial produce, on one condition. that the same might be exported therefrom to this country, on equal terms, in vessels of the United States, the British vessels thereby admitted “being navigated by a master and three fourths of the mariners, at least, British subjects.” The next section (section 3) provided for equalizing the duties on tonnage. The act of 1823, was apparently designed as a counterpart to St. 3 Geo. IV. c. 44 (18221. That statute allowed American built vessels, lawfully navigated, to import certain goods directly to the "West Indies, and export colonial produce in their own bottoms. The trade authorized by this statute (like that secured by the commercial convention to be carried on with the East Indies) was to be conducted in ships built in the United States, whereof the master and three fourths of the mariners, were American. This act established the free ports enumerated in our act of 1823, and authorized the importation of certain specified articles, either in British built vessels, owned and navigated according to law, or in vessels of the build and ownership of the country, in which the articles imported had their origin, and authorized exportation. in the same description of vessels, direct to the country where the vessel belongs. By St. 3 Geo. IV. c. 45, the national commerce of the colonies, in exports and imports, is limited to British vessels, owned and navigated according to law The act of congress of 1823. corresponding to these provisions (section 5). enacted, that it should be lawful to export to any enumerated British port, in any vessel of the United States, or in any British vessel, navigated as required by the 2d section, and having come directly from any of the enumerated ports, articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, or imported therein, under the restriction therein provided. The proviso to the section relates exclusively to exportation in British vessels, and requires, that when exported in any such British vessel, bond shall be taken by the collector of the port, at which she shall have entered, for the due landing of the goods at the enumerated port, for which she shall have cleared out. The bond was to be given before shipment. No goods were allowed to be exported to any other than one of the enumerated ports, nor to be shipped on board any British vessel, except one coming direct from such port. And it was further enacted by the proviso, that “in case any such articles should be shipped or waterborne for the purpose of being exported contrary to the act. they should be forfeited.” This act of 1823, was intended to meet and reciprocate the act of parliament of 3 Geo. IV. c. 44, establishing the free ports enumerated by our law. The regulations respecting exports and imports are understood to have been, in a legislative sense and measure, squared with the provisions of that act. The intercourse which was opened to our vessels in direct voyages to the free ports by the act of parliament, was opened also to British vessels, coming directly from, and returning directly to. the same ports, by the act of congress. British vessels, such as are privileged in the “trade and intercourse” before mentioned, were the subjects of this reciprocal measure; and the original retaliatory interdict was left to operate upon the same privileged vessels, either coming from, or going to, any other than one of the free and enumerated ports. And the previous interdict was further armed by the clause condemning goods either shipped, or waterborne, for the' purpose of shipment, contrary to the force of this determined regulation. The whole measure seems to have had a final relation to the West India trade and intercourse; and the object appears to have been, to prevent exportation directly on board such British vessels, or indirectly and clandestinely by intermediate conveyance. British and American vessels, the respective objects of national protection, are thus brought into opposition by the principles and terms of the two corresponding acts; and the act of congress makes a special provision to prevent the liberty allowed to British vessels, from exceeding the measure granted to ours. The two acts of parliament and congress, taken together, constituted a sort of legislative convention, for the time being. Hence the language of the 5th section of the act of 1823, that “it shall be lawful to export from the United ¡States, directly to any of the British colonial ports enumerated, in any vessel of the United States, or in any British vessel navigated,” as the 2d section prescribed, &c. The terms employed are mutual; but the power of the act does not operate on vessels of the United States. So far as our laws were concerned, our vessels were at liberty before; and the only obstruction was from British legislation. After this act of 1823, was passed, there was nothing else, besides the act of parliament, to limit our vessels to the free or enumerated ports. Our act did not extend to prevent them from going to any other ports. In regard to them, viz. “vessels of the United States,” its words had no legal meaning. The restrictive terms of the act of 1S23, apply emphatically to British vessels, “being navigated by a master and three fourths at least, of the mariners, British subjects.” Its force is expended on them. The prohibition is not put upon export. The qualification or disqualification, is only fixed upon the character and quality of the carrier. The prohibition does not extend beyond the class of vessels, that were privileged by Great Britain.</p> <p>The inference, which the attorney for the government is understood to draw from the evidence in this case, is that the boat was going to St. Andrews, which was one of the enumerated ports; and to which it would have been lawful, under the act, to export in a British vessel, coming directly from that port. And the employment of the boat is contended, by the attorney, to have been between Eastport and St. Andrews. This is supposition,—but if the defence rested on that point, there is no positive proof of that fact (viz. arriving from St. Andrews), in fa-vour of the boat. But the operation of the act is annulled by the contingency provided for in the Gth section; the trade and intercourse between the United States and the British colonial ports having been subsequently prohibited by a British order in council, and the provisions of that act thereupon ceasing to operate in favour of British vessels, so far as it extended to them, as announced by the president’s proclamation of 17th March, 1S27; and the acts of 1818 and 1820 are thereby revived in full force. That the act of 1823 was thereby in effect repealed, was decided by the district judge in the case of The Atlantic (Dec. Term, 1S27) [Case No. G21]. Erasing from the act the regulation in regard to British vessels, it is emphatically asked, what is left? The idea of an implied prohibition, a penalty by implication, raised constructively from the mention of “ves-seis of the United States,” in the terms of the act, will not stand the test of legal principles. Although within the permissive words of the act. there was nothing within the terms of the prohibition but British vessels of the privileged class; nor is there anything else upon which they can act. It may be very true, that the present boat was not a proper “vessel of the United States:” but there can be no pre-tence for considering it a British vessel within the contemplation and meaning of the act; and although it be not the one, it is no matter, as long as it be not the other. The allegation, that this was not “a vessel of the United States,” may be, technically, true enough, but it draws no consequence after it; but it will be difficult to sustain the allegation of its being a British vessel, to bring it within the act of 1820. It may be granted, that the persons represented as owners do not come within the requirements of our registry act. Neither is it a British built, owned, and navigated vessel, within the in-tendment of the act of 1820. The boat does not come within the scope, policy, and provisions of the act in reference to entry, bonding, tonnage. It is not a vessel “coming and arriving by sea within the sense of the statute.” The allegation in the first article of the information is defective. It does not state any entry, or attempt to enter. The coming and arriving by sea do not constitute the offence. It is only a sort of inducement to its taking place, or more properly, perhaps, an indication of its character. The vessel so coming and arriving, being British, is excluded. It is the vessel entering or attempting to enter, that is forfeited; and the language of the act has reference only to the class of vessels capable of coming to entry. It is submitted, therefore, with great deference, that a decree of forfeiture cannot be sustained on either allegation. It is not questioned that such a boat, in proceeding to discharge its lading on the opposite shore, might come in contact with some law there established, to prevent importation in other than their own privileged shipping; but the exportation supposed to be intended in the present case, was an American enterprize entirely.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.]</p> <p>Libel of seizure against an open boat and her lading, seized in fact at Eastport on navigable waters for a violation of the laws of the United States, on the 4th of January, 1S2S, by the collector of the district of Passamaquoddy. At the trial in the district court, a decree of condemnation was pronounced against the boat and all her lading, except 7 barrels of flour, 2 barrels of pork, and 13 bags of meal, for default of any daim. [Case unreported.] The excepted goods were claimed by Bucknam and Gun-nison of Eastport; and upon a subsequent hearing a decree of acquittal passed by consent in favour of the claimants; from which decree an appeal was taken in behalf of the United States to the circuit court.</p>

Claim [by Quintín Ortega and others] for [the Rancho San Ysidro] one league of land in Santa Clara county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

The defendant was indicted for an assault upon the person of Mr. Salmon, the Spanish charge d’affaires, and for infracting the law of nations by committing violence upon his person. These charges were contained in two separate indictments, both of which were tried at the same time. The facts of the case, as proved by Mr. Salmon (who presented himself to the court as a voluntary witness), weie as follows.

<p>Case Mo. 16,971a.</p> <p>Forgery of Pension Papers.</p> <p>[1. Forgery is the false making of a paper, but it need not be the entire fabrication thereof. Any addition to a genuine paper, or any alteration of it in an essential particular, so as to give it a different meaning, is a forgery.]</p> <p>[2. Aiding or assisting in forging papers with intent to defraud the government consists in the commission of any act having a tendency to forward or facilitate a forgery committed by another. The degree of aid or assistance is unimportant. To trace a name with a pencil, afterwards filled up with another in ink. or to take measures to prevent surprise or detection while the forgery is being committed would be such an act.]</p> <p>[3. To forge the name of the magistrate to the jurat of an affidavit is a forgery of the affidavit, within the meaning of the law.]</p> <p>[This was an indictment for forgery against Walter F. Osgood.]</p>

<p>Claim [by Antonio Alaria Osio] for Angel Island, situated in the Bay of San Francisco.</p>

The question raised in this motion was, whether, on the indictment found by the grand jury against the defendants, the district court were bound to remit it to the circuit court. The facts and circumstances sufficiently appear in the opinion delivered by the learned district judge.

<p>[This was an indictment against John L. O'Sullivan and others for preparing and setting on foot, etc., a military ' expedition against the Island of Cuba. Heard on motion to quash.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,975.</p> <p>Military Expeditions against Friendly Peoples — Statute of ISIS — What Constitutes the Offence — Criminal Law — Province of Jury.</p> <p>[1. Before the jury can convict any persons of preparing or setting on foot, etc., an expedition against any prince, people, etc., with whom the United States are at peace, under the act of 1818, it must be proved to their satisfaction that the purpose of the expedition or enterprise was some military service, some attack or invasion of another people or country as a military force. To constitute the offence there must be a hostile intention connected with the act of beginning or setting on foot the expedition.]</p> <p>[Quoted in U. S. v. Lumsden, Case No. 15,-641.]</p> <p>[2. When connected with this hostile intent, there are four acts which the statute declares unlawful, either one of which completes the crime; namely: (1) to “begin” an expedition; (2) to “set on foot” an expedition; (3) to “provide the means” for an expedition; and (4) to “procure” those means.]</p> <p>[3. To constitute the offence it is not essential that the expedition should start for its, destination. On the contrary, the law is designed to reach any act done within the jurisdiction of the United States íd preparation for, or furtherance of, a warlike expedition against a people with whom the United States are at peace, without regard to whether the expedition was ever actually' started on its way or not.]</p> <p>[4. The law of 1818 is not a neutrality law merely, which applies only during a state of war, in order to prevent our citizens from interfering as against one of the belligerents. On tlie contrary, it applies to all hostile expeditions or purposes designed t.o violate the peace and rights of a people at peace with the United States, whether they be at war with any other nation or not.]</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Lumsden, Cáse No. 15,641.]</p> <p>[5. The statute of 1838 does not affect the application of the law of 1818 to all ordinary cases. The former act was only a temporary provision, adapted to the peculiar conditions of the Northern frontier, and intended .to stop incursions into the Canadas.]</p> <p>[6. The guilty purpose must be proved, and the guilty acts done within the judicial district, where the indictment is found.]</p> <p>[7. In criminal cases in the federal courts the jury are not the judges of the law, as well as of the facts. They are to understand and accept the law as it is stated to them by the court.]</p> <p>[See Cases Nos. 15,973 and 15,974.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,976.</p> <p>Steam Passenger Vessels—Inspection and Regulation—Ferry Boats.</p> <p>1. [The exception in] the 42d section of the act of congress passed August 30, 1852 [10 Stat. 61], entitled “An act to amend an act, entitled ‘An act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam,’ passed July 7, 1838 [5 S’tat. 304], and for other purposes,” cannot be so construed as to exclude boats or vessels ordinarily used as ferry or tug boats.</p> <p>[Cited in American Transp. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 390.]</p> <p>2. Where a steamboat, built for a ferry boat, used in her daily employment as such, and occasionally as a tug boat, was employed one day-in making several trips from Detroit to Ham-tramck, three miles distant, carrying passengers to the grounds of the state fair; held, that such use did not change the ordinary character of the boat, or take her from the exception of the statute, or make her liable to the penalties of the act.</p>

This is a suit in equity, commenced by process of attachment, which was brought in the hustings court of the city of Alexandria, Virginia, and afterwards, on motion of the United States, removed into this court. The demand of the United States against Ottman is for 815,000, of which $10,-000 is claimed from the banking company as held for [W. H.] Ottman.

<p>Case No. 15,978.</p> <p>Degrees or Murder—Manslaughter—Malice— Justifiable Homicide—Self-Defense — Threats.</p> <p>1. In the laws of the United States, there is no such designation as murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree; they simply provide for the crime of willful murder, and attach to it the punishment of death.</p> <p>2. In the absence of statutory provisions, I he federal courts resort to the common law for guidance in the construction of legal terms and phrases.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Clark. 46 Fed. 635.]</p> <p>3. The difference between murder and manslaughter consists in the existence of malice, express or implied in the one case, and the absence of malice in the other.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 426.]</p> <p>4. Malice is implied in every case of intentional homicide; that is to say, when once it is established that a person was intentionally killed, the law implies that malice existed in the party who caused the death, and the burden rests upon him to rebut the implication.</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte Brown, 40 Fed. 83.]</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Dillon, 30 Pac. 152.]</p> <p>5. A man may repel force by force in the defense of his person, his family or property, against any one who manifestly endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a felony. The right to oppose force to force in such case, is founded upon the law of nature, and is not superseded by the law of society.</p> <p>6. Neither words nor gestures, however insulting and irritating, nor an assault, will justify the killing of the aggressor; his killing is justifiable only when there is an apparent intent by him to commit a felony, and the danger is imminent, and the species of resistance used necessary to avert it.</p> <p>7. By imminent danger is meant immediate danger, such as must be instantly met, such ns cannot be guarded against by calling on the assistance of others or the protection of the law.</p> <p>8. Mere threats against the person or life of another, without any attempt at execution, will not justify homicide, nor even when such a ttempt at execution is made, unless the danger lie so imminent as not to admit of any delay in meeting it on the part of the assailed.</p>

<p>Case No. 15,979a.</p> <p>Neutrality Laws — Fitting out Privateers — Evidence—Liability or Owner for Acts or Master.</p> <p>[1. Where it is claimed that defendant fitted out a privateer in his country, contrary to the act of June, 1794 (1 Stat. 381), it must appear affirmatively, in order to convict him, that the equipment was within the United States: that defendant caused such equipment (o be made, or was knowingly concerned in it; and that the intent of the equipment was to commit hostilities on nations with whom the United States were at peace.]</p> <p>12. A French citizen, transiently within the United States, cannot be criminally prosecuted for piracies and robberies committed by the captain of a privateer, owned by him, upon neutral vessels.]</p>

<p>Case No. 15,980.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Objections to Survey — Estoppel.</p> <p>[1. The claimants of a grant are estopped lo object that parts of the land, which they have sold and conveyed as part of their rancho, are not within its limits, for the purpose of completing their quantity by embracing in the survey lands not conveyed by them.]</p> <p>[2. The mere fact that the diseño of a neighboring rancho includes part of the land embraced in the claimants’ diseño is no ground for excluding such land from the claimants’ survey, where the adjoining rancho has not yet been surveyed, and the owners thereof liave not intervened to assert their alleged rights.]</p>

Claim [by Saliro Pacheco] for [the Rancho Monte del Diablo] four leagues of land, in Contra Costa county, confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States. [The grant was made March 30, 1844, by José Figueroa to S. Pacheco, and a patent was eventually issued.]

<p>Claim [by Rosa Pacheco and others, de-visees of Juana Sanchez de Pacheco] for [the Rancho Arroyo de las Nueces y Bol-bones] two leagues of land, more or less, in Contra Costa county, confirmed by the board for two leagues, and appealed by the United States and by claimants.</p>

This was a bill in equity by the United States to recover the amount of certain taxes claimed to be due, under the internal ■revenue law, from the defendant company, and to enforce the lien of the taxes upon the property of the company, which, since the taxes accrued, has passed into other hands.

This was a suit in equity, brought in 1877, under the authority of the statute (Rev. St. § 3213). which provides for the recovery of taxes by suit and to enforce the lien of the taxes against the property owned by the delinquent (the Pacific Railroad) at the time the taxes accrued (Rev. St. § 3186). The taxes sought to be recovered, amounting to about twenty-five thousand dollars, accrued in 1871 against the Pacific Railroad.

On the 5th September, 1831, the attorney of the United States, for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania, filed an information against a package of cotton lace, imported into the port of Philadelphia, on the 24th July, 1831, from Liverpool, in England, on board of the ship Monongahela.

On the 16th October, 1830, the attorney of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania, filed an information against a package containing two hundred and fifty pounds of coney wool and five dozen and ten caps, imported into the port of Philadelphia on the 8th September, 1S30, from Liverpool, in the ship Ann.

<p>Case No. 15,986a.</p> <p>Shipping — Master’s Bond for Return of Seamen from Foreign Votage — Interpretation and Performance—Exceptions—Special Verdict.</p> <p>[1. The statutory bond given by the master to the United States when going upon a foreign voyage, to exhibit his crew list, and produce the persons named therein, to the first boarding officer on his return from the voyage, imposes upon him a duty not merely to receive them passively, and return them when willing, but requires him to exercise all his lawful authority for the purpose of bringing them back.]</p> <p>[2. The exception in the statute and bond of the case of a seaman who “absconds,” does not necessarily apply to the case of a deserter, or of one who leaves the ship openly; for in such case the seaman may be found and apprehended by the aid of the local authorities, and it is the master’s duty to have this done.]</p> <p>[S. In an action on such a bond there was a special verdict finding that one of the seamen was dissatisfied, applied to one of the foreign owners for discharge, and understood from the answer that his discharge was assented to, and that he “left the ship, going to sea, 33 miles out from Liverpool, and returned there in the steamboat which towed her out.” Held, that the court could not construe this as a finding that the seaman “absconded,” within the meaning of the bond, so as to relieve the master from liability.]</p> <p>[4. Assuming that there is no difference between bonds at common law and statutory or official bonds, the master would not be exonerated from his covenant by merely showing physical inability, subsequently accruing on iiis part, to perform it; or that others, whose assent and concurrence were necessary, could not be prevailed upon or compelled to aid or permit its performance.]</p> <p>[5. The exceptions enumerated in the statute and bond are persons who may be discharged abroad with the written consent of the consul, etc., or who may have died or absconded, or been forcibly impressed into other service. Held, that these express exceptions should be extended by construction to other eases of a like character, and that, as the master signed the bond in his official capacity, he should be considered as relieved from its performance, when by reason of sickness he becomes unable to perforin his duties, and is relieved in a foreign port and superseded by another.]</p>

[Claim of Thomas S. Page for four leagues of land in Sonoma county, known as the “Rancho Cotate.” Confirmed by the board of land commissioners, and appeal taken by the United States.]

[Claim by the heirs of Francisco Guerrero Palomares for a lot 400 varas square in the Mission Dolores, San Francisco county. Confirmed by the board of land commissioners, and an appeal taken by the United States.]

A capias had issued in this cause against Daniel Parker, Wm. Duer, and John Holker, returnable to April term, 1792; and the marshal then returned, cepi corpus as to Duer, (who gave special bail in due time) and non sunt inventi, as to Parker and Hol-ker.

<p>Case No. 15,997.</p> <p>Principal and Agent — Contract in Agent’s Name.</p> <p>No action will lie in the name of a principal, on a written contract made by his agent in Ins own name, although the defendant may have known the agent’s character; and a demurrer, in such a case, to the declaration, where the United States were the plaintiffs, was sustained.</p> <p>[Cited in Chandler v. Coe, 54 N. H. 567. Distinguished in Gilpin v. Howell, 5 Pa. St. 50; Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 375. Cited in City of Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 278; Sisson v. Cleveland & T. R. Co., 14 Mich. 496.]</p>

The bill in this ease is filed for an injunction, and the appointment of a receiver. The object is to restrain the working of a quicksilver mine, known as the “New Almadén,” of the alleged value of $25,000,000 and from which defendants are extracting minerals to the annual value of $1,000,000.

<p>Application for a dedimus potestatem to take testimony abroad. [An injunction pend-ente lite was heretofore granted. See Case No. 15.99S.]</p>

The defendant [Charles H. Parsons] was indicted under section 22 of the post-office act of March 3d, 1825 (4 Stat. 108), which provides that any person who shall open any letter or packet which shall have been in a post-office, or in custody of a mail-carrier, before it shall have been delivered to the person to whom it is directed, with a design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into another’s business or secrets, or shall secrete, embezzle or destroy any such mail,…

Debt on a bond given by the master of the ship William & Henry, as required by tbe act of Feb. 2S, 1S03, § 1 (2 Stat 203), for the return to the United States of the company of the ship.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.]</p> <p>This was a libel of seizure against the' schooner Paryntha Davis for a forfeiture, resulting from an alleged illegal employment of the vessel. The libel set forth that the schooner was regularly seized at Portland on the 12th of October, 1857, and that prior to the seizure she was a vessel of the United States, duly enrolled and licensed to carry on the cod-fishery, and that, being so licensed, was then and there employed in a trade other than that for which she was licensed. At the hearing it appeared that the schooner, on March 27, 1857, took out a license in the collection district of Bamestable, in the state of Massachusetts, for carrying on the cod-fishery, and was employed under that license until July 23d, when the license was surrendered and one taken out for the mackerel-fishery. The schooner held her mackerel license until September 22d, when she again surrendered it and took out a cod-fishing license. The schooner sailed from Wellfleet, September 24, 1857, and was seized October 11th at Hogg Island Roads, in Portland Harbor. When seized, she was at anchor by the side of another fishing-schooner, and had mackerel-lines aE around the waist. Some fifteen or twenty barrels of mackerel were found on board, and also twenty empty mackerel-barrels. Mackerel recently caught were found in wash-barrels on the deck, and there were about fifteen barrels of salt on board. The hawser and chain cable of the vessel were not such as are suitable for deep-sea fishing. No codfish were seen on board, except a few dried or pickled, apparently having been caught more than a month. The first day the boarding officers went on board no cod-lines were discovered, but on a second visit they were shown some which were brought on deck by the crew, but the lines were without sinkers. The barrels containing the mackerel were stowed away on the bilge. There were porgies for floating bait, and a mill for preparing them. Inquiry from the master and others on board the schooner elicited that they were “catching anything that came along.” It was in testimony that there was a complement of cod-lines on the vessel, and everything necessary for preserving the fish when caught. The testimony showed that during a course of several days more mackerel than codfish had been caught, although several attempts had been made at various places. It was set up that the mackerel were caught to be used for bait, although It did not appear that they were used for such purpose. Several barrels of mackerel were caught at different times, but no codfish of any amount. It was shown in evidence that a portion, at least, of the mackerel were split and corned. The vessel was on her trip some sixteen or seventeen days, at the end of which, returning to Portland for water, she was seized. Nine days afterwards she was delivered to the claimants, upon giving a bond in the usual form, shortly after which she took a license for the mackerel-fishery. The district judge was of opinion that the vessel was employed, if not exclusively, at least in part, in taking mackerel, not for bait or consumption by the crew, but as the proper business of the voyage. [Case No. 16,004.]</p> <p>The information is insufficient, because it does not set out what other trade, and, though in the words of the statute, is uncertain where it should be specific. Dunl. Adm. Prac. 431; The Merino, 9 Wheat. [22 U. S.] 391. The libel having alleged a specific time and place, “then and there” when the vessel was so employed, the libellants can give no evidence except of employment at that time and place. Macomber v. Thompson [Case No. 8,919]. To work a forfeiture under the thirty-second section of the act of 1793, the vessel must have abandoned her employment in the cod-fishery and engaged in some other. The catching of mackerel is not a trade separate from fisheries, because the act of 1793 (section 4) speaks of licensing vessels for the coasting trade and other fisheries. U. S. v. The Reindeer [Case No. 16,-145]. The court will require the most determinate evidence that the mackerel-fishery was intentionally and exclusively carried on. The Harriet [Id. 6,099]. The decisions bearing on this case are The Active, 7 Cranch [11 U. S.] 100; The Two Friends [Case No. 14,289]; The Eliza [Id. 4,346]; The Swallow [Id. 13,666], The intent is no part of the evidence for or against condemnation. The law does not punish the intention to defraud the revenue; there must be an unlawful act. ü. S. v. Riddle, 5 Cranch [9 ü. S.] 311.</p> <p>The cod-fishery and the mackerel-fishery are severally “trades” within the legal meaning of the act of 1793, and each is a distinct trade from the other. The Harriet [Case No. 6,099]; The Nymph [Id. 10,389]; The Active, 7 Cranch [11 U. S.] 100; The Eliza [Case No. 4,340]; 4 Stat 312; 5 Stat 16.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,004.</p> <p>Shipping—Cod Fisheries—Breach of License-Taking Mackerel.</p> <p>1. The fishing business is a trade within the meaning of the license act of Feb. 18. 1793 [1 Stat. 305]. The meaning of the word “trade” in the act, is equivalent to “employment,” and every act of trade beyond the scope of the license subjects the vessel to forfeiture under the 32d section of the act.</p> <p>2. Since the act of May. 1828 [4 Stat. 312], authorizing a special license for the mackerel fishery, that is a trade distinct from the cod fishery.</p> <p>3. A vessel with a cod-fishing license may take mackerel for bait, or for the consumption of the crew, but if she engages in this fishery as a business, she is liable to forfeiture.</p>

The defendant, who had become bankrupt, was prosecuted by indictment, containing two counts, for perjury, in swearing before the commissioners, on the 20th day of September, 1803, that he “could not tell exactly the time, but believed it was the latter (end) of 1799, that he first owned the brig Abigail. He ceased to own her, he rather thought, in the year 1800,” when In truth and in fact he never did own her, but had covered the property for an alien under his name.

<p>Action at law [against Jarvis Patten and others] to recover duties on materials used in the repair of the ship Matterhorn. The case was heard by the court on an agreed statement of facts, the material parts of which are stated in the opinion.</p>

These were actions for debt [against John Patterson and Elizabeth, his wife, and Daniel Branley and Mary, his wife, administrators of George Lewis Lefler, and against Christian Brenneman, John Forrey, and Mary Gossler, executors of the last will and testament of Philip Gossler] on two bonds for twenty-five thousand dollars each, dated on the 14th October, 1799.

[This was an indictment against John Patterson, a United States marshal, charging him with paying his deputies in depreciated paper. See Case No. 16,010.]

<p>Case No. 16,010.</p> <p>Penalties — Informers as Witnesses — United States Marshals—Payment of Deputies.</p> <p>1. An informer who receives one-half of the penalty on conviction is, notwithstanding, a competent witness.</p> <p>2. This is chiefly placed on the ground of public policy.</p> <p>3. A payment by a marshal to his assistant for taking the census in depreciated paper, is a violation of the census act of 1839 [5 Stat. 331]. And this is especially so, where good funds had been received by the marshal, to pay his assistants.</p> <p>[See Case No. 16,009.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,011.</p> <p>Offenses against Postal Laws—Embezzlement of Lettek—Indictment.</p> <p>1. In an indictment for embezzlement, under (he post office law, it is sufficiently certain to charge ‘‘that defendant was a person employed in one of the departments of the post office establishment of the United States.”</p> <p>2. When the embezzlement is of a letter con-laining a bank note, it is not necessary to describe the note.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Noland, 111 Mo. 487, 19 S: W. 716.]</p> <p>3. In larceny such description is necessary.</p> <p>4. The verdict being general, if one count is good, judgment will not be arrested.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.] This was a libel filed in the district court of New Jersey, on behalf of the United States, against this vessel and her cargo, for a breach of the non-intercourse law.

This cause is submitted to the court upon the facts set forth in the petition, answer, and reply, which are severally admitted to be true. The petition states that, on June 10th, 1871, the defendant [Benjamin T. Payne] was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $6,111.84, for money before that time had and received by the defendant, to and for the use of the plaintiff.

<p>Case No. 16,013.</p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors—Unlawful Sales.</p> <p>A servant selling spirituous liquors for his master without hcense is not liable to tbe penalty.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Shuck. Case No. 16,285; U. S. v. Voss, Id. 16,628.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,015.</p> <p>Mexican Land Gkants—Parol Evidence—Act of Possession.</p> <p>[The record of the act of possession based on depositions containing statements upon which the alcalde acted cannot be contradicted by parol evidence of aged, illiterate, and infirm witnesses as to their recollection of what was done or intended by the alcalde.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,016.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants—Construction of Deeds —Reformation.</p> <p>1. If the description in a deed is impossible or repugnant, the court will so correct it as to make it conform to the probable intentions of the parties.</p> <p>2. Where no such repugnancy or impossibility exists, the court will not (as against third parties who purchased the remaining interest of grantor at sheriff’s sale, ignorant of his intentions in making his previous conveyance, except so far as the deed disclosed them) entertain an application to reform the description in a deed, although it has no doubt of the error of the description.</p> <p>3. The facts that the tract in question was confirmed by the board of land commissioners, in the same language as the description in the deed: that, in the same language, it was excepted out of the confirmation of another part of the same general rancho to another claimant; and that eleven years have elapsed since the presentation of the claim—operate strongly against such application.</p> <p>[See Cases Nos. 16,015 and 16,017.]</p>

Claim [by Henry R. Payson] for two leagues of land in San Francisco county [known as the “Rancho Cañada de Guadalupe” and “Visitación y Rodeo Viejo”], confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States

Indictment for forgery. A venire was ordered to this day, Thursday, January 17, 1805, and upon request of the prisoner [B. W. Peacock] the trial was postponed until Monday next; whereupon the jurors summoned were ordered to attend on Monday. The like was done in the case of U. S. v. Williams [Case No. 10,709] at last term.

<p>The district attorney appeared for plaintiff, and for defendant [Josiah Pearce].</p>

(Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Debt by the United States upon the official bond of the collector of the port and district of Gloucester, in Massachusetts. Plea, non •est faetum.

[This was an indictment against John Pel-letreau for embezzling a letter from the United States mails. Heard on motion to quash.]

This was an information filed by A. J. Dallas, Esq. against the schooner Penelope and her cargo for a supposed breach of the first section of the act of congress, entitled “An act to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and certain parts of the Island of St. Domingo.” [2 Stat. 351.] The facts of the case were these: Mr. Richard Wood, a native of Bermuda, and who had been established there for a great number of years, in partnership with Mr. Joseph…

Indictment for obtaining and disposing of goods in violation of the provisions of the bankrupt law.

The only question in this cause was, whether sugar, which had gone through the whole process of refining, and was, on 1st of January 1814, in moulds or in the store room; was subject to the duty imposed by the first section of the act of the 24th of July 1813,—4 Laws [Bior. & D.] 5t>4 [3 Stat. 35],—which declares, that “from and after the first of January 1S14, there be levied, collected, and paid, upon all sugar which shall be refined within the United States, a duty of…

<p>Case No. 16,027.</p> <p>Shipping—Tonnage Dues, Etc.</p> <p>A canal boat is not a ship or vessel within the meaning of the act of congress of February 18th, 1793 [1 Stat. 305).</p>

This was an action of debt on a bond executed by defendants to secure the payment of duties upon railway iron imported by them into the port of Fernandina, and deposited by them in a bonded warehouse in July, A. D. 1860. Felix Livingston was at that time collector of the customs of the United States for the port of Fernandina.

<p>[Claim by Maria Teodora Peralta for the Rancho Buacocha, 2% square leagues, in Marin county.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,030.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants—Decree of Confirmation—Affirmance by Supreme Court—Objections TO SURVEV—AUTHORITT OF DISTRICT Court.</p> <p>[Where the supreme court, in affirming a decree of confirmation by the district court, delivers an opinion clearly showing that the land intended to be confirmed is that described in the title papers, but it is not clear from the decree of the district court that the boundaries fixed are the same as those described in the title papers, the latter court may, under the act of 1860, upon objections to the official survey. inquire, not merely whether the boundaries described therein are in accordance with the terms of its own decree, but whether they are in accordance with the title papers upon which the judgments of both courts were founded.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,032.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Limitation as to Quantity—Confirmation of Claim—Finality of Decree—Stipulation bt United States Attorney'.</p> <p>[1. There is no authority which will justify the court in confirming to a claimant a tract four or five leagues in extent, under a grant which designates the quantity as two leagues, a little more or less.]</p> <p>[2. An appeal was taken from a decree confirming a claim, but thereafter the district attorney, by a stipulation, consented that the order granting the appeal might be vacated and an order entered allowing the claimant to proceed under the decree of this court, as under a final decree. The stipulation was made upon a misconception by the district attorney, occasioned by misrepresentations upon the diseño, and by a witness, as to the extent of the land contained within the boundaries confirmed; and it subsequently appeared that these boundaries gave to the grantee more than twice the quantity granted. Held, that the stipulation would not prevent the court from so modifying the decree, in advance of the official survey, as to give only the quantity granted.]</p>

[This was an indictment against Joseph Perez for piracy.] In calling the jury the panel was exhausted and Dr. Roosa was selected as a talesman. He was objected to by the counsel for the prisoner, that he was a physician. The court overruled the objection, and a peremptory challenge was made.

The cases first named above were indictments against the judges who held the munic-ijDal election of Petersburg in 1874, respectively at eight precincts in that city.

<p>Case No. 16,034.</p> <p>Larceny—Peremptory Challenges.</p> <p>In Alexandria, a prisoner indicted under the act of congress, for larceny, has the right of peremptory challenge.</p>

Motion to quash an indictment. The defendant, Frederick W. Peters, was indicted, under section 20 of the crimes act of 1825, for counterfeiting the coin of the United States.

This was an indictment against the prisoners [John Peterson and others] found at this term, in two counts.

<p>Case No. 16,039.</p> <p>■Customs Duties—Damage Allowance on Trial —Conclusive ness op Liquidation.</p> <p>1.One entry was made at the custom house ■ ■of fruit imported in a vessel, which fruit belonged to several owners, and was embraced in several invoices. The duties were estimated at $4,648 and deposited and the goods were delivered. Afterwards a damage allowance for loss by decay on the voyage was applied for. The report showed that the damage sustained by various lots of the fruit was more than 25 per cent, of the quantities in such lots, but that the damage on all the fruit imported by the vessel was less than 25 per cent, of the whole quantity. The collector, by allowing the damage on the lots which were damaged more than 25 per cent., liquidated the duties at $270.40 less than the amount deposited, and refunded the $270.40. Afterwards the collector reliq-uidated the duties at $4,648, refusing to allow any damage, because it did not exceed 25 per cent, of all the fruit covered by the entry. The United States having sued, in the district court, to recover the $270.40, that court directed a verdict for the defendants. On a writ of error: Held that, under section 2931 of the Revised Statutes, the first liquidation was not conclusive as to the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Comarota. 2 Fed. 146: U. S. v. Campbell. 10 Fed. 819; U. S. v. Clark, 11 Fed. 79; U. S. v. Barnshaw, 12 Fed. 286; U. S. v. Schlesinger, 14 Fed. 685; U. S. v. Leng, 18 Fed. 17; s. c., 7 Sup. Ct. 445. 120 U. S. 113.]</p> <p>2. The United States are entitled to recover according to the last liquidation.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Campbell, 10 Fed. 818; U. S. v. Leng, 18 Fed. 21.]</p> <p>3. The defendant could not be allowed to give evidence to show that the decision of the collector in the last liquidation was erroneous.</p> <p>[Cited in Chase v. U. S., 9 Fed. 883.]</p> <p>4. The district court ought to have directed a verdict for the United States.</p>

<p>[In error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.</p> <p>[This was an action brought in the district court against Frank Phelps and Howard Phelps, to recover certain duties alleged to have been illegally refunded to the defendant by the collector of the port of New York. The judgment was for the defendants. Case unreported.]</p>

This was an information filed to forfeit two-sixteenths of the vesssel, as being owned by inhabitants of the state of Louisiana, under the act of congress of July 13, 1881 [12 Stat. 255], and the proclamations of the president dated April 15 [12 Stat. 1258] and August 16. 1861 [12 Stat. 1262]. The vessel was seized under the process.

<p>Case No. 16,043.</p> <p>Recognizance—Liability of Signers—Acknowledgment.</p> <p>1. Where a defendant and another person signed a recognizance before a justice of the peace, conditioned for the appearance of the defendant, before the district court of the United States, to answer to a charge of stealing from the mail; and three days subsequently to said signing, a third person, whose name did not appear in the body of the recognizance, also signed the same: Held, that a joint action could not be sustained against all of said persons upon such recognizance, and that it did not, upon its face, import a joint liability on the part of all the signers thereof.</p> <p>2. There is no statutory provision, either of the United States or of the state of Ohio, requiring parties to sign a recognizance.</p> <p>3. An acknowledgment, without the signatures of the parties, certified by a justice of the peace, is all that is required to. make a recognizance valid and obligatory.</p> <p>[Cited in Heyward v. U. S., 37 Fed. 7®.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,044.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Location of Boundaries—Objections to Scrvey.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,045.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants—Evidence to Establish.</p> <p>[The only papers in relation to a claim consisted of a grant of June 0. 1846, and a certificate of approval by the departmental assembly on June 15. 1846. These papers were produced from the possession of the claimant, and the governor’s signature thereto was different from that used by him on other documents of about the same date. The only papers produced from the archives was a communication signed by a deputy secretary of the assembly, informing the secretary of state that the grant was approved on July 15th. This communication was on a detached sheet, which could easily have been placed in the surveyor general’s office by fraud. The journal of the assembly showed that the grant was not approved on the day mentioned in the communication. There was no evidence of occupation, or that the existence of the grant was known until after the conquest. Held, that the claim must be rejected.]</p>

[Claim of Maria Antonia Pico to the Rancho Punta del Año Nuevo embracing four leagues of land in Santa Cruz county. The board confirmed the claim, and the United States has appealed.]

[Where the papers relating to a grant were produced from the archives and were regular in all respects, including the approval of the grant by the departmental assembly, but there was a doubt as to… Held: that the fact of such provisional occupation, which lasted some 16 years to the time of making the grant, was sufficient to entitle the claimant to a confirmation.]

^Presentment, for opposing Clement Venable, a constable, in the execution of his duty; it having been proved that Venable had a warrant against the defendant, [Richard Pignel.] moved that the i l warrant should be produced, and to instruct the jury to that effect. It is not necessary to produce the warrant. Venable took the man in an affray, and had a right to do so as a peace-officer.

Messrs. Pingree & Co. imported certain bags of castaña nuts, and placed them in the bonded warehouse in Salem, giving bonds for the import duties, which were $105. The invoice value of the nuts was 8350. Being desirous of removing them to Boston for sale, in bond, they executed, with sureties, the instrument required of them at the Salem custom house, which is called a transportation bond.

The prisoner, master of the ship Sterling, of Boston, was indicted, jointly with Samuel N. Dixey, master of the bark Missouri, of New York, and also separately, upon the 9th section of the statute of 1825, c. 65, commonly called the “Crimes Act.” 4 Stat. 116.

<p>Case No. 16,054.</p> <p>Prosecution’s for Penalties—Informers—Liability for Costs—Stopping—Enrollment and License.</p> <p>1. The eighth section of the act of 28th of February, 1799 [1 Stat. 620], in relation to prosecutions upon a penal statute, by an informer. contemplates an action in the name of the informer alone, as well as in the name of the United States, to the use, in whole or in part, of an informer.</p> <p>2. If the informer, for whose use the suit is prosecuted, in whole or in part, is not an officer of the United States, the United States cannot be liable for costs in the cases mentioned in the said eighth section.</p> <p>3. The informer is liable, although the United States may be a party on the record.</p> <p>4. The court may require an informer to give security for costs, and in case of refusal, strike his name from the record.</p> <p>5. An enrollment and license, duly executed, does not require delivery to give it validity.</p> <p>6. Where a license was duly executed, sealed, signed, dated and numbered, but not delivered until a month thereafter, lteld, that it was a valid license from its date.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,054a.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Fraudulent Entries—Forfeitures and Personal Penalties—Repeal of Statute—Limitations.</p> <p>[1. Section 66 of the act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 677), which provides, as a punishment for making entries under fraudulent invoices, that the goods, “or the value thereof to be recovered of the person making entry,” shall be forfeited, was not impliedly repealed, at least so far as concerns the personal penalty, by any of the subsequent acts, and is still (1840) in force.]</p> <p>[2. An intent to evade the payment of duties is essential to the maintenance of a prosecution for the personal penalty, and failure to aver the scienter renders the declaration fatally defective on demurrer; but the plaintiff will be allowed to amend as a matter of course.]</p> <p>[3. It is not necessary to aver that the goods were invoiced below their actual value, for the statute requires the invoice to be at the “actual cost,” by which is meant the purchase price.]</p> <p>[4. The statute leaves it to the government to elect whether it will proceed for the forfeiture of the goods or for the personal penalty, and there is no requirement that there should be an attempt to proceed in rem, before a personal action can be maintained.]</p> <p>[5. The limitation of three years contained in section 89 of the act was repealed and superseded by section 3 of the act of 1804 (2 Stat. 290), which declares that any person incurring any fine or forfeiture, “under the revenue laws of the United States.” may be punished within five years, “any law or provisiog to the contrary notwithstanding.”]</p>

This was a petition for the allowance of a writ of error in a capital case, and for stay of execution until a hearing could be had in the supreme court, on the alleged errors. Plumer, with three others, had been indicted, tried, and convicted in the circuit court, Massachusetts district, and sentenced to be executed. The material facts of the record were as follows: United States of America. Circuit Court of the United States of America, for the District of Massachusetts.

The prisoner, with three others, was in-' dieted in the circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, for murder on the high seas. Held: the said Archibald Mellen, then and there being in and on board of the ship aforesaid, and on the high seas aforesaid, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States, and within the jurisdiction of this court, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the said United States, in and upon the…

<p>Case No. 16,059.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Evidence of Good Character.</p> <p>1. The defendant was intimately associated with the individual, who stole the letter containing a hundred dollar bank bill and a promissory note for eighty-two dollars. But he proved himself to be a man of irreproachable character and of high intelligence, by witnesses of undoubted respectability.</p> <p>2. This would seem to be sufficient to protect him from suspicion, where no other fact is proved to implicate him.</p> <p>3. He was formerly acquainted with Coyle in Virginia, who was, probably, the guilty party; and this may account for their intimacy.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,061.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Absence of Archival Evidence—Possession and Occupation.</p> <p>When the archives contain no evidence or trace of the existence of a grant, the court will demand the fullest and most satisfactory proofs of possession and occupation during the existence of the former government, under a notorious and undisputed claim of title; and ’Clear and indubitable evidence of the genuineness of the grant produced.</p> <p>[Cited in Bouldin v. Phelps, 30 Fed. 567.]</p>

[This was an action by the United States against Janies A. Polhamus and Eugene J. Jackson to recover a sum of money received by the defendants, which had been embezzled from the government. Heard on a motion for a new trial.]

This libel was filed by against the schooner Polly and Nancy, John Russel, master, a British owned vessel, and her cargo, seized by the collector for a breach of the laws relating to the embargo, by taking on board prohibited goods. who was also the owner of the vessel; alleged that the illegal act was committed without the knowledge or approbation of his client; but submitted to the condemnation of the vessel and cargo, excepting the sea stores and provisions. After hearing

[This was a libel of forfeiture against the sloop Polly and Jane for alleged violation of the embargo law of January 9, 1808 (2 Stat. 506).]

<p>Case No. 16,065.</p> <p>Post Office Laws — Sending Letters bt Express.</p> <p>A person who sends a packet of letters by a passenger in a railroad car over a post road, without the knowledge and against the consent of the owners of the car and their agents, is not subject to the penalty imposed by the nineteenth section of Act Oong. c. 275 [3 Story’s Laws, 1990; 4 Stat. 107. c. 64).</p> <p>[Followed in U. S. v. Hall, Case No. 15,201.]</p>

This was a motion to quash an indictment under the 22d section of the act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 109), for the government of the post-office department, &c. The indictment, omitting the merely formal parts, was as follows:—“That on the fifteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, one Abel Pond, at Holliston, in said district, did then and there open a certain letter directed to one ‘Ebenezer H. Currier, Esq.’ which letter…

[Claim of Joseph Pope and others, heirs of Julian Pope, deceased, for the Rancho Loeo-allomia, consisting of] two leagues of land in Napa county; confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.

<p>Case No. 16,069.</p> <p>Extradition—Arrest in One District for Trial in Another—Indictment as Evidence.</p> <p>1. Where a person is arrested and brought before a judge or commissioner to be held to bail for trial in another district, a certified copy of the indictment found in such other district is competent evidence against the defendant; but if such indictment be so inconsistent that an impossible offence is set forth therein, it is not evidence authorizing such judge or commissioner to hold the defendant to bail.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Brawner, 7 Fed. 88; U. S. t. Rogers, 23 Fed. 661.]</p> <p>2. The indictment in this case charged in substance that on the 10th day of June, 1874, in Louisiana, the defendant- and others conspired to defraud the United States by procuring to be entered against the United States in the court of claims, an unjust judgment on the 18th day of May, 1874, and further sets forth that such judgment was in fact rendered on said 18th day of May Held, that such indictment is no evidence of guilt.</p>

The defendant [James A. Porter] was an attorney of this court.

Indictment [against Henry Porte] upon the Maryland statute of 1793 (chapter 35) for stealing bank-notes, charging the prisoner with stealing the “notes of some bank established by a charter from the government of the United States or of some individual state of the United States.” for the prisoner prayed the court to instruct the jury that they must be satisfied, by the evidence, that the notes were of some bank having a charter from the United States, or from some…

Indictment for high treason, committed in the county of Allegheny in the state of Pennsylvania, by levying war against the United States. After a long examination of witnesses it was discovered, tliat the defendant, though he was at Couche’s Fort, had taken no part in the insurrection; that, in fact, he was not the person, liable to the charge, but another person of the same name; and, thereupon, the jury, by direction of THE! COURT, found a verdict of not guilty.

This was an indictment charging “that before, on, and ever since the 1st day of February last, the public highway from the city of New York, on the road through Dan-bury, Litchfield, and Farmington, and from thence to Hartford, by force of the several acts of the congress of the United States relating to postofiices and post-roads was made, and still is, a post-road designated for the transportation of the public mails of the United States; and during all the period from and…

The application is as follows: “To Col. S. S. Walrath, of New York 12th Volunteers. Your petitioner represents that his son James Murphy enlisted in your regiment of New York 12th volunteers, at Syracuse, New York, in Captain Church’s Company H, and is now in your regiment in said company, as he is informed at Fort Onan-dago, where your regiment is now encamped.

<p>[In this case a witness residing in the state of Michigan was subpoenaed on behalf of the United States, and failing to attend, the district attorney asked for an attachment against him. The attachment was issued to the United States marshal for the Northern district of New York. It was objected that this practice was not regular.]</p>

[This is an action on an official bond dated August 4, 1871, by Potter, as disbursing agent of the United States at Pembina. He retired from the office June 30, 1874. The principal item in controversy was a charge against Potter of $1,500, a draft for which sum was transmitted to him May 17, 1871, to cover disbursements for the quarter ending June 30, 1871, the facts concerning which sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

<p>[This was an indictment against Erastus Potter for cutting timber on government lands.]</p> <p>In arrest of judgment.</p>

[Indictment of Amos S. C. Powell for accepting the office of sheriff when disqualified from holding office by the 14th amendment to the constitution of the United States.] This was an indictment under the 15th section of the act of congress of the 31st May, 1870, entitled “An act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of this Union and for other purposes.” 2 The indictment charged that the defendant knowingly accepted and held…

<p>[This was an indictment against Martin Power upon the charge of perjury. Heard on demurrer.]</p>

. This was an action of debt, on a bond for the sum of 23.000 dollars, given in December, 1808, under the first embargo law, conditioned, that a cargo of cotton, laden on board the schooner Clarinda, bound for Boston, should be landed in some port of the United States (dangers of the seas excepted). The defendants, Kip and Adams, one owner of the cargo, and the other master of the vessel, were principals, and the other defendants merely sureties in the bond.

This was a motion to quash an indictment. The prisoner was charged with the offence of depositing and causing to be deposited in the post-office for mailing, a postal card, upon which was written indecent epithets, contrary to the provisions of section 3893 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:—“No obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, print, or other publication of an indecent character, or any article or thing designed or intended for the…

<p>Case No. 16,083.</p> <p>United States Marshals — Suit on Official Bond—Right of Set Off—Limitation of Actions.</p> <p>1. In a suit brought by the United States against the marshal and his sureties, on his bond for the recovery of moneys collected in divers executions, issued at the suit of the United States, the defendants attempted to set off the items of an account, contained in a treasury transcript, which had been disallowed; but which transcript reserved a balance due the government, over and above such items, without including any of the moneys claimed in this suit. It was held that the set off could not be allowed.</p> <p>2. It makes no difference that the marshal might be able to plead the statute of limitation to a suit brought for such balance.</p> <p>3. 'When a debtor has a set off equally applicable to the demands against him, the court will apply it according to the equity between the parties.</p> <p>4. Besides, the marshal had presented this account to meet another claim of the government not included in this suit.</p> <p>5. The statute of the state can have no influence on this question; it depends upon the act of congress.</p> <p>6. There is no law of congress regulating set off in suits against officers; but several statutes imply that set off may be allowed.</p>

Motion to quash an indictment. The defendant was iudicted under section 44 of the bankrupt act, for fraudulently obtaining goods on credit; and now moved to quash the indictment upon grounds which appear in the opinion.

It appeared from the agreement of counsel, that a suit was brought in the court below by the United States against Joseph and Thomas Lea, and Perrit their surety, upon a duty bond, upon which a judgment was rendered, and the amount of it was paid by the surety, to whom the bond was surrendered for his reimbursement out of the estate of Joseph Lea, in the hands of the defendants, voluntary assignees of all his estate. [Case unreported.] The present action was assumpsit,…

Indictment under section 44 of the bankrupt act [of 18G7 (14 Stat. 539)], charging the defendant with disposing of his property with intent to prevent it from coming into the possession of the assignee in bankruptcy. The defendant had, before being indicted, been compelled to submit to an examination under section 26 of the act, and that examination was reduced to writing and signed by the bankrupt.

<p>Case No. 16,086.</p> <p>Pedlers— License and Special Tax — Indictment.</p> <p>A pedler who has duly applied to the assessor for a license in April, is not indictable for carrying on business without payment of the special tax, between the 1st and 7th days of May, before the tax was, in the usual course of business. assessed upon him for that year, if he intended during that time to pay the tax when it should be assessed, although -when the tax bill was presented him on the 21st of May he refused to pay it, having stopped business on the 7 th.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,088.</p> <p>Summoning Jury in Federal Courts — Compliance with State Laws—Challenge to Array—Practice.</p> <p>[1. The provision in the judiciary acts, requiring jurors to be designated in the federal courts. as nearly as practicable, in the same mat-ner as in the state courts, does not require a compliance with the state laws when in the opinion of the court it is wholly impracticable to do so.]</p> <p>[2. The provision in the statute that jurors shall be returned, as there shall be occasion for them, from such parts of the district, from time to time, as the court shall direct, so as to be most favorable to an impartial trial, etc., leaves it entirely discretionary with the court to give or not to give any directions as to the place from which the jurors shall be summoned. If defendant desires that such directions should be given, he should apply to the court therefor. In the absence of such application, it is no ground of challenge to the array that the marshal has summoned the jurors according to his own will.]</p>

[Suit by the United States against Price’s administrator.] Rule to show cause why the commission for taking depositions should not be accepted as duly returned, or be sent back for a more regular return. The commission, in consequence of a misdirection of it by the commissioners, had been opened first by the secretary of war, and afterwards by some other officer of the government, before it came to the hands of the clerk of the court.

<p>Case No. 16,090.</p> <p>Bill or Exchange Drawn by Public Agent — Consideration.</p> <p>1. A bill of exchange was drawn by a public sub-agent, on the general agent of the United States, and payment of the same was at first refused, but it was afterwards made to the defendant, and soon after, it having been discovered that the sub-agent, who drew the bill, was unfaithful, notice was given by the general agent to the defendant, who held the money, as administrator of the payee, not to pay it over, as it was claimed by the United States.</p> <p>2. Though a bill drawn for value received, might, prima facie, be considered as drawn upon a consideration, yet, when a strong ground is laid to show a want of consideration, the defendant ought to show that value was given for the bill.</p>

[This was a suit by the United States against Violet Primrose, administratrix of John Primrose, deceased.] This case was submitted to the court on the pleadings.

Indictment. The first count was for stealing the goods of one Eekloff. The second count was for receiving them, knowing them to be stolen. contended that the court ought to oblige the attorney for the United States to elect the count upon which he would proceed; and they cited Russell on Crimes.

The defendant [John W. Prout] was tried, upon two indictments, by the same jury. The first indictment was for forging a certificate of freedom under the seal of this court. Upon the trial, Mr. Key, U. S. Atty., offered to show to the jury, the prisoner’s signature. written in the presence of the marshal, and to allow them to compare it with the handwriting of the forged certificate, and cited 4 Starkie, Ev. 570. But THE COURT (nem. con.) rejected the evidence.

This was in indictment against the defendants, Prussing and Hitz, for having made and fermented on premises other than a distillery duly authorized by law, to-wit: in the vinegar factory of said Prussing. a molasses wash, fit for distillation and the production of spirits. By agreement of the parties the case was submitted to the court for trial without a jury.

This was an indictment for treason. The first four counts, charged the prisoner [William Pryor] with adhering to the enemy, giving them aid and comfort; by taking on board at Philadelphia a cargo of provisions, and carrying it to the squadron which blockaded the Delaware, in April, 1813.

The defendant was tried and convicted on an information under that clause of section 44 of the bankrupt act of 1867 which provides “that from and after the passage of this act if any debtor or bankrupt * * * shall, with intent to defraud his creditors, within three months next before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, pawn, pledge, or dispose of, otherwise than by bona fide transactions in the ordinary way of his trade, any of his goods and chattels which have…

<p>[This was an information against a quantity of distilled spirits, etc., found at Fifty-Fifth street between Tenth and Eleventh, avenues.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,100.</p> <p>FORFEITURE OF SPIRITS IN BOND.</p> <p>[Spirits in bond may be forfeited for noncompliance with the provisions of the internal revenue laws.]</p> <p>UNITED STATES v. QUANTITY OF DISTILLED SPIRITS. See Gases Nos. 11,-493-11,495.</p> <p>Case No. 16,101.</p> <p>UNITED STATES v. QUANTITY OF DISTILLED SPIRITS AT NO.</p> <p>133 MOTT ST.</p> <p>[See Case No. 11,495.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,102.</p> <p>Bonds—Surety—Notice of Decree — Approval of Security on Appeal.</p> <p>In an action against property for violation of the internal revenue laws, L. appeared as claimant of the property seized and gave a stipulation with O. as surety in which L. was named as proctor of the claimant. The decree in the district court being in favor of the United States, L. took the case by writ of error to the circuit court, and gave his own personal bond on the writ of error, which was approved by the judge in the usual form. The decree was affirmed by the circuit court and a writ of error was taken to the supreme court, on which L. again gave his personal bond without surety by consent of the district attorney; and this bond was also approved by the judge in the usual form. The supreme court affirmed that decree and a final decree was entered, and an order was made that notice be given to the sureties on the first stipulation to perform' their stipulation or show cause why execution should not issue against them. Other proctors had during the progress of the cause been substituted for S. and this notice was served on such other proctors, who had agreed to notify O. of the entry of any decree. They failed to do so, however, and O. had in fact no notice, and an order was made by default that execution issue and it was issued accordingly. O. thereupon applied to open the default and to be allowed to come in and show cause and that the execution be set aside, claiming that the taking of the bonds on the appeals without surety and with the approval of the district attorney had discharged him, and that L. had given to the plaintiff $75,000 in government bonds as further security, which bonds it was alleged had been stolen: Held, that the default against the surety might be opened if he had shown any meritorious de-fence, but that the facts put forward by him furnished no defence against his liability on the stipulation.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,103.</p> <p>Violation of Internal Revenue Laws—Illicit Distillekv.</p> <p>[Personal property found in buildings which are in the same enclosure with a building in which an illicit distillery is carried on, and in such juxtaposition to it that the owners thereof could not be ignorant of the existence of the still, is subject to forfeiture under section 48 of the internal revenue law.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,105.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Evidence—Fraudulent Intent-Sales—Manufactured Goods.</p> <p>1. A fraudulent intent in respect to a particular importation of goods may be legitimately inferred by a jury from a previous fraudulent intent and previous fraudulent acts, shown in respect to previous importations.</p> <p>2. The same kind of evidence is legitimate in prosecutions for the forfeiture of property under the internal revenue acts.</p> <p>3. The internal revenue act of March 3d, 1SC5 [13 Stat. 468], which went into effect on the 1st of April, 1865. imposed a tax of thirty-five cents a pound upon certain tobacco, upon which the previous act had imposed a tax of twenty-five cents a pound. On the 31st of March, 1865, L., a tobacco dealer in New York, entered upon his sales-book a sale of about $60,000 worth of such tobacco to K. & W., who gave him their check for the amount. Two or three days afterwards he gave to K. & W. his check for the same amount. The tobacco never passed into the possession of K. & W., but L. kept it on his own premises, treated it as his own, and disposed of it as such. In connection with that alleged sale, he entered a quantity of the tobacco in the tax-book, at that date, and returned it as sold: Held, that, under the 94th section of the act of June 30th, 1864 [Í3 Stat. 204], it was illegal for L. to return that tobacco for tax, because it was not sold, nor was it “removed for consumption,” under the 91st section of the same act.</p> <p>4. The fact of this -tax of twenty-five cents having been paid on this tobacco by L., under the above circumstances, was no reason for his not returning for tax a sale of a portion of it in April and May, 1867, although the tax upon such tobacco had at that time been reduced to fifteen cents a pound, by the act of July 13th, 1866 [14 Stat. 98], notwithstanding the provision of the 70th section of the latter act.</p> <p>5. Under the 90th section of the act of 1864, as amended by the 9th section of the act of July 13th, 1806, a manufacturer of tobacco is required to keep a book showing the goods manufactured by him as well as the goods he has sold.</p> <p>6. Manufactured goods, under that section, means goods the manufacture of which is completed, so that the goods are in a condition to be sold.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. 10 Barrels Distilled Spirits, Case No. 16,300.]</p> <p>7. It appeared to be the manner of doing business in the warehouse of L., to enter for tax on a certain day a large mass of tobacco, which was then taken down stairs into the retail counter department, where it was sold at retail, no record being kept of such sales: Held, that this was an illegal mode of doing business; that there was no sale when the property was taken to the retail counter; and that, under the 90th section of the act of 1864, as amended by the act of July 13th, 1866, a record of the sales at the retail counter should have been kept, and an abstract of such sales returned by the 10th day of every month.</p> <p>[Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were subsequently overruled. See Cases Nos. 16,106 and 16.106a.]</p> <p>All the rulings of the court, in its charge, were affirmed by the circuit court (Woodruff, Circuit Judge), on writ of error, in December, 1872. [Not reported.]</p>

[This was an information of forfeiture against a quantity of tobacco, charging a violation of the internal revenue laws. A verdict of condemnation was returned by the jury (Case No. 16,105), and the claimant has now moved for a new trial.]

<p>Case No. 16,106a.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Forfeiture—Form of Verdict.</p> <p>1.In an action brought to forfeit, for violation of the internal revenue acts, a quantity of manufactured tobacco, and a quantity of raw materials, and certain tools and other property, the jury rendered a verdict “in favor of the United States, condemning the goods.” On a motion to arrest judgment on the verdict: Reid, that the verdict was a verdict in favor of the United States on each of the three issues presented to the jury.</p> <p>2. The words “condemning the goods” did no harm, but might be rejected as surplusage.</p> <p>3. Under the 32d section of the act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 91), the court was authorized to give judgment as the right appeared, without regarding any imperfection or want of form in the verdict, if such had existed.</p> <p>This decision was affirmed by the circuit court on writ of error. [Case unreported.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,107.</p> <p>Information against British Vessel and Her Master—Smuggling—Amendment—Jurisdiction-Trial by Jury—Joinder.</p> <p>1. An information was filed ngainst the steamship Queen and her master, alleging that the vessel belonged, in whole or in part, to a citizen or citizens of the United States, and charging that certain merchandise, not included in the manifest on board, had been imported by her into the United States, contrary to section 24 of the act of March 2, 1799 [1 Stat. 644], which, for such offence, imposes upon the master a forfeiture equal to the value of the goods not included in the manifest, and that, by section 8 of the act of July 18, 1866 [14 Stat. 180], the vessel is holden for the payment of the penalty against the master, and becomes liable to be seized and proceeded against, by libel, to recover the same, in this court. The answer of the owners of the vessel denied the allegations of the information, and especially that they were citizens of or residents in the United States, and excepted to the information as alleging no cause of action against the vessel, inasmuch as it did not show that the master or owners of the vessel had been convicted of the acts complained of. The answer of the master also denied the statements of the information and excepted to it. in that it did not set forth a joint cause of action against the vessel and the master, and in that parties were improperly joined, and in that the parties joined were entitled to different modes of trial, and in that this action could not be sustained against the vessel and the master jointly. The suit, as to both vessel and master, was tried before the court without a jury, as a civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction: Held, that it was clearly proved that the violation of the law set forth in the information was committed.</p> <p>2. The vessel was a British vessel, and as, under the law, it is immaterial whether the offending vessel is a vessel of the United States or a foreign vessel, the information might be amended without terms, in respect to the ownership of the vessel, and by averring a violation of section 25 of the act of 1866. which extends the provisions of the act of 1799 to vessels owned, in whole or in part, by foreigners.</p> <p>3. The court had jurisdiction to enforce the penalty against the vessel, in such a proceeding as this, without a trial by jury.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. The Missouri, Case No. 15,7S5.]</p> <p>4. The vessel might be proceeded against for the penalty, irrespective of any proceeding against the master.</p> <p>[Cited in The Helvetia. Case No. 6,345. Followed in Pollock v. The Sea Bird, 3 Fed. 575: The Paolina S.. 11 Fed. 174. Cited in The Sidonian, 38 Fed. 442.]</p> <p>5. The suit to recover the penalty against the master was a suit at common law, and he was entitled to a trial by jury, under the seventh amendment of the constitution of the United States.</p> <p>6. The right to recover against the vessel in the present form of proceeding was clear, and, as the answer of the master excepted to the information on the ground that the suit could not be maintained against the vessel and master jointly, and because they were entitled to different modes of trial, and the answer of the vessel did not except to such joinder, the information would be dismissed as to the master. and a decree entered against the vessel.</p> <p>[Upon an appeal to the circuit court the libel-ants were held entitled to a decree against the vessel, with costs. See Case No. 16,108.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] [This was an information of forfeiture against the steamship Queen for alleged violation of the revenue laws. On appeal from the district court. See Case No. 16,107.]

This was an indictment against the defendant [Terence Quinn], founded on the 20th section of the act of Hay 31, 1870 (10 Stat. 145). It contained thirteen counts.

<p>Case No. 16,111.</p> <p>Neutrality Laws—Power of Federal Courts— Bonds to Observe Laws—Grand Jury.</p> <p>1. A judge of the United States has power, on just grounds of suspicion, to require bond to observe the neutrality laws.</p> <p>2. A grand jury charged with inquiring as to the existence of an organization whose object was the invasion of the territory of a friendly power, presented that the principal-witnesses examined before them, and who were rumored to be the leaders in the unlawful ■enterprise, had refused to answer questions propounded to them on the subject, on the ground that it would criminate themselves. The grand jury also presented that, though they were unable to elicit any facts on which to base an indictment, or to show the existence of any actual military organization, yet that they believed that some such organization was in contemplation. Held, that there were sufficient grounds for requiring from the parties who declined to testify before the grand jury, bonds to observe the neutrality laws of the United States.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,113.</p> <p>Indian Tribes—Adoption op White Max—Construction of Penal Statutes.</p> <p>1. A white man who is incorporated with an Indian tribe at mature age. by adoption, does not thereby become an Indian, so as to cease to be amenable to the laws of the United States.</p> <p>2. He may, however, by such adoption, become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and also make himself amenable to their laws and usages.</p> <p>3. Therefore, the second article of the treaty of Washington, of the 6th of August, 1846, between the United States and Cherokee Indians (9 Stat. 871), had the effect to pardon an of-fence previously committed by an Indian, in the Cherokee country west of Arkansas, against a white man who had been adopted by that tribe, and become a part of it.</p> <p>4. The case of U. S. v. Rogers, 4 How. [45 U. S.] 571, cited.</p> <p>5. In the construction of penal statutes, it is a general rule that an offender who is protected by its letter, cannot be deprived of its benefit, on the ground that his case is not within the spirit and intention of the law.</p> <p>[Cited in Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 337.]</p> <p>6. Where there is no ambiguity there is no room for construction.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] Action for moneys alleged to have been paid to a defendant by mistake of a government officer. In the court below a verdict for the defendant was directed. [Case unreported.]

This is an application by the United States for an injunction against the Railroad and Bridge Company, to prevent them from constructing their railroad across Rock Island and bridges connected therewith, over both ■channels of the Mississippi river.

The indictment charged, in substance, that certain persons to the grand jurors unknown, in the Indian country west of Arkansas, fe-loniously, wilfully, and of their malice aforethought, murdered one Charles Butler, an Indian, and that John Ramsay, a white man, was accessory thereto before the fact. filed a motion to quash the indictment, on the ground that there was no law of congress punishing the offence charged in the indictment, and this point he argued at length. in his…

<p>Case No. 16,116.</p> <p>Makshai.’s Bon'd—Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>Section 786 of the Revised Statutes, limiting the time within which actions must he commenced on marshal's bonds, does not apply to actions instituted by the United States.</p>

The indictment in this case was found under section 12, of the act of July 1, 1864 13 Stat. 337), and filed in this court on November 11, 18CS.

This was an information for a penalty under the United States act of 1799 ■ (chapter 22) filed hy the district attorney for Massachusetts, against the master of the brig Nitheroy, for not making a report of the arrival of his vessel to the deputy collector of the port of Holmes’ Hole, in accordance with the SCth section of the above act.

<p>Case No. 16,ISO.</p> <p>Statutes — Title of Laws — Offenses against Natukalization Laws—Forgery of Certificate.</p> <p>1. The title of an act of congress, when at variance with its provisions, deserves no consideration, though it may sometimes serve to explain a doubtful meaning of part of it.</p> <p>2. Defendant was indicted under the thirteenth section of the act of congress of March 3.1813 [2 Stat. 811], for forging, etc., a certificate of naturalization. Held, that the penalties provided in that section applied to that indictment, and that the district court had jurisdiction.</p>

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>[This was an action by the United States against William P. Rathbone.]</p>

[This was an indictment against the consul from Genoa, for a misdemeanor in sending anonymous and threatening letters to various persons named, with a view to extort money. A motion to quash the indictment was heretofore overruled. Case No. 16,122. [The defendant was defended on the following points:] (1) That the matter charged in the indictment was not a crime by the-common law, nor is it made such by any positive law of the United States.

[Claim by Pearson B. Reading for the Rancho Buenaventura, embracing a tract of six square leagues. Confirmed by the board of land commissioners, and appealed by the United States.]

[This was an action at law against Robert Reagan to recover the penalty' of $100, for alleged failure to keep the book required, in the ease of a wholesale liquor dealer, by the internal revenue laws.]

<p>Case No. 16,139.</p> <p>Navigation Laws — Importations of Coi.onial Products—Construction of Statutes.</p> <p>1. The construction of the navigation act of March 1, 1817 (3 Stat. 351). is no longer an open one to the United States. The contemporaneous construction of the act, corroborated by an undeviating usage of thirty years, must now govern.</p> <p>[Cited in Barney v. Leeds. 51 N. H. 266. Cited in brief in Burritt v. Commissioners of State Contracts, 120 Ill. 322, 11 N. E. 181.]</p> <p>2. Therefore, as the United States have never, since the act of 1817, questioned importations of colonial products made in vessels of the mother country from her home ports, and as the secretary of the treasury, within six months after the passage of the act, instructed the collectors of the customs that the act allowed such importations, which instructions remained unaltered for twenty-five years, held, that the United States cannot now insist that the act does not allow the importation from London into New-York. in a vessel owned by British subjects residing in England, of goods, the growth, production or manufacture of the British East Indies.</p> <p>3. If it were doubtful whether the trade in question was allowable under the act, or even if the intention of the act to the contrary were manifest, the contemporaneous exposition by the government, followed the concurrent practical construction, ought to govern.</p> <p>4. But that construction was a correct one, and the act does not compel the productions or manufactures of the dependencies of Great Britain out of Europe, to be imported in vessels belonging to the place of production or manufacture.</p> <p>"5. The word “country” in the first section of the act, means the entire nation, and not merely a section or portion of territory belonging to the nation.</p> <p>6. The act has in view foreign governments and nations, and their vessels, and not the localities within which the individual owners reside.</p> <p>7. Nor does the act exact a direct trade from the port of production or of usual shipment, when the importation is in a vessel belonging to the country in which the goods are produced.</p> <p>8. It does not appear that Great Britain prohibits the importation in vessels of the United States, of the productions of our territories or dependencies, shipped from a port of the United States to which they had been transported from the place of production.</p> <p>9. Nor does it appear that vessels of the United States are prohibited by the British government from importing into this country from England, goods, wares or merchandise, the growth; production or manufacture of her East India dependencies.</p> <p>[Subsequently the collector of the port of New York made an application for a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure. The court decided that he was entitled to the certificate, although there had been laches in making application for the same. Case No. 16,130.]</p>

This was an application on the part of the collector of the port of New-York, for a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure. The application was made in pursuance of the provisions of the 1st section of the act of February 24th, 1807 (2 Stat. 422). The vessel had been seized by the collector as forfeited to the United States under the act of March 1st, 1817 (3 Stat. 351), for an alleged violation of that act, and á libel filed praying her condemnation.

[This was an information of forfeiture against a rectifying establishment, and the fixtures, apparatus, and liquors found therein, which are claimed by S. Sloss & Co. On demurrer to the information.)

The defendants [Nelson Rector and Smith A. Ellis] are charged, in this court, of counterfeiting the coin of the United States. They are now in jail, on a criminal charge under the process of the state court; and a motion is made in behalf of persons who were bail for their appearance at this term, for a habeas corpus to bring the defendants before this court, and from the custody of the state.

<p>Case Wo. 16,133.</p> <p>Cdtting Timber on Public Lands—Indictment^</p> <p>1. Under the act of congress, it is not necessary to describe in an indictment for trespass on the public lands, every kind of timber that was cut.</p> <p>2. It is sufficient to name one or more species, and in the words of the statute allege other timbers.</p> <p>3. An indictment will lie for cutting timber on any of the public lands, though it may not have been reserved for naval purposes.</p>

<p>This was a motion, to quash an indictment found in the district court at Buffalo, in November, 1S51, and transmitted to this court. The indictment was founded upon the 7th section of the act of congress of September ISth, 1850 (9 Stat. 464), commonly called the “Fugitive Slave Act,” and the alleged of-fence consisted in rescuing from the custody of the United States marshal, at Syracuse, Jerry, a person lawfully in his custody under that act, as a fugitive from service or labor. The indictment contained two classes of counts—one averring that the person rescued was held to service or labor in the state of Missouri, and was a fugitive from such service, and, as such in the lawful custody of the marshal when the rescue took place—and the other averring that the person rescued was an alleged fugitive from service or labor, and was, at the time of the rescue, in the custody of the marshal, under a warrant duly issued by a United States commissioner under said act, he having jurisdiction of the case, and proceedings being in progress before him under said warrant, to determine whether the person rescued was such fugitive or not. The motion was founded upon affidavits, and affidavits were read in opposition. The defendant [Enoch Reed) had not pleaded, but was now brought into court for the first time, and arraigned, nor had he been arrested, or held to answer in any way, before the indictment was found.</p> <p>stated two general grounds for the motion: (1) Irregularities in obtaining the grand jury by which the indictment was found. (2) Irregularities in the proceedings by and before the grand jury, after they were empanneled. Under the first point he was proceeding to urge: (1) that there were irregularities on the part of the deputy marshal at Buffalo, in drawing the grand jury; (2) that one of the grand jurors was a volunteer, not having been summoned by the deputy marshal; (3) that no order was made by the district judge for a venire to summon the grand jury, as required by the 3d section of the act of congress of August 8th, 1846 (9 Stat. 73); (4) that no venire or precept was issued by the clerk of the court to the marshal, authorizing him to summon the grand jury.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,135.</p> <p>Internal Revenue Law—Distii.lery Tax.</p> <p>[Under Act July 20. 1868, the “deficiency” tax for which a distiller is fiable is based on the quantity of spirits actually produced by I him, unless this is less than 80 per cent, of the capacity of Ms distillery, in which case the tax is to be estimated on such 80 per cent.]</p>

The defendant is charged, by an information preferred by the district attorney, and filed on the 5th of April, A. 'D. 1879, with violating section 5388 of the statutes of the United States, “by unlawfully cutting timber on lands situated and lying in the Cherokee Nation, in the Indian country, in the Western district of Arkansas, which said lands, in pursuance of law, may be reserved and purchased by the United States for military or other purposes.” To the information the…

[This was an indictment against William G.Reed upon the charge of violating the internal revenue law. Heard on a motion in arrest of judgment.]

This was an action upon a recognizance of bail, and was tried upon stipulation of the parties by the court without the intervention of a jury, at the June term of 1860. The-court found for the United States. The facts-are sufficiently stated in its opinion.

<p>Case No. 16,139.</p> <p>Qualification's of Jukors—Grand Jurors — Previous Service.</p> <p>1. Where a juror was summoned to the November term, 1876, and was impaneled and sworn on December il, 1876, and afterwards was summoned as a juror to the November term, 1878. and was impaneled and sworn on December 14, 1878: Held, that he was not liable to challenge under section 812 of the Revised Statutes, although his service as a juror under the first summons extended to April 27, 1877.</p> <p>2. Defendants who have not had any earlier chance to object to the composition of the grand jury by which they have been indicted, may do so by plea in abatement.</p> <p>3. The fact that a grand juror had, on a previous summons, attended the court as a juror within two years, does not constitute such a disqualification under section 812 of the Revised Statutes as will render bad any indictment found by the grand jury of which he is a member.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Clark, 46 Fed. 640.]</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Elson. 45 Ohio St. 657, 16 N. E. 686. Cited in brief in State v. Ward, 60 Vt. 147, 14 Atl. 190.]</p> <p>[4. Cited in U. S. v. Richardson, 28 Fed. 67, to the point that in misdemeanors, as well as felonies, two or more pleas in abatement, not repugnant to each other, may be pleaded together.]</p>

[Claim by Juan Reid for the Rancho Corte de Madera del Presidio, embracing one league of land in Marin county. Confirmed by the board of land commissioners, and appeal taken by the United States.]

<p>[Claim by Samuel G. Reid and others for the Rancho del Puerto, embracing three leagues of land in San Joaquin county. Confirmed by the board of land commissioners, and appeal taken by the United States.]</p>

[Appeal from tbe district court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.] This was a libel of information filed by the district attorney, in behalf of the United States, and claiming forfeiture of the vessel.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.] This was a libel, instituted in the district court on the 23d of June, 1847, in behalf of the United States and Edward Wilbur, collector of Newport, and others interested.

The accused were tried befo.re Judge Peabody and a jury, and were severally convicted; [Augustus] Reiter of murder, and [John] Louis of arson. After the convictions a motion was made in each case in arrest of judgment.

This was a writ of error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, bringing up the record of an information filed by the district-attorney against [Benjamin] Rendell, as master of the American brig Nithroy, for not making report, within twenty-four hours, of the arrival of the brig at the harbor of Holmes’s Hole, in the district of Massachusetts, from a foreign voyage, pursuant to the act of March 2. 1799.

<p>Case No. 16,148.</p> <p>Rebellion—Confiscation Acts — Constitutionality and Construction.</p> <p>Construction of the confiscation act of 1861 [12 Stat. 319]. It is constitutional, and applies to real estate.</p>

This action, brought to recover the amount remaining due on the official accounts of the defendant [James D. Reymert], late receiver of public moneys and designated depositary at Hudson, Wis., came on for trial on the 10th instant.

<p>Case No. 16,150.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Authority of Inspectors— Examination of National Banes.</p> <p>1. The law under which the national banks are incorporated does not exempt them from examination by the internal revenue officers-. mentioned in section 3177 of the Revised Statutes.</p> <p>2. A clerk of a supervisor of internal revenue is, however, not such an officer.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,151.</p> <p>Indictment — Civil Rights ,Bill—Its Constitutionality.</p> <p>1. An indictment need not aver the existence or the provisions of a public statute upon which the prosecution is founafed.</p> <p>.[Cited ir U. S. v. Goodwin, 20 Fed. 239.]</p> <p>2. An indictment for burglary in entering the house of T. in Kentucky, averred that T. was of African descent, and a citizen; that she was, by the laws of Kentucky, denied the right to testify against the defendants, they being white. There was a public statute of Kentucky, enabling white persons under similar circumstances to testify. Held, that the indictment was sufficient, and that the circuit' court might take jurisdiction under section 3 of the act of April 9, 1866, (14 Stat. 27) known as the “civil rights” bill, notwithstanding there was no averment of the statute of Kentucky. The circuit court should take judicial notice of such statute, and the indictment should be construed in the same manner as if the statute were averred.</p> <p>3. A prosecution for burglary is “a cause affecting” the owner of the building entered, within the meaning of section 3 of the eivii rights bill, giving the courts of the Union jurisdiction of all causes affecting persons who cannot enforce in the courts óf the state any of the rights secured to them by the first section. If the owner of the building entered, is, on account of color, incompetent, by the law of the state where the offense is alleged to have been committed, to testify in support .of the indictment as a white person might, the circuit court has jurisdiction.</p> <p>4. The criminal jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit and district courts by section 3 of the civil rights bill, is not confined to offenses committed by colored persons. It extends to prosecutions against white persons for offenses affecting persons who cannot enforce in the state courts the rights secured to them by section 1.</p> <p>5. The civil rights bill is not a penal statute. It is a remedial one, and is to be liberally construed.</p> <p>6. The history of the adoption of the first thirteen amendments to the constitution, and the objects and proper construction of them, explained.</p> <p>7. Free persons of color, born within the allegiance of the United States, are citizens: and have always been entitled to be so regarded.</p> <p>[Cited in McKay v. Campbell, Case No., 8,840.]</p> <p>8. The dicta to the contrary, in Scott v. Sanford. 19 How. [60 U. S.] 393, disapproved.</p> <p>9. The emancipation of a native bora slave, by the thirteenth amendment, removed the disability of slavery, and made him a citizen of the United States; subject, however, to any lawful restrictions imposed upon his right to vote, or other powers or privileges.</p> <p>[Cited in Le Grand v. U. S., 12 Fed. 581; U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 640, 1 Sup. Ct. 610.]</p> <p>10. The act of April 9, 1866 (14 Stat. 27) known ns the “civil rights” bill, is constitutional in all its provisions. It is an appropriate method of exercising the power conierred on congress by the thirteenth amendment.</p> <p>[11. Cited in Re Bogart, Case No. 1.596, to the point that since the organization of the supreme court, but three acts of congress have been pronounced by that body void for unconstitutionality.]</p>

On the 15th of last September, Andrew Woody, of Spring Creek, Madison county, was killed by Noah H. Rice, a United States deputy marshal, who was endeavoring to serve a capias on him for violation of the internal revenue laws. From facts developed before the court it appears that Woody had expressed a determination to resist any process which might issue against him, and had threatened to kill the defendant Rice if he attempted to arrest him.

<p>Case No. 16,156.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant—Evidence—Conclusiveness of Location.</p> <p>[Where it appears that the claimants have m the most emphatic and solemn manner made their election of the three leagues granted to them, and have surveyed the same; that important interests have grown up and large expenditures been made on the faith of that election, by the purchase and improvement at great expense of land within the survey, and by settlement and improvement under the laws of the United States of lands without it; and that no objections to the location of the grant thus elected are suggested by the United States or the owners of the adjoining ranchos,—the land should be surveyed in accordance with the claimants’ original survey and election.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,160.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant—Confirmation of Claim — Conclusiveness.</p> <p>[In a proceeding to correct a survey under the act of 1860, the district court has no jurisdiction to review and reverse the final decree, whereby the genuineness and validity of the claim was established.]</p>

Assault and battery upon Robert Aber-crombie, a constable [by Benjamin Ricketts]. moved the court to instruct the jury, that if the defendant was present and aiding, abetting, or encouraging the assault and battery, he was a principal. contended that it was necessary he should have been present, and aiding, and abetting, and encouraging.

[Claim of Francisco Rico and J. A. Castro to the Rancho del Rio Estanislao, comprising eleven leagues of land in Stanislaus county; confirmed by the board of land commissioners, and appeal taken by the United States.]

The defendant was tried by the same jury upon two indictments. One was for an assault committed at sea by defendant, master of the ship, on his mate, with intent to kill. The other for maliciously, and without justifiable cause, forcing the mate of his ship on shore a.t Batavia, a foreign port; and leaving him there.

The defendant [James Riley] was indicted for a misdemeanor, in carrying on the business of a retail dealer in liquors, without having taken out a license therefor, as required by the act of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat. 432), commonly known as the “Internal Revenue Act,” and by the amendments to that act made by the act of March 3, 1863 (Id. 713). The defendant was convicted, and now moved for a new trial.

The defendants [Samuel Rindskopf and others] were indicted for conspiracy under section 30, Act March 2, 1867.

<p>Case No. 16,166.</p> <p>Assessment against Distiller—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. The validity of an assessment against a distiller may be inquired into by defendants answering a bill oy the United States to subject to the payment of such assessment, lands transferred to them.</p> <p>2. When the defendants have rebutted the presumption of law as to the validity of the assessment the burden of proof is shifted upon the government to establish its validity.</p>

In 1869 Mr. [John] Ritchie was state’s attorney for Frederick county, and in assessing the internal revenue tax upon his income for that year, the assessor included as taxable the money received as compensation for his services as state’s attorney. Mr. Ritchie took the ground that his compensation received as an officer of the state was exempt from the income tax, and declined to pay the portion of the tax assessed upon that part of his income.

[This was an indictment against John J. Robbins, for violation of the internal revenue laws for the purpose of evading payment of taxes.] The court first recapitulated the testimony that had been given in reference to the charge of selling tobacco without proper stamps to Sprague, Warner & Co., of Chicago; to Randall, of Grand Rapids; and to Beidelbeck & Miller, of Davenport As to the sales to Robert Sprague, James F. Rothschilds, and the White Brothers, the court considered…

[This was an application by John T. Robbins for a writ of habeas corpus.] In June, 1870, the defendant was convicted of sundry violations of the internal revenue law, viz., the 71st section of the act of July 20, 186S [15 Stat. 156]; and sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, and to pay a fine of $2,000 and costs, and stand committed until the fine and costs were paid. [Case No. 16,170.] After the expiration of the year’s imprisonment, .the defendant being still detained in the…

<p>Case No. 16,173.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction—Crimes Committed in Foreign Harbors—Piracy—Revolt-Authority of Mate.</p> <p>1. Where prisoners were indicted for an endeavor to make a revolt on board of the American packet ship Burgundy, lying at the port of Havre in France, in an enclosed dock into which the tide was let at the will of the owner: Held, that the circuit court of the United States had jurisdiction of the offence. Held, also, that the admiralty jurisdiction, under the act of congress passed March 3d, 1835. was co-extensive with the English admiralty courts in cases when robbery or offences were committed in creeks, harbors and ports in foreign countries, which robbery was done by American citizens, and amounted to piracy.</p> <p>2. Under the act of 1825 [4 Stat. 115], passed by the American congress, the United States courts had jurisdiction over their own citizens in foreign countries for offences committed on tide waters.</p> <p>3. The mates of a vessel in the absence of the master had the command of such ship or vessel, and they could direct the whole of the crew to go below from the deck of the vessel to their berths in the night time.</p> <p>4. Where one of the crew came on deck apparently to see what the cause of a disturbance was that was then going on, when ordered peremptorily to go below and neglected to do so, he was guilty of disobedience of orders and might be punished under the act of congress for disobedience of orders and an endeavor to make a revolt.</p>

The question, before the court was grounded on a habeas corpus, to bring up Jonathan Robbins, who was commited to jail in February, 1799, on suspicion of having been concerned in a mutiny on board the British frigate Hermione, in 1791; which ended in the murder of the principal officers, and carrying the frigate into a Spanish port; and on a motion by counsel, on behalf of the consul of his Britannic majesty, that the prisoner should be delivered up (to be sent to Jamaica…

Action for breach of contract to deliver barley. The defendants agreed to deliver upon the requisitions of the United States quartermaster, at certain military posts in the vicinity of San Francisco, at such times within the year, and in such quantities as required for the use of such posts, not exceeding in the aggregate one million pounds. The contract did not specify the mode of delivery, whether in sacks, in bulk, or otherwise.

This was an action of debt against sureties, brought on the official bond of B., late marshal of the Western district of Pennsylvania. The declaration was in the usual form with proferí: the plea non est factum.

In this case a decree had been rendered in favor of the government upon the libel, and the court was called on to pronounce judgment against the claimant and his sureties upon the bond executed by them for the redelivery of the property seized, to the United States. Upon this branch of the case several questions were raised which were disposed of in the following opinion.

[Rule against John Roche to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt for violating an injunction against the infringement of a trademark.]

<p>Case No. 16,181.</p> <p>Mexican Land Claims.</p> <p>Objections by the board met by the additional testimony taken in this court-</p>

The following is the history of this claim: “Manuel Rodriguez, claimant for ‘Butano,’ one square league, in Santa Cruz county. Informal grant, February 19, 1838, by Juan B. Alvarado, ratified November 13,1844, by Manuel Mieheltorena to Romana Sanchez; claim filed February 24, 1853; confirmed by the commission February S, 1855, by the district court November 19, 1S56 [Case No. 16,185]; and appeal dismissed June 12, 1857,—contain-ing 3,025.65 acres.”

<p>Case No. 16,182.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Location of Bounda-kies—Rejection of Sorvet.</p> <p>[See Case No. 16,185, and note.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,183.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant — Location — Deficiency in Quantity.</p> <p>[There is no principle or authority for decreeing to a grantee an equivalent for a deficiency within his exterio” boundaries out of a sobrante (surplus or excess), accidentally found to ex-I ist within the exterior boundaries of a neighboring grant.]</p> <p>[The final decree locating the claim was affirmed in 1 Wall. (68 U. S.) 582.]</p>

[Claim confirmed on evidence from the archives, supported by long continued possession, though the original title was lost.] [Claim of Manuel Rodriguez to the Rancho Butano, being one league of land in Santa Cruz county, California.]

Mr. Justice Harlan has recently disposed of numerous cases, in which the United States is a party, arising under the internal revenue laws. They were spoken of in argument as “first batch” and “second batch” eases. The “second batch” eases were actions of debt on distillery and warehousing bonds; breach, nonpayment of taxes.

At the April term, 1845, of the said circuit court,. the grand jury indicted William S. Rogers for the murder of Jacob Nicholson.

Indictment against the defendants [William Rogers and others] for an endeavor to commit a revolt, on the 10th of May, 1838, on board of the brig Troy, belonging to Bristol (Rhode Island), alleged to be a registered ship, owned by certain citizens of the United States, named in the indictment, and the defendants being seamen in and on board thereof, against the act of March 3, 1835, c. 40 [4 Stat. 775]. Plea, not guilty.

<p>Case No. 16,190.</p> <p>Mexican Land Gbant — Genuineness of Titulo —Evidence.</p> <p>[1. Where no map was presented or informes obtained, and the titulo purports to have been issued on the same day that the borrador was drawn, the fact that the description of the land in the former is much more specific than that in the latter is strong evidence adverse to the genuineness of the titulo.]</p> <p>[2. The fact that the governor’s signature to the alleged titule, testimonio, and order for extension, are in a style rarely, if ever, used by him. and different from his signature affixed to similar documents on the same date, tends to show that such papers are forgeries.]</p> <p>[3. The fact that the journals of the departmental assembly show that that body was not in session at the date on which the testimonio states that the grant was approved by it is strong evidence that the grant is not genuine.]</p> <p>[4. Proof that four days after the date of the alleged grant by the governor of eleven leagues he .granted another nine leagues to the same persons tends to show that the former grant is not genuine.]</p> <p>[Affirmed in 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 743.]</p>

Indictment for carrying on business as retail liquor dealer without .paying special tax. In the summer of 1881 the defendant, Roli-ger, and about thirty others, in Assumption, Illinois, united themselves in a voluntary association for the purpose of providing themselves with liquor and beer to drink as they wanted it, the village of Assumption refusing to license the sale of liquor or beer.

<p>[This was an indictment against Philip Ronzone.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,195.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grant—Sutter General Title— Abandonment.</p> <p>[1. One claiming under the “general title” of Micheltorena has merely to show that he is one of those in whose favor General Sutter reported, and need not show that he received a copy of the grant.]</p> <p>[2. Where one who had purchased land, and had built a house thereon, obtained a grant from the government of adjoining land, his continued occupancy of the former tract extended to the latter, so as to rebut any presumption of abandonment of the grant.]</p> <p>[3. The fact that claimant was recognized by General Sutter as one of those entitled to the benefits of the “general title” of Micheltorena, which was in terms restricted to “citizens,” and that Sutter delivered a copy of the grant to him as such, is sufficient, when accompanied by the oath of the claimant to that effect, to show that he was within the class of “citizens.”]</p> <p>[Claim by John Rose and others for the Rancho de Tuba, comprising six leagues of land in Tuba county: eonhrmed by the board, and appeal taken by the United States.]</p> <p>[The case was taken, on an appeal, to the supreme court,, where the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the petition. 23 How. (64 U. S.) 262.]</p>

The prisoner [William Ross] was indicted for being present, aiding, and abetting, in the murder of a colored man, on board of the American schooner Pocahontas, on the high seas, near the Cape de Verd islands. At the trial it appeared, that on or about the 5th of June, 1812, the schooner lay at anchor in an open roadstead or bay, near the isle of St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verd islands, about a half mile from the shore, and about a mile from the town of Praga.

The accused, in this case [Moritz Ross-vally], was convicted, under an indictment under the 11th section of the act of June 30, 18G4- (13 Stat. 218), of aiding and assisting, in the making of a counterfeit plate from which counterfeit national currency bank notes could be printed.

This was an indictment for passing a counterfeit ten dollar note of the Bank of the United States, on the trial of which Mr. Gil-pin, Dist. Atty., without objection, had given evidence of the defendant [Adam Rouden-busli] having passed a counterfeit five dollar no' -' of the Easton (Pennsylvania) Bank, to a u.. rent person and at. a different time from what was laid in the indictment.

Buie to show cause why an information should not be filed upon the presentment of the grand jury for playing at vingt et un at a tavern, contrary to the act of assembly.

Bill in equity brought by the United States, as trustees of the Newport Bank, against the defendants as administrators of the estate of Lewis Rousmaniere. The bill in substance states, that the Newport Bank is a bank of deposit of the United States for the revenue collected in that district, and agent for- the collection of such revenue.

In this case, General Rucker, who had been arrested for treason, moved to be discharged from arrest, on the ground that he was embraced in the agreement of capitulation between Sherman and Johnston, by which it was stipulated that he should not be molested by the authorities of the United States.

<p>Case No. 16,204.</p> <p>Lands under Navigable Waters — Grants by State—Injunction—Rights op United States Navy Yard.</p> <p>1. Under the act of the legislature of New York, of April 10th, 1850 (Sess. Laws 1850, c. 283) authorizing the commissioners of the land office of the state to grant lands under the waters of navigable rivers or lakes, and providing that no such grant shall be made to any person other than the proprietor of the adjacent lands, the grant must be confined to a line starting at the intersection with the shore, and extending at a right angle with the thread of the stream, or at a right angle into the lake, without any regard to the course or direction of the line upon the land.</p> <p>2. A party who has obtained a grant in violation of the statute, as thus interpreted, will be restrained by injunction, at the suit of the proprietor of the land adjacent to the land under water so granted, from erecting docks on the land under water, so granted.</p> <p>3. Where such adjacent land was owned by the government and used as a navy yard, an injunction was granted to restrain the erection of docks on other land under water properly granted to such party, until it should be shown that such erection would not seriously interfere with the rights of the government as proprietors of the navy yard, and it was referred to a master to inquire into the efiect of such erection.</p>

' Indictment [against Spencer Ruggles] for maliciously forcing a mariner on shore in a foreign port, contrary to the tenth section of the-act of 1S25, c. 276 [3 Story’s Laws, 2001; c. 65, 4 Stat 117]. Plea, not gnilty. The cause turned principally on matters of fact at the trial. Upon the summing up to the jury, the following opinion was delivered as to the construction of the statute:

This was an indictment for disclosing and delivering to an assistant assessor a false and fraudulent return of manufactures, under section 15 of the act of June 30, 1864. Held: however, by the judge, that the defendant must not be tried both for perjury and for false return, as to the same monthly return, and that the district attorney must elect as to which he would try.

<p>Case No. 16,208.</p> <p>United States Commissioners — Criminal Complaints—Authority to Take Bail— ' Recognizances—Default.</p> <p>1. A commissioner, appointed to take affidavits, &c., under the acts of congress, has power to let to bail, one brought before him on a criminal complaint, pending the proceedings; in those states where justices of the peace have a similar power; and a recognizance to appear before him to have the proceedings completed is valid.</p> <p>[Approved in U. S. v. Case, Case No. 14,-742. Cited in U. S. v. Horton, Id. 15,-393; U. S. v George, Id. 15,199; U. S. v. • Evans, 2 Fed. 151; U. S. v. Martin, 17 Fed. 155; Ex parte Perkins, 29 Fed. 909; Rand v. U. S., 36 Fed. 672; Marvin v. U. S.,’ 44-Fed. 410. Cited in U. S. v. Ewing, 140 U, S. 144, 11 Sup. Ct. 743; U. S. v. Keiver, 56 Fed. 425: Re Acker, 66 Fed. 294; Hallett v. U. S., 63 Fed. 822; Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 282, 15 Sup. Ct. 452; U. S. v. Hudson, 65 Fed. 77; Re Dana, 68 Fed.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Mantz, 19 D. C. 598; U. S. v. Eldredge (Utah) 13 Pac. 679.]</p> <p>2. Such a commissioner has power to adjourn to another time and place, as incident to the power to hear and determine; but he cannot adjourn in the absence of the accused.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Ewing, Case No. 4,587.]</p> <p>3. In New Hampshire, one under a recognizance to appear before an examining commissioner at his office at ten o’clock, a. m., is not in default for not appearing precisely at ten o’clock, nor before the expiration of that hour,— nor is he bound to appear elsewhere than at the commissioner’s office.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Gilley, Case No. 5,438; Be Ewing, Id. 4,587.]</p> <p>4. The condition of a recognizance to appear before a commissioner can be shown to be broken, only by calling the cognizor at the time and place, when and where he was bound to answer, and making an entry of his default to appear on the minutes of the commissioner which he returns to the court.</p> <p>[Cited in Marvin v. U. S., 44 Fed. 411.]</p> <p>[Cited in Brooks v. U. S. (N. M.) 27 Pac. 311; Philbrick v. Buxton, 43 N. H. 463; State v. Kinne, 39 N. H. 138.]</p> <p>5. It is not sufficient to aver and prove aliunde, that the cognizor had in fact absconded, and did not intend to appear, and could not have appeared if he had been' called.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,209.</p> <p>Murder on High Seas—Peremptory Challenges.</p> <p>[One indicted for murder on the high seas is entitled, by the express provision of the statutes. to only 20 peremptory challenges.]</p>

This was .an indictment against John Ry-craft for .aiding, assisting, and abetting in the escape of Joshua Glover, a fugitive slave.

[The defendants, four in number, and Indians, have been indicted in this court, charged with and convicted of the murder of one Edward McMurty, a white inhabitant of the state of Nebraska. They were tried before Mr. District Judge Dundy, sitting alone in this court, upon their plea of “Not guilty.” Prior to the verdict, neither by demurrer, motion, plea, or otherwise, did the defendants make any objection to the jurisdiction of the court.

The defendant [Christian Salentine] having been convicted of violation of certain provisions of the internal revenue law, a motion for new trial was made on the ground of misconduct of one of the jurors.

The prisoner was indicted under the act of congress passed March 3, 1825 (section 22), for an assault with a dangerous weapon, to wit: a knife of the length of 12 inches, and of the breadth of 2 inches, done and committed upon the mate of the American packet ship called the “Mediator,” on a voyage upon the high seas from the port of London, in the kingdom of Great Britain, to the port of New York.

Bill of review in chancery. Bernardo Sam-peryac, under the act of congress of the 26th of May, 1824 (7 Laws U. S. 300 [4 Stat. 52]), entitled “An act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the • state of Missouri and territory of Arkansas to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims,” by R. C. Oden, .his solicitor, filed his bill against the United States, in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the territory of Arkansas, on the 21st…

<p>Case No. 16,216,</p> <p>Prize—Lien foe Seamen’s Waqes.</p> <p>[Seamen on board a prize captured and condemned as enemy property have no lien for wages, as against the title of the United States and the rights of the captors.)</p> <p>[See, also, Case No. 12,261.)</p>

[Petition by Elizabeth Martin for an injunction to restrain the issuance of a patent to the persons to whom the court had previously confirmed the grant of the rancho of Las Animas.]

<p>Case No. 16,218.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants.</p> <p>The objection that the boundary of an adjoining rancho is affected by this claim is not tenable, the controversy being between and concluding the United States and the claimants only.</p> <p>[Cited in Header v. Norton, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 457.J</p> <p>LClaim by the heirs of José Maria Sanchez for the Rancho Las Animas, comprising four leagues of land in Santa Clara county; com firmed by the board, and appeal taken by the United States.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 16,217.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,219.</p> <p>Indictment — Offenses against Postal Laws — Embezzling Letter.</p> <p>1. A count in an indictment, which alleged that the defendant, did secrete and embezzle a certain letter, is not defective.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Atkinson, 34 Fed. 318.]</p> <p>[Cited in Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 90.]</p> <p>2. When a statute makes one or more distinct acts connected with the same transaction, indictable, they may be charged as one act.</p> <p>3. Where a letter is delivered to an authorized agent, the letter cannot be charged with having been embezzled. Whether the alleged agency existed, the jury must determine from the evidence.</p> <p>[Cited iñ U. S. v. Driscoll, Case No. 14,994; U. S. v. Thoma, Id. 16,471; U. S. v. Mc-Cready, 11 Fed. 228; Re Burkhardt, 33 Fed. 27; U. S. v. Safford, 66 Fed. 945, 946.]</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Smith, 11 Utah, 433, 40 Pac. 709.]</p>

Murder. The defendant [Ellis Sanders], a Cherokee Indian, was indicted for the murder of Billy, a white hoy, in the Cherokee country, west of Arkansas, in 1844. The defendant plead not guilty, and on the trial the proof on the part of the prosecution was, that in the latter part of July; 1844, the defendant, without any provocation or excuse, killed Billy by a blow on the head with a large maul, breaking the skull, and of which blow Billy instantly died.

Indictinent, for assault and battery. General demurrer, because the name of a prosecutor was not indorsed according to the act of assembly. cited the law of Virginia of November 13, 1792, and read the title of the act to show the intent to prevent vexatious and malicious prosecutions.

Libel of information .against.- the schooner Sarah B. Harris, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, for a violation of section 50 of the act of March 2, 1799.

<p>This was an indictment for fitting out a vessel wIth intent to employ her in the slave trade. One James Murphy, as surety, entered into a recognizance for the appearance of the defendant, to abide the order of the court. The defendant [Joseph E. Santos] appeared and answered to the indictment, but, during the trial and before It was concluded, he departed, without the leave of the court. He was called and defaulted, and the recognizance was duly estreated and ordered to be prosecuted. but. as the offence charged was only a misdemeanor, the trial proceeded, and the defendant was acquitted by the jury. Murphy now applied to the court, to be relieved from the default and estreat.</p>

On the 5th January, 1831, John F. Sarehet, imported into the port of Philadelphia, by the ship Alexander, from Liverpool, fifty-six sheet iron casks containing small pieces of round iron, from three to eight inches in length, and about half an inch in diameter.

Indictment against the defendant [Samuel P. Savage] who was mate of the ship Plato, Charles Knapp master: (1) For confining the said master, and (2) for an endeavour to commit a revolt on board of the ship, against the crimes act of 1790, c. 36, § 12. Plea, not guilty. in the course of the trial contended (1) that to constitute a confinement within the act, there must be an intention to confine the master.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] The original action was debt by the United States, against the defendant in error [Abner Sawyer, Jr.], on a bond dated on the 17th March, 1809, for $3,746.

Motion to quash an indictment under the revenue act for removing five kegs of lager beer, without affixing and canceling the stamp required by law.

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.</p> <p>[This was an action by the United States against John J. Schillinger to recover the income tax on certain promissory notes.]</p>

Indictment [against Andrew Scholfield] for false imprisonment of James Carter, a mulatto boy. moved the court to instruct the jury, that the evidence does not support the indictment. The evidence was that the boy (who was a free mulatto) was bound to the defendant, in Maryland. The defendant brought him into Alexandria. By the law of Maryland the indenture was void if he carried him out of that state. The defendant having brought him to Alexandria, sold his time to Hodgkins.

<p>Case No. 16,232.</p> <p>Offenses under Revenue Laws — Forgery of Supervisor’s Certificate—Indictment.</p> <p>1. An indictment for forgery under section 19 of the act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 120). in altering a certificate issued under section 41 of the act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 659), alleging that the certificate was issued by the collector ex officio, is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>2. By the act of 1799, the certificate was to be issued by the supervisor of the revenue, and the indictment ought to allege that the collector was designated by the president to fulfil the duties of supervisor, under the act of March 3, 1803 (2 Stat. 243), and that the certificate was granted by the collector in that capacity.</p> <p>[See Case No. 16,232a.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,232a.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Violation* op Laws—Counterfeiting Collector’s Certificate.</p> <p>[1. The certificate which the supervisor (or collector) is required by the 41st section of the act of March 2,1799 (1 Stat. 659), to give to the importer of distilled spirits, to accompany the cask, as evidence that the same has been lawfully imported, is an “official document granted by the collector,” within the meaning of the 19th section of the crimes act of 1825 (4 Stat. 120), which makes it a felony to forge or counterfeit such documents.]</p> <p>[2. The provision of the statute that the certificate is to be “numbered, signed, and delivered”by the collector, and “filled up and countersigned” by the inspector, does not require that the collector shall affix his manual signature, and the instrument may be the subject of forgery, although his signature was printed.]</p> <p>[3. But even if an original paper, executed with printed signatures, would not be good under the statute, yet, as it purports to be a genuine certificate, it would still be a felony, under the terms of the crimes act, to counterfeit it.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 16,232.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,233.</p> <p>Federal Convicts in State Jails—Commutation of Sentence—State Laws.</p> <p>1. The sentence of a convicted prisoner, sentenced to be imprisoned for twelve months, did not fix the place of confinement. .The sentence was executed in Ludlow street jail. Ten months of the term having expired, the prisoner applied for his discharge, on the ground that, under the act of March 3d, 1875 (18 Stat. 479), he was entitled to a deduction of five days during every month: Held, that, as the state of New York had a system of commutation for its own prisoners, the deduction could not be allowed.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Terry, 37 Fed. 652; U. S. v. Goujon, 39 Fed. 774; Re Deering, 60 Fed. 267.]</p> <p>2. The prisoner would be entitled, under sec- | tion 5543 of the Revised Statutes, to the deduction of one month, there allowed, on the certificate and approval required by that section.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Deering, 60 Fed. 207.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,234.</p> <p>Public Laxos—Removal or Timber—Indictment —Construction op Statute.</p> <p>1. The indictment charged the defendant with being employed in “removing from lands of the United States, at the mouth of the river Muskegon, in the county of Ottawa, and district of Michigan, a large amount of timber, to wit: one hundred thousand shingles and twenty cords of shingle bolts.” The court held this description too vague and uncertain. That the locality of the trespass was inseparably connected with the offense, and the particular section or quarter section of the public domain must be stated, so as to protect the defendant from another trial, for the same offense, more particularly described according to the designations of the public survey. That the question was not one of jurisdiction; but pertained to the statutory description of the offense.</p> <p>2. That the United States, as a great land proprietor,, had the public lands officially surveyed, platted and designated, by fixed ranges, townships, sections, and quarter sections. These divisions were of record, and notorious, and the defendant was entitled to such a particular description that he might be apprised of what trespass he was called upon to defend. The mouth of the Muskegon might embrace more or less of the land of the United States, and comprehend townships or counties. The being “employed in removing timber from the lands of the United States,” had reference to the well known and legally designated parts of the public survey, by which the national domain, other than that reserved, was purchased and sold.</p> <p>3. The statute under which the indictment was found, constitutes part of the land' law of the United States, and was designed for the protection and the preservation of both classes of the national domain by severe penalties. The term “other land” in the statute, has reference to its surveyed divisions, and contemplates the lands known and described in the public surveys as distinct from those reserved for naval purposes. The one was held for a special object; the other, by various enactments as trustee for subsequent purchasers.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Garretson, 42 Fed. 25.]</p> <p>4. The term “other lands” being general, and the intention manifestly requiring a specific application, in order to charge the particular offense, a particular description was necessary as to place. The general language, “lands of the United States,” not sufficient, as descriptive of the offense.</p> <p>5. The term “timber” in the statute, signifies, the standing and the felled trees prepared for transportation to a vessel or saw-mill, such as saw logs, or lumber in bulk; but does not embrace any article manufactured from the tree, as shingles or boards. The trees are those, the wood of which is generally used in ship and house building.</p> <p>6. It is not necessary in an indictment for removal, to allege that the timber was removed from the land on which it was grown or from which it was cut. But it must be stated that it was removed from the lands of the United States, specially described according to the public survey.</p> <p>7. The allegation that the defendant knowingly committed the act, is unnecessary.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Three Railroad Cars, Case No. 16,513.]</p>

<p>Question certified for the opinion of the court by a United States commissioner. One Sehumann, having beeD brought before a United States commissioner at the city of San Francisco, for examination upon a charge of having committed a public offense against the laws of the United States, the district-attorney proposed, before the examination was completed, to dismiss the proceeding. The commissioner applied to Judges FIELD and HOFFMAN, then holding the circuit court, for their opinion as to the power of the district-attorney to do so. The following opinion was rendered in answer to this question.</p>

Conrad Schwartz was indicted for obstructing a public highway. contended that it was only a private way for the accommodation of those who purchased lots of General Forrest.

<p>Case Wo. 16,239.</p> <p>Navigation op Steam Vessels—Safetv op Passengers—Licensed Pilots on Ohio River —Violation op Statute.</p> <p>1. The act of congress of August 30, 1852 [10 Stat. 61], providing for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels, propelled in whole or in part by steam, requires that every one connected with the navigation of such vessels, whether upon the rivers, the lakes or the ocean, be held to.the strictest accountability.</p> <p>2. A vessel, with passengers, navigating between ports so distant from each other as Pitts-burg and Gallipolis on the Ohio river, having but one licensed pilot on board, the captain acting also as pilot, has not the "complement” of licensed pilots required by the act.</p> <p>3. If the captain of the boat is deprived of his “complement” of pilots, during a voyage, without his consent, fault or collusion, the deficiency may be temporarily supplied, until others, licensed, can be obtained.</p> <p>4. But he has no right to begin a new voyage and imperii the lives of passengers, by arrogating to himself the knowledge and responsibility of licensed pilots, whose function alone in the navigation of the vessel the law recognizes.</p> <p>5. If he does so he incurs himself the penalty of $100, imposed by the act of August 30, 1852, besides subjecting his boat and its owners, under a proceeding in admiralty, to the penalty of $500. under the 1st section of the act of July 7, 1838 [5 Stat. 304].</p> <p>[Cited in Pollock v. The Sea Bird, 3 Fed. 576.]</p>

<p>Case Ho. 16,240.</p> <p>Shipping — License and Enrollment — Sale to Foreigner—Violation op Regulations—For-peiture—Construction op Statutes.</p> <p>[1. The provision in the third section of the act of 1831 (4 Stat. 487, which regulates the foreign and coasting trade on the northern, northeastern, and northwestern frontiers) authorizing vessels not registered, but merely licensed and enrobed for the coasting trade and fisheries, to engage in foreign commerce, without a certificate of registry, provided, however, that in all other respects they shall be liable “to the rules regulations and penalties, now in force relating to registered vessels,” etc., does not render applicabie to such licensed and enrolled vessels the provision in the sixteenth section of act of 1792 (1 Stat. 295. which relates only to registered vessels) declaring a forfeiture of any vessel sold or transferred to a foreigner, unless such sale or transfer is made known by delivering up to the collector the certificate of registry within seven days from such sale or transfer. A provision for a forfeiture should not be imported into a statute by construction.]</p> <p>[2. A vessel which has been enrolled and licensed under the act of 1831, but whose license has become void by reason of a subsequent sale, is no longer a licensed and enrolled vessel, so as to be subject to forfeiture by her sale in whole or in part to a foreigner, in violation of section 32 of that act.]</p> <p>[3. In the act t>f 1793 (1 Stat. 305), relating to the enrolling and licensing of vessels for the coasting trade and fisheries, the provision (section 2) that the same requisites shall in all respects be complied with as are necessary in registering vessels (under the act of 1792) does not render applicable thereto the provision in the sixteenth section of the act of 1792, declaring a forfeiture of the vessel in case the parties applying tor registration shall knowingly swear falsely in respect to any matter of fact]</p> <p>[This was a libel of information against the propeller Seiota (William Williams, Andrew J. Rich, and Henry Martin, claimants), alleging a forfeiture because of a violation of the laws relating to enrolled and licensed vessels.]</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against James Scott for the rescue of one Shadrach, a fugitive slave.]</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against George T. Scott for murder.]</p>

Maiming. Indictment that [John W.] Scroggins, a white man, shot James Rawles, also a white man, with a rifle gun, in the right arm, with intent to disable and maim. moved to quash the indictment, on cne ground that to disable the limb or member of a person by means of shooting, was not embraced by the act of congress.

In equity. Heard on bill and answer. This was a bill filed to set aside a deed for fifty-seven sections of land made by the defendant William T. Scott to his co-defendant Hiram G. Austin. The bill alleged in substance as follows: Scott was surety on the bond of the late collector of internal revenue, who had died in ■ default to the United States in the sum of $127,000. The penalty of the bond was $50,000.

W. H. Smyth, a commissioner of this ■court, filed his petition, in which he represented that as such commissioner he had issued a warrant for the arrest of one Wesley Scroggins, directed to the United States marshal for the Northern district of Georgia; that this warrant was dated January 17, 1879, and on that day placed in the hands of the marshal for execution; that on February 10, 1879, he, the said commissioner, addressed an official letter to the marshal inquiring what…

<p>This was an indictment against [Henry Seagrist and others], four of the crew of the American brig Humming-bird, of New York, for an endeavor to make a revolt and mutiny on board of her, in the harbor of Palermo, Sicily, on the 31st of December, 1859. On the trial they were convicted, and they now moved for a new trial.</p>

[This was a petition by Beverly Tucker for a writ of mandamus against A. G. Seaman, printer for the United States senate, to require him to deliver a certain document to the relator.] The -petition sets forth that the relator is the public printer for the senate of the United States, duly elected and qualified, and in the actual exercise of said office; that A. G. Seaman is the superintendent of the public printing, duly appointed and qualified, and in the actual exercise of…

Indictment for resisting Chipman, an inspector of the customs, in the execution of his ■office, viz. in attempting to enter the schooner Dinah, for the purpose, as was alleged, of ascertaining, first, whether any breach of the law had been committed; secondly, whether goods were on hoard, intended to be illegally exported.

[Indictment of Albert Seeley and others for obstructing and impeding the due administration of justice, contrary to the act of March 2,1S31.]

Upon a petition of the claimants [Mayoz and others], praying that the segars might be appraised, and delivered to them upon their executing a bond with surety for the amount of the appraisement, a question arose whether the amount of the duties upon the segars was to be deducted by the appraisers from the market value, and the difference to be returned as their valuation, or their. appraisement at the market value was to be returned without any such deduction.

<p>Case No. 16,249a.</p> <p>Mandamus to Marshal—Witness Bees.</p> <p>A writ of mandamus will be refused to command the marshal of the District of Columbia to pay the petitioner, an attorney, of this court, witness fees. Especially will it be the case when the judge of the criminal court decides-the petitioner is not entitled to the same.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,250.</p> <p>California Land Claims — Proceeding to Contest or Reform Survey—Interlocutory and Pinal Decrees.</p> <p>[1. The act of June 14, 1860 (12 Stat. 33), relating to the settlement of private land claims in California, declares that all cases in which proceedings “are pending” for the purpose of contesting or reforming surveys made and approved by the surveyor general “are made subject to this act.” Held, that a case in which an order had been entered rejecting the original survey, and giving directions for a new and reformed survey, was still "pending.” so as to be subject to the act: for such an order is merely interlocutory.]</p> <p>[2. In such proceedings no decree can be deemed final which does not adopt and approve some survey and plat, fixing with precision every line of the land.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,251.</p> <p>Steam Vessels—Inspection of Hulls and Boilers—Internal Commerce of State.</p> <p>A steamboat employed in transporting passengers between ports in the same state is not liable to a penalty for not having the hull and boilers inspected under the act of congress of August 30, 1852 [10 Stat. 61], and the district court has no jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in The Daniel Ball, Case No. 3.564. Disapproved in The City of Salem, 37 Eed. 848.]</p>

This was an information in rem, against certain crude oil and a still and apparatus for distilling such oil, alleged to have become forfeited to the United States, under the provisions of the 25th section of the internal revenue act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 483). The only claim interposed, was by one Clau-son, who intervened as claimant, by virtue of a mortgage upon the property, executed to him by one Seeley, the owner.

<p>Case No. 16,253a.</p> <p>Forfeitures under Internal'Revenue Laws — Costs.</p> <p>In proceedings in rem against merchandise, under the 48tb section of the internal revenue act of 1864 [13 Stat. 248], in cases of adjudged forfeiture to the United States, claimants' contesting such forfeiture are subject to costs.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 16,254.</p> <p>Forfeitures axd Penalties—Condemnation of Propertt—Informer—Percentage.</p> <p>[When property has been condemned, and the proceeds of sale do not exceed $500, the informer is entitled to his percentage upon the gross proceeds of sale; to be paid him, however, after payment ont of the fund of the costs of the proceedings.]</p>

<p>Prize. Certain rice was stored in a warehouse close by the river, which communicated with Charleston harbor, and was captured by the launches of the Albatross and her consort</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Western district of Missouri. [This was an information of forfeiture against seventeen empty barrels, etc., Adler & Purst, claimants.]

[In this case, decided at the March term, 1868, the. goods were imported into Brownsville in 1864.

<p>Case No. 16,358.</p> <p>Customs Laws—Forfeiture for Undervaluation — Information — Necessary Averments — Intercourse with Canada—Repeal of Statutes.</p> <p>1. In an information under section 66 of the act of congress of 1799 [1 Stat. 677], alleging fraud in the importation of merchandise at an undervaluation, it is necessary to aver that the valuation was under cost at the place of exportation.</p> <p>2. The information in this case not containing this averment is defective, but the district attorney is permitted to amend.</p> <p>3. In the additional or amended information, based on section 1 of the act of congress of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 737], it is not necessary to allege that the person making the fraudulent entry, was either owner, consignee, or agent of the property, if it appears from the statements of the information that the person making the entry was the owner, or acted as an agent of the owner.</p> <p>4. An averment that the requirements of the statute have been complied with, which are merely directory to the officers of the revenue and the importer, is not necessary under the act of March, 1863.</p> <p>5. The acts of 1799 and 1863 extend and apply to commercial intercourse between Canada and the United States as well as to other foreign countries.</p> <p>6. Section 66 of the act of 1799 is not repealed by section 1 of the act of March, 1863, the latter being in aid of, or auxiliary to, the act of 1799.</p> <p>[See Cases Nos. 16,258a and 16,258b.]</p>

[This was an information of forfeiture against seventy-eight cases of books, under the customs laws, on the ground of a fraudulent undervaluation. Certain exceptions to the information were heretofore overruled. Case No. 16,258.]

[This was an information of forfeiture against certain cases of books, for fraudulent undervaluations on importation into this country.

[This was an information against seventy-eight casks of white wine, forty half casks of red wine, and five hundred cases of red wine, on the ground that the same were imported in violation of the customs laws.]

Indictment for assault and battery upon Jacob Millan. The indictment had been sent to the grand jury by Mr. Swann, attorney of the United States, in consequence of a presentment of the grand jury at November term, 1827, which stated that evidence had been heard before them whereby it appeared that Richard Shackelford, one of the constables of the county of Alexandria, was guilty of an assault on the body of Jacob Millan, but that the time limited by law for the prosecution…

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.) Debt for the penalty of one hundred dollars, against the defendant [Jacob Shack-ford], as master of the schooner Sarah, of Eastport, for not delivering up a temporary register, obtained in the district of New York, within ten days after the arrival of the vessel at Eastport, where she belonged, according to the provisions of the 3d section of the coasting act of 1793, c. 52.

This was an action of debt, brought to recover a penalty of one hundred dollars, against the master of the schooner Sarah, of Eastport, under the act of congress of 1793, c. 52, § 3 [1 Story’s Laws, 2S6; 1 Stat. 306, c. 8].

This was an indictment [against Sharp, Steward, Anderson, Macky, Smith. Williams, and Johnson] for making a revolt, endeav-ouring to make a revolt, and for confining the master. The prisoners upon their arraignment, severally pleaded, not guil'ty. The counsel for the three first, moved that they might be tried by one jury, distinct from the other four; as their defence was not only different in some respects, but at variance with that of the other four.

The action was upon a contract dated October, 1851, for the delivery, at his own risk and expense, free of charge, to the plaintiffs, at their navy yard in Brooklyn, between the 1st of January, 1852, and the 1st of May of the same year, of twelve hundred barrels of pork, of a specified quality, at a stipulated price, and in case of failure that the defendant and his sureties were to pay liquidated damages.

This indictment charges that the defendant, at Umatilla county, on November 24, 1872, did dispose of spirituous liquor to an Indian, one Moo-los-le-wick, who was then and there under the charge of an Indian agent of the United States. On the trial it appeared that the defendant was an Indian living on the Umatilla reservation, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.

This case came before the court on a motion for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, after the conviction of the defendant [Thomas J. Shea] on an indictment framed under the 23d section of the internal revenue act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 133), and containing but a single charge, namely, carrying on the business of a distiller, without having paid a special tax.

The defendant was indicted for uttering, passing and publishing as ti;ue a counterfeit order, purporting to be an order upon the cashier of the Bank of the United States in the words and figures following: “(5) A. 10,363. A 10,363. (5) “Cashier of the Bank of the 'United States, “Pay to Thomas Mather, oi; order, Five Dollars. “Office of Discount and Deposit, Mobile, the 13th day of Oct. 1829. “Geo. Poe, Philip M’Closkey, Cashier.

[Claim of Catherine Sheldon and others for the Eaneho Omochumnes, embracing five leagues of land in Sacramento county; confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.]

Motion to quash an indictment. In September, 1869, the district-attorney filed an information in the district court for the Eastern district of Michigan, against G. Shepard. The offense with which the accused was charged was the knowingly and fraudulently bringing into the United States certain personal property in violation of section 4 of the act of July 18, 1866 (14 Stat. 179); [and the punishment is by fine not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not exceeding two years.

<p>Case No. 16,272.</p> <p>Debts Due United States — Priority — Insolvency or Partnership.</p> <p>Where a partnership firm, being indebted to the United States for duties, makes an assignment of all their effects for the payment of their debts, for .vhich the social fund is inadequate, this is an act of insolvency, quoad the social fund, under the act of congress, which gives the United States the preference to other creditors, “in all eases of insolvency:” and it seems, that such an assignment amounts to an act of general insolvency, and that the private property of the individual partners, will also be subjected tc the payment, in the first instance, of the debt due to the United States, in the event of the inadequacy of the partnership fund.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in U. S. v. Lewis, Case No. 15,-595.]</p> <p>[Cited in Morris v. Morris, 4 Grat. 313.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,5274.</p> <p>Cbimes under National Bank Laws—Felonies —Misdemeanoks—Tkial in Absence of Accused.</p> <p>1. Under the Revision of 1874, that clause of section 59, e. 106, of the act of congress of 3d June, 1864 [13 Stat. 117], relating to the national banks, which makes the offence it creates a felony, is repealed, and an indictment charging such an offence need not charge that it was feloniously committed.</p> <p>2. There are no crimes against the 'United States which are felonies by virtue of the common law,'except such as may be committed on the high seas, or in the places in the states which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 205.]</p> <p>3. Except offences committed on the high seas or in such places, there are no felonies against the United States, cognizable by courts of the United Slates, except those which are expressly made such by act of congress.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 205.]</p> <p>4. Trials for misdemeanors may be had after service of summons upon the accused, without the actual presence of the accused in court, especially if he is represented by counsel, certainly in the state of Virginia.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 207.]</p> <p>5. The verdict of guilty upon an indictment for misdemeanor may be rendered by a jury in the absence of the accused, if his’ counsel be present; and when so rendered, judgment will not be arrested.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,275.</p> <p>Construction or Foreign- Statutes — Mexican Land Grants—Pueblo Lands—Authority of . Prefect—Evidence—Recitation in Grant.</p> <p>[1. In the absence of any judicial decision determining the construction and effect of a foreign statute, the practical interpretation given to it by those whose duty it was to apply and administer it affords the best means of ascertaining its true construction; and such construction will be followed, unless it be clear that such officers have misinterpreted it.]</p> <p>[2. Mexican prefects in California had power, under the 77th article of the organic law of 1837, to grant the common lands of a pueblo.]</p> <p>[3. In a grant of pueblo lands by the prefect, a mention of the land granted as “within the demarkation” .of the pueblo affords presumptive proof, in the absence of opposing evidence. that the land was so situated, and that the officer acted within the limits of his authority.]</p>

This was an action brought upon the bond of T. Jefferson Sherlock, as surveyor of customs, and designated depositary at Cincinnati, Ohio, for the amount of a balance stated against him by the treasury department. He claimed in defence that he was entitled to an additional allowance for commissions upon deposits to the credit of pension agents and other disbursing officers,

This was an indictment [against David Shive] for passing a counterfeit note of the Bank of the United States. moved for a continuance of the case on the ground that the defendant had not been furnished with a copy of the indictment and a list of the jurors. But inasmuch as it appeared that they had not been applied for, the motion was overruled. When the ease was ordered on, Mr. Phillips claimed the right of peremptory challenges.

The United States have obtained judgment and execution against the late collector of this port, for a debt incurred after the passing of the act of congress of 3d March, 1797 (3 Fol-well’s Laws, 423 [1 Stat 515]). It appears that a citizen of this state has a previous lien by judgment and execution in the state court. The sheriff has proceeded by virtue of that execution, to levy on the property so bound; and this suit is brought to stop the sale: to this a demurrer is filed.

<p>Case No. 16,279.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Authority of Prosecuting At-tornet—Nolle Pros—Discharge of Jurt.</p> <p>1. The prosecuting attorney has a right, with leave of the court, to enter a nolle prosequi on a bill of indictment, and it constitutes no bar to a subsequent indictment for the same offence.</p> <p>2. A jury sworn in a criminal case may be discharged by the court, under any sudden and uncontrollable emergency, and such discharge is no bar, even in a capital case, to another trial.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Morris, Case No. 15,S15.]</p> <p>[Cited in Eliis v. State (Fla.) 6 South. 769; Hawes v. State (Ala.) 7 South. 310; State v. Walker. 26 Ind. 354; Woodworth v. Mills, 61 Wis. 50, 20 N. W. 731; State v. Davis, 31 W. Ya. 393, 7 S. E. 26.]</p> <p>3. But after the jury are impanneled, and witnesses sworn, the prosecuting attorney has no right to enter a nolle prosequi, because the evidence is not sufficient to convict.</p> <p>4. Such an abandonment, by the prosecuting attorney, is equivalent to a verdict of acquittal.</p> <p>[Cited in Weinzorpflin v. State, 7 Blackf. 191; State v. Walker, 26 Ind. 350. Cited in brief in State v. Champeau, 52 Vt. 315.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,281.</p> <p>Counterfeiting—Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>S. was indicted for having counterfeit United States notes in his possession and attempting to pass the same at divers times, and pleaded that the indictment had not been found within two years subsequent to the commission of the acts charged. Held, that the indictments were barred by the statute of limitations.</p>

<p>The indictment against the defendant [Alanson J. Shorey] is founded upon the 19th section of the act of the 30th of August, 1842, which provides that if any person shall * * * smuggle or clandestinely introduce into the United States any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty by law, and which should have been invoiced, without paying or accounting for the duty, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Defendant appeared and pleaded the general issue that he was not guilty, and also pleaded especially that he was not guilty at any time within two years next before the finding or institution of the indictment. Allegation of the indictment is that .the offence was committed on the 10th of October, 1865, more than two years before the indictment was found and filed in court. The district attorney demurred to the special plea, and the defendant joined in demurrer. Treason and certain other capital offences are defined by the crimes act of the 30th of April, 1790, and the 32d section of that act provides that no person or persons shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for treason or other capital offence aforesaid, wilful murder or forgery excepted, unless the indictment for the same be found by a grand jury, within three years next after the treason or capital offence aforesaid shall be done or committed. Evidently that provision is limited to the crimes defined in that act, but the section further provides that no person shall “be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offence not capital, nor for any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute, unless the indictment or information shall be found or instituted within two years from the time of committing the offence, or incurring the fine or forfeiture aforesaid.”</p>

[This was an indictment against Alanson J. Shorey for smuggling. Defendant was heretofore allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty, and demur to the indictment. Case No. 16,280. The case is now heard on a demurrer, which was accordingly filed.]

<p>Case No. 16,286.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Insanity as Defense—Tests of Sanity.</p> <p>1. An individual is liable to punishment, when he can discriminate a right from a wrong act.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 248.J</p> <p>2. And this can be best ascertained, not by any theory as tc, the mind, but by the acts of the party.</p> <p>3. The concealment of the offense, an endeav- or to elude the officers of justice by an escape, a judicious use of the money stolen, all show a knowledge of the offense.</p> <p>4. And this is the point to be- ascertained, when insanity is set up as a defense.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. t. De Quilfeldt, 5 Fed. 279.]</p>

Information for selling spirituous liquors, permitted to be amended, by inserting the date of the offence, and also the words “sold and to be drank at the circus, instead of at his own house.” On the trial, the defendant attempted to prove that he acted as servant or agent of another person.

<p>Case No. 16,287a.</p> <p>Murder—Presumption of Malice—Insanity as Defense—Province of Jury—Reasonable Doubt of Sanity.</p> <p>1. The burden of rebutting the presumption of malice by showing circumstances of alleviation, excuse, or justification rests on the prisoner, and it is incumbent on him_to make out such circumstances to the satisfaction of the jury, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him.</p> <p>2. The law does not require that the insani-' ty which absolves from the crime should exist for any definite period, but only that it exists at the moment when the act occurred with which the accused stands charged. The time when the insanity is to operate is the moment when the crime charged upon the party was committed, if committed >at all.</p> <p>3. Every one is presumed to be sane who is charged with a crime, but when evidence is adduced that a prisoner is insane, conflicting testimony makes it a question for the jury, and raises a reasonable doubt which should avail a prisoner on a defence of insanity as to any other matter of fact.</p>

A rule was issued against the respondent [Frank Silverman], the county judge of Jefferson county, Arkansas, at the instance of the relators [Hewett and Cooper], to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Shortly, the facts are these: Hewett recovered judgment in this court against Jefferson county. The county did not appeal from that judgment. Hewett assigned part of the judgment to Cooper.

Indictment [against the negro Henry Sims] for highway robbery of one Latimer, by snatching his watch from his side pocket, it being fastened to his neck by a ribbon, which was broken by the first snatch, the owner not having been put in fear. cited Russ. & R. 419; 3 Chit. 805. cited Rex v. Gnosil, 1 Car. & P. 304, 12 Serg. & L. 182.

Trial of an indictment. The defendant, Charles Simons, was indicted for carrying on business as a produce broker, without paying the special tax required by the internal revenue laws.

[This was an indictment against Stephen J. Simmons charging the violation of . certain provisions of an act of congress relating to distilled spirits. Heard on a motion for a new trial.)

This was a demurrer to pleas filed by the defendants [Jacob Singer and others] in an action by the United States on a distiller’s bond, and also a demurrer to one of the breaches alleged in the declaration.

This was a libel of information, filed against certain distilled spirits as forfeited, under the 45th section of the internal revenue act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 163), which provides, that “all distilled spirits found elsewhere than in a bonded warehouse, not having been removed from such warehouse according to law, and the tax imposed by law on the same net having' been paid, shall be forfeited; * * * and the burden of proof shall be upon the claimant of said spirits, to…

Indictment [against George Singleton] for assault on Julia Drake. moved the court to arrest the judgment upon the verdict, because the name of a prosecutor was not indorsed on the; indictment; and cited the Virginia law, New Rev. Code, p. 105, c. 74, §§ 24, 25; Id. p: 346, c. 188, § 2; and Act 1802, p. 431, c. 303.

<p>Case No. 16,295.</p> <p>Rebellion — Suspension of Commercial Intercourse—Contraband Goods—Arms and Munitions.</p> <p>1. By the law of nations where a war exists between two distinct and independent powers, there must be a suspension of all commercial intercourse between their citizens; but this principle has not been applied to the states which joined the so-called “Southern Confederacy.”</p> <p>2. • The destination of arms and munitions of war, and the use intended to be made thereof, at the time of seizure, must furnish a test of their status as contraband or otherwise.</p>

Motion to set aside a verdict against the defendant in an information for a breach of the revenue laws. The information in this case was filed against certain apparatus used in the distillation of spirits, in violation of the internal revenue law.

<p>[This was an information of forfeiture against 661 bales of tobacco, of which Weil & Co. were claimants, charging a violation of the laws in relation to fraudulent entries, at the customhouse.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,299.</p> <p>Evidence — Confidential Communications — Writs of Error—Clerical Mistake—Decree of Confiscation—Effect of Pardon—Conditional Amsestx.</p> <p>1. The correspondence between a district attorney, representing the United States, and the attorney general, is confidential in its nature ar.d cannot be cited by third persons.</p> <p>2. If in the copy of a writ of error, lodged with the clerk of the court for the defendant in error, the return day of the writ is correctly stated, and the record be actually returned and filed in due time, a mere clerical error in the return day, in the original writ, is immaterial and is cured.</p> <p>3. A district court of the United States cannot. three years after rendering a decree in a confiscation case, sh as a court of error upon its own decree and reverse it.</p> <p>4. It is a general rule, that a judicial sale made by virtue of a judgment which the court had jurisdiction to render will stand, though the judgment itself be afterwards reversed for error.</p> <p>5. Pardon and amnesty do not annul past transactions so far as to invalidate a previous judicial confiscation and sale of a claimant’s property.</p> <p>6. A pardon containing a condition, that the person to whom it was granted should not claim any of his property or the proceeds thereof, that had been sold by the order, judgment or decree of a court, under the confiscation laws of the United States, is a bar to his claim.</p> <p>7. A pardon may be partial or subject to conditions, but the conditions must be lawful ones.</p>

[This was an information of forfeiture against sixteen barrels of distilled spirits, seized at No. 340 Delancey street, New York City. Heard on a motion for a new trial.]

<p>Case Mo. 16,301.</p> <p>Violation op Customs Laws — Forfeiture por Undervaluation — Imports bt Manufacturers—Evidence of Market Value—Estoppel.</p> <p>[1. Id cases of importation of goods by the manufacturer thereof, the value at which he is required, by the act of March 3, 1803, to invoice them, is the actual market value at the time and place of manufacture.]</p> <p>[2. By “market value” is meant the price at which the manufacturer holds them for sale, the price at which he freely offers them' in market, the price which he is willing to receive, and purchasers are willing to pay, in the ordinary course of trade. Following Clicquot’s Champagne, 3 Wail. (70 U. S.) 114.]</p> <p>[3. The law presumes that there was at the time and place of manufacture an actual market value for the goods, and no evidmce can be received to show that there was not in fact such an actual market value.]</p> <p>[4. Among the best evidences of market value would be a series of sales, general in their character, not accompanied by any exceptional circumstances tending to make one or more of such sales higher or lower than it would otherwise be; also a single sale, if made in the ordinary course of trade. Other evidence would be offers by merchants or manufacturers to sell to persons supposed by them to come in good faith as buyers, such offers being made in the usual course of trade, and under such circumstances as generally attend the sale of merchandise.]</p> <p>[5. It is only in cases where such evidence as the foregoing is wanting that it becomes proper to resort to such inferior evidence as the actual cost of the raw materials to the manufacturer, with the addition of a manufacturer’s profit. Even in such cases this cost is not to be received as a substitute for market value, but only aa evidence tending to show market value.]</p> <p>[6. In cases where such inferior evidence is resorted to, the cost of the raw materials is not to be based upon the actual price paid for them by the manufacturer, if he purchased them long prior tc making them up, and at a time of depression in the market, but rather upon the actual price of raw material at the time when the manufacture of the goods was completed.]</p> <p>[7. The fact that the United States consul at the place of exportation has. in compliance with his duties, certified that the invoice is correct, and the fact that the goods have been appraised, entered, and delivered to the consignee by the officers of the customhouse, on the theory that the invoice stated the true value, are not conclusive upon the question of a fraudulent undervaluation in a proceeding to forfeit the goods. The offence, if any, is complete when the entry is made, and it is immaterial that the invoice was used in the estimation of the duties; for the government is not bound, in respect to the question of forfeiture, by the acts of its officers based upon false and fraudulent statements.]</p> <p>[8. Evidence of the value of goods in New York cannot be received, in a suit to forfeit them on the grounds of an entry by means of a false invoice except as evidence of value at the place of exportation, and to contradict olher evidence given in regard to the value there.]</p> <p>[9. Evidence of prior undervaluations by the same importers is admissible only for the purpose of showing the intent with which the present undervaluation was made, and can only, be considered by the jury in casé they find that there is in fact an undervaluation in the present ease. Nor can alleged prior undervalua-tions be considered for this purpose, unless the jury are satisfied that such prior undervalua-tions were knowingly made.]</p> <p>[10. The rule prescribed by Act 1799, § 71 (1 Slat. 678), that, where probable cause of seizure is shown, the burden of proof is cast up-' on the claimants, is in force under the act of 1868, though the latter act is silent on this subject. Whether probable cause is shown is a question for the court.]</p>

<p>Information of forfeiture.</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Information on the 66th section of the collection act of 1799, c. 128 [1 Story’s Laws, 631; 1 Stat. 677, c. 22], for a forfeiture of the goods in question.

<p>Case No. 16,304.</p> <p>Forfeitures under Internal Revenue Laws— —Payments to Informers.</p>

<p>[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p>

This was a suit for the forfeiture of 65 packages of glass, imported by the claimants in October, 1838. and alleged to have been entered at the custom house below their cost, in order to defraud the revenue.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Provision is made by section 45 of the act of July 13, 1866, that “all distilled spirits found elsewhere than in a bonded warehouse, not having been removed from such warehouse according to law, and the tax imposed by law on the same not having been paid, shall be forfeited to the United States, or may immediately upon discovery be seized, and after the assessment of the tax thereon be sold…

<p>[This was an information of forfeiture against sixty-nine barrels of rum, and certain spirits, materials, and articles seized by the revenue officers.]</p> <p>Proceedings having been instituted in May last, to forfeit the rum, etc., above mentioned, under sections 48 and 68 of the internal revenue act of 1864, the application referred to in the following decision was made, on the ground that the mode of bonding goods provided in section 88 of the collection act of 1799 [1 Stat. 695], as well as the other proceedings provided for in that section, was a part of the practice of this court in internal revenue cases.</p>

The facts of this case appeared as follows: Judge Livingston issued warrants against Captain Skinner, Don Manuel H. Aguirre, and Mr. Delano, for “knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming, in the port of New York, two ships, called the Curiazo and Horatio, with the intent that they should be employed in the service of some foreign prince or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects of some other foreign prince or state, with whom…

Indictment for assault and battery. The defendant pleaded the act of congress of April, 1790 (1 Stat 112), by which prosecutions are limited to two years, after the of-fence committed. Replication that a presentment was found for the offence within the two years. General demurrer.

Writ of entry counting on the seisin of the United States within twenty years, and a dis-seisin by the tenant [William Slade]. Plea, nul disseisin. At the trial, the title of the United States appeared to be under an execution dated the 10th of April, 1805, and issued on a judgment recovered by the United States against one John Bowers, the owner of the land, at the March term of the district court of Massachusetts district, A. D. 1805.

Indictment for resisting the execution of a habere facias possessionem issued from this court, returnable to the 11th of April, 1821. The writ is set out in the indictment in hsec verba.

This was an indictment against' [Sanford Small] the mate of the ship Tigress for beating and wounding James Sweeney, one of the crew. There was also a count for an assault with a dangerous weapon. It appeared that Sweeney went on board the Tigress while lying at New Orleans, without the knowledge of the master, or either, of the officers; and there concealed himself until after the ship was at sea, bound for Boston.

<p>Case No. 61,315.</p> <p>Post Office—Publication of List of Letters— Mandamus—When mat Issue from United States Court—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. The Times, being the newspaper of the largest circulation in New Orleans, has a right to the printing, under government contract, of the weekly list of letters uncalled for at the New Orleans post office, and that it was the duty of the acting postmaster to send such list to that paper for publication.</p> <p>•2. Outside of the District of Columbia, the circuit courts of the United States cannot issue a writ of mandamus in the exercise of original jurisdiction, and such writs can be issued only as necessary to the jurisdiction of the court, and to enforce a judgment rendered.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Pearson, 32 Fed. 310.]</p> <p>3. In this case the court had not jurisdiction in the first instance by mandamus to compel the postmaster to furnish the letter list to The Times newspaper.</p>

Capt. Smidth was convicted at the last term of this court of being employed in the African slave trade, on board the slave brig Julia Moulton. Heard on motion for a new trial.

[This was an indictment against Thomas J. L. Smiley and others for plundering and stealing property from a wreck, under the act of congress of May 3, 1825. Heard on demurrer.] The case was as follows: The steamer Golden Gate, belonging to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, left San Francisco for Panama on the twenty-first of July, 1862, with two hundred and forty-two passengers and a crew of ninety-six persons.

<p>[This was an indictment against William Smith for piracy.]</p>

<p>This was a writ of error to the district court [of the United States for the Northern district of New York],</p> <p>The action was debt, brought by the United States against [Abel B.] Smith, to recover a penalty under the acts of congress passed March 2d, 1821, and March 3d, 1823 (3 Stat-C16, 781). The declaration set forth, in substance, that the defendant brought from. Canada into the United States, in the collection district of Cape Vincent, certain goods- and merchandise subject to duty, and neglected and refused to deliver a manifest thereof at the nearest collector’s or deputy-collector’s office, and passed by and avoided such office, contrary to the provisions of the acts of congress above referred to; and claimed the penalty of four times the value of said merchandize. The defendant pleaded nil debet On the trial, the counsel for the defendant admitted that a cause of action had been made out, and that the United States were entitled to recover according to-the case as presented by the declaration; but insisted that the penalty imposed under the acts of 1821 and 1823 had been abrogated by the 19th section of the act of congress of the 30th of August, 1842 (5 Stat. 565). The court so ruled, to which ruling the plaintiffs excepted, and, after verdict and judgment for the defendant [case unreported], they brought a writ of error.</p>

This was an indictment against the defendant [James Smith], under the act of congress passed May 15, 1820 (3 Stat. 600), upon a charge of having been engaged in the slave trade, in violation of the provisions of that act.

<p>Case No. 16,321.</p> <p>Offices of United States—Compensation—Set-Off—Accounting Officeks—Double Salaries—Territorial Secretary—Commissions.</p> <p>1. In a suit by the United States to recover a balance due on the books of the treasury department, the defendant can not give in evidence, as a set-off, a claim against the government, which has not previously been presented to, and disallowed by, tire proper accounting officer, without proving that it was not before in his power to produce the voucher for such claim, and that he was prevented from exhibiting it, “by absence from the United States, or some unavoidable accident.”</p> <p>2. The rejection of an account or claim against the United States, by an accounting officer of the government, authorized by a special act of congress to adjust the same on equitable principles, does not preclude the defendant, when sued, from setting up such rejected claim or account as a set-off.</p> <p>3. There is no authority, either in the executive or judicial department of the government, to allow a claim against the United States, which is prohibited by law.</p> <p>4. The legislation of congress prohibits any extra compensation to an officer for services performed, properly pertaining by law to his office.</p> <p>5. The defendant, as secretary of Minnesota territory, having a fixed salary as such, was not entitled to claim, in addition thereto, the salary of governor, during the absence of that officer; as the act organizing the territory made it the duty of the secretary, “in case of the death, removal, resignation, or necessary absence of the governor,” to discharge the duties of that office, without any provision for an increase of compensation to the secretary.</p> <p>6. The proviso in the second section of the act of September 30, 1850. expressly prohibits the allowance of double salaries in all cases.</p> <p>7. The act organizing the territory of Minnesota, made the secretary the disbursing officer of the territorial government; and he can not claim a commission on such disbursements.</p> <p>8. Where an officer, with a salary payable quarterly, is appointed for four years, “unless sooner removed by the president,” and a removal is made during a current quarter, he is not entitled to his salary to the end of the quarter.</p> <p>9. By the organic act of Minnesota territory, the general government became pledged to defray “the expenses of the legislative assembly, the printing of the laws, and other incidental expenses;” and the defendant is entitled to a credit for services rendered, or expenditures made, within the fair scope and meaning of these terms, so far as they did not pertain to the office of secretary of the territory; but the words “other incidental expenses” must be restricted to such expenses as were incidental to the legislative assembly and the printing of the laws,</p> <p>10. The second section of the act of August 29, 1812 [5 Stat. 541], which applies to territories, then or afterward to be organized, provides that no act of the legislature of a territory shall be deemed of sufficient authority for a payment by the national treasury, and requires proper vouchers and proof of the same to be exhibited to the accounting officers of the proper department.</p> <p>11. In a judicial case involving the accounts of a former secretary of a territory, in which credits are claimed which have been rejected by the treasury department, the fact that such credits have not been embraced in the estimate required by the organic act of the territory, to be previously made by the secretary of the treasury does not preclude their allowance by a jury, if not objectionable on other grounds.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,322.</p> <p>Conspiracy to Defraud United States—Indictment—Variance—Internal Revenue Laws— Bonded Warehouses — Testimony op Accomplices—Evidence op Good Character.</p> <p>1. In an indictment for a conspiracy to defraud the United States under section 30 of the act of March 2, 1867 [14 Stat. 484], there must be satisfactory evidence, not only of the conspiracy charged, but of the overt act averred, to carry into effect the objects of the conspiracy.</p> <p>2. A conspiracy is where two or more persons confederate or combine to do an unlawful act, and may be proved by direct and positive evidence, or by facts showing that there was concert of action and a unity of purpose in effecting an unlawful object.</p> <p>3. In such an indictment, alleging the conspiracy to have been entered into in the county of Champaign, within the Southern district of Ohio, if the proof shows that if there was a conspiracy, it was entered into in the county of Montgomery, it is not a fatal variance between the allegation of the indictment and the proof, the act charged being averred to have been committed within the territorial limits of the Southern district of Ohio, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>4. It was not necessary to set forth the county in which the alleged conspiracy was formed, and it may be rejected as surplusage.</p> <p>5. A distiller’s bonded warehouse, which the law requires him to provide, is a part of the distiller’s premises; and proof of the unlawful removal of the spirits from such a warehouse sustains the averment of the indictment, that the removal was bom the distillery with which it was connected.</p> <p>6. The government, in an indictment under section 30 of the act of March 2, 1867, is not bound to strict proof of the ownership of the rectifying distillery to which it is alleged the spirits were unlawfully removed.</p> <p>7. The evidence of an accomplice, in the crime charged, is to be received with great caution, and, as a general rule, will be rejected unless corroborated, as to the material facts stated by him, by credible witnesses.</p> <p>8. Proof of the good character of the party charged with crime, if there is doubt of his guilt upon the evidence, may afford good ground for a presumption of innocence, but will not be available to overcome or set aside satisfactory proof of criminality.</p> <p>[Cited in State v. Northrup, 48 Iowa, 585.]</p>

<p>Case Ho. 16,323.</p> <p>Criminal Cases—Common-Law Jurisdiction of.</p> <p>The federal courts have common-law jurisdiction of criminal cases, and may punish a crime though there be no express statute for that purpose.</p>

Indictment [against W. Smith) lor stealing fence-logs, the property of John Orr, from a worm fence. The fence consisted of ten logs, two supporting a rider. contended that it was not larceny, but trespass. The fence is part of the freehold, and would have gone to tne heir, and not to the executor. It could not be taken in execution. Orr was the tenant of W. Brent.

[This was an action by the United States .against Hezekiah Smith, Stephen Griffith, and Nathaniel L. Griswold, upon a bond •executed by the defendants.

The government of Virginia under the Confederacy, having borrowed a large amount of specie from one of the banks in Richmond, the then governor (William Smith), and other officers, withdrew it on or about the 2d day of April, 1865, which was the day preceding the occupation of Richmond by the Union army.

This was an indictment [against David A. Smith] for perjury in making a false declaration to obtain the bounty on a fishing schooner, called the East Wind, of Province-town. The act of 1818 allows a bounty' to vessels that have been employed in the cod fishery not less than four months at sea, provided they shall have been employed under an agreement with the fishermen on shares.

Indictment against the defendants [James Smith and others] for an endeavour to make a revolt in a ship on the high seas, contrary to the 12th section of the statute of 30th of April, 1790 (chapter 9).

Indictment [against Joseph P. Smith] on the second and third sections of the act of 20th April, 1818, c. 86, against the slave trade. This case was similar in most material respects to the preceding case of U. S. v. La Coste [Case No. 15,548]. A verdict of guilty was brought in by the jury, and motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment on the same grounds as those in that case, were made by Hooper for the prisoner.

<p>Case No. 16,339.</p> <p>Bxxkkuptcv—Fkaudulent Disposition op Goons —Ciimi-NAL Psosecutio.n—Evidence.</p> <p>1. It is not necessary that the goods which have been fraudulently disposed of shall have been obtained within three months prior to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, in order to convict a party of a fraudulent disposition thereof.</p> <p>2. The intent of a party is ordinarily to be inferred from evidence which tends distinctly and directly to prove the intent.</p> <p>3. In order to obtain a conviction for concealing assets from the assignee, it is not necessary to prove a demand on the part of the as-signee.</p>

Three several indictments for piracy, under the act of congress of 1819 [3 Stat. 510] were preferred against the defendant, John Smith, and returned by the grand jury.

<p>Case No. 16,340.</p> <p>Internal Revenue—Pawnbroker’s Tickets. The ticket given by a pawnbroker under the statute of California is “an agreement or contract” within the meaning of section 170 of the internal revenue act of 1864 [13 Stat. 297].</p>

On August 6, 1869, the defendant [William K. Smith] was indicted for -the crime of perjury, in swearing to his income return. 4 Stat. 118; 12 Stat. 309.

[Indictment for misdemeanor under Act June 5, 1794, § 5. Motion to bring on the trial, and for an attachment against absent witnesses.] Golden read a subpoena, directed to James Madison, Esq., whereby he was commanded to appear at the present circuit court, to testify in behalf of the defendant; also, the copy of the subpoena ticket, and read an affidavit in the words following: “City and County of New York, ss: Charles Lindsay, attorney at law, being duly sworn, saith that…

[Trial of William S. Smith, indicted under the act of congress of June 5, 1794, § 5 [1 Stat. 384], for a misdemeanor in beginning, setting on foot, and providing the means for a military expedition to be carried on from the city of New York against the dominions of Spain in South America, the United States and Spain being at peace.

The indictment is founded on the 12th section of the act of congress, for the punishment of certain crimes, passed April 30, 1700 [1 Stat. 112], and contains two counts; the first for confining the master, and the second for endeavouring to make a revolt in the ship; both of which are charged to have been committed on the high seas.

<p>Case No. 16,345.</p> <p>Seamen— Correction bt Master—Right of Resistance—Confinement of Master—Revolt.</p> <p>1. The master of a vessel has an absolute authority on board the vessel under his command, and his lawful orders must bé obeyed. He may inflict moderate correction for disobedience, and impertinent language or behaviour. The seaman may endeavour to escape from it; and if he is pursued, and is otherwise exposed to a repetition of such treatment, he may resist for the mere purpose of protecting himself trom injury.</p> <p>[Cited in Fuller v, Colby, Case No. 5,149.]</p> <p>[Cited in Buddington v. Smith, 13 Conn. 33(5; Thompson v. Hermann, 47 Wis. (507, 3 N. W. 579.]</p> <p>2. If the master use an unlawful weapon, or the seaman is exposed to danger of his life, or limbs, he may resort to any necessary species of defence to avoid this danger.</p> <p>[Cited in Fuller v. Colby, Case No. 5,149.]</p> <p>3. If the master strikes the seaman, and is seized by him, and' is so firmly held, as that he cannot extricate himself, the seaman is guilty of confining the captain.</p> <p>4. Quere, what is making a revolt on board a ship?</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was a writ of error, sued out September 10, 1844, on a judgment rendered the 3d of that month, in the district court on the following case. [Case unreported.] An action of debt was brought in that court by the United States, against the defendants [Albert Smith and others] on an official bond, and the ease was as the counsel agreed in the statement annexed: Agreed statement: The writ is dated…

A clear case of fraud was proved against the defendant in this case, and judgment was duly rendered, but it, is only recently .that.a written opinion was filed by the honorable judge. Obligation is due to Assessor Need-ham of Louisville, for transmitting copy for publication after revision by Judge BALLARD. [Thomas] Smock is stated to be still in jail, unwilling or unable to pay the fine.

<p>Case No. 16,350.</p> <p>Fees in Pension Cases.</p> <p>To an indictment for retaining a greater sum than the statutory allowance for collecting a widow’s pension, it is a good plea that the husband of the applicant, for whose services the pension was sought, was charged on the rolls of the war department as a deserter, and that it was agreed between defendant and the applicant that he should receive one-half of the first payment on account of the pension, less costs and expenses, for his services in causing such charge to be removed.</p> <p>To an indictment for a violation of ■ Rev. St § 5485, in retaining a greater compensation than allowed by law for prosecuting a claim for a widow’s pension, defendant [Alexander L. Snow] pleaded that the husband of the applicant for whose service the pension was sought, was charged on the rolls of the war department as a deserter; that no pension could be allowed till such charge was removed; that it was accordingly agreed between him and the widow that he should receive one-half of the first payment on account of the pension; (such payment being about 81,200,) less his costs and expenses, for services in causing such charge to be removed, and the further sum of $10 for prosecuting her claim for the pension, all of which was done, etc.</p> <p>To this plea the district attorney demurred.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] This was an action of debt brought in the district court, upon the official* bond given by the defendant, conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office, as collector cf the internal taxes and duties, in the Twelfth district of Pennsylvania, and for collecting and paying over the said taxes and duties.

<p>Case No. 16,352.</p> <p>Perjury — Affidavits of Drafted Soldiers — Notary Public.</p> <p>1. Under the act of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 73], the secretary of war has authority to prescribe what facts shall be stated in affidavits by drafted men claiming exemption from military service; and false swearing in reference to facts so required is perjury.</p> <p>2. A notary public is an officer authorized to administer oaths in such cases.</p>

<p>Case 3STo. 16,353.</p> <p>Indictment—Conbfibacy.</p> <p>The time and place of conspiracy must be alleged in the indictment.</p>

[Claim of Barbara Soto for the Bancho San Lorenzo, in Alameda county. The decision of the board of land commissioners confirming the claim was affirmed at the December term, 1856. See Case No. 16,357. The cause is now heard on objections to the survey.]

[Claim of Teodora Soto for the Rancho Cañada del Hambre, comprising three leagues of land in Contra Costa county; confirmed by the board, and appealed by the United States.]

<p>Claim [of Barbara Soto] for one league and a half of land [constituting the Rancho San Lorenzo] in Contra Costa (now Alameda) county, confirmed by the board, and appeal-' ed by the United States.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,358.</p> <p>Elections—Preventing Voting—Constitutional Law—Election Returns, How Certified.</p> <p>1.On indictment, under section 19 of the act to enforce the right of citizens to vote, &e., approved May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. 1441, for “unlawfully preventing certain qualified voters from freely exercising the right of suffrage;” where the proof was, that the defendant, with others, attacked a number of voters, waiting in line for their turn to cast their ballots, and expelled them from the room; and that said voters aft-erwards returned and voted: Held, that the defendant committed the offense which congress meant to define and punish in the clause of the section under which the indictment was drawn.</p> <p>2. The prevention took place, and the offense was complete, by the expulsion of the voters from the polls, although the prosecutors after-wards voted.</p> <p>3. The words “exercising the right of suffrage” in section 19 of the act of May 31, 1870, may be held to mean “voting,” without bringing that section in conflict with the provisions of section 4 of the act,—provided that the penalties prescribed in section 19 be understood to apply to offenses committed at elections for members of congress, and those in section 4 to state, county, and municipal elections.</p> <p>4. Query, whether under the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, congress has power to pass any law to operate upon private individuals?</p> <p>5. A copy of a return of an election in a township, filed with the clerk of the county, accompanied by the certificate of the clerk of the county, that it was a full and correct return of such election, as filed in his office,—sent to the office of the secretary of state, is not made and certified in the manner, and does not come from the source required by the election law of New Jersey, to constitute it an official paper.</p>

Debt on bond, dated November, 1875, in penal sum of $7,000, given by South Branch Distilling Company, as principal, and H. J. Pahlman and Joseph Haas as sureties, conditioned that, if the said principal should well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, to the collector of internal revenue for the First district of Illinois the amount of taxes due and owing on a certain eighty-seven barrels of distilled spirits, particularly described in said bond, which were entered for…

<p>Case No. 16,360.</p> <p>Condemnation or Prize—License from Enemy.</p> <p>[1. Where no prevarication or other improper conduct on the part of the captured vessel is shown, the question of condemnation of the vessel is to be determined from the papers found on board.]</p> <p>[2. A United States vessel is not subject to condemnation because it carries a special pass or license from the enemy or the enemy’s agent.]</p>

The defendant [Ld. Southmayd] was indicted for the alleged forgery of a postal money order, and for passing such order. There was no preliminary examination previous to the finding of the indictment.

[This was an action against William H. Sowers and others, executors of the will of William Chamberlain, deceased, to recover duties claimed to be due the United States.]

Debt on five obligations, executed by Joseph Hubbard as principal, and the deféndant [Edward Spalding] as surety, for certain sums of money, set forth in the declaration.

<p>[Por a decision on demurrer to the declaration, see Case No. 16,367.]</p>

H. T. Sperry was a distiller, and B. S. Prettyman a dealer in whiskey, and an attorney at Pekin, Ill. The government charged that the two defendants conspired together; that Prettyman furnished the money to run the distillery; that they manufactured 3 times as much as they reported and sent barrels with duplicate serial numbers, to Chicago and St. Louis.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,370.</p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors—Illegal Sales.</p> <p>Selling less than a pint, under a license to sell not less than a pint, is selling without license.</p>

<p>Case 3STo. 16,378»</p> <p>Action on Bond—Pleading—Variance.</p> <p>Where, in an action of debt on a bond, the defendant was described in the bond and declaration, as “principal paymaster of the militia of the state of .New York, which have been, or may be ordered into the service of the state of New York,” and the evidence was an account against him as paymaster-general of the New York militia;. it was held, that the court could not, as matter of law, decide that these different descriptions applied to the same officer, and that, therefore, the variance was fatal.</p> <p>NOTE. In an action on a bond for the payment of a sum of money by instalments, it is not necessary to assign breaches in the declaration according to the requirement of the statute. Spaulding v. Millard, 17 Wend. 331. In declaring on a justice’s judgment, rendered in this state, it is sufficient, besides stating the amount of the judgment, the time and place of its rendition, and the name of the magistrate, to allege that the judgment was rendered in a justice’s court in a county of this state, in an action of which justices of the peace have civil jurisdiction. Stiles v. Stewart, 12 Wend. 473. In declaring on a justice’s judgment of a sister state, the statute giving jurisdiction to the justice must be pleaded. Sheldon v. Hopkins, 7 Wend. 435. In a suit on a bond given by a deputy sheriff for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, the plaintiff must assign breaches, and cannot, without such assignment, take a verdict for even nominal damages. Barnard v. Darling, 11 Wend. 30. Where, in an action of debt, two several sums are demanded as due and owing in two separate counts, the declaration should, in the commencement, demand the aggregate amount, the first count should describe the sum demanded in it as parcel. &.C., and the second count the sum demanded in it as the residue, &c. People v. Van Eps, 4 Wend. 387. The assignee of a lease, who enters upon and occupies the demised premises, is liable for the rent in like manner with the assignor. In declaring against him, he may be described as assignee in general terms; and the manner in which the assignment was made need not be set forth. But the assignee cannot be made answerable, by the action of debt, for the rent of any part of the premises demised, except that which has been possessed and enjoyed by himself; and the rent in such cases may be apportioned, the action being founded on the privity of estate merely, and not on the privity of contract. Norton v. Vultee, 1 Hall, 384. The plaintiffs demised certain premises, for a term of yeare, to one F. L. Vultee. The lessee, a short time before the expiration of the term, died, and the defendant (his widow) took out letters of administration upon his estate, and continued in possession of a part of the premises until the lease expired. An action of debt being brought against her for all the rent which was in arrear at the time of the expiration of the lease, it was held, that she was only liable in this action for the rent of such parts of the premises as had been occupied by her after her husband’s death, xd. By the second section of the act (1 Rev. Laws, 222), any person, losing at any game any sum above twenty-five dollars, and paying the same, may, at any time within three months, recover it back of the winner by an action of debt, founded on the act .As the remedy afforded to the loser is provided by statute, in pursuing that remedy the forms and limitations prescribed must be observed; and a general action of assumpsit will not lie. Id. Though the legal effects of altering, by consent of parties, the time limited to do an act, e. g. to make an award, in the condition of a bond, leaving the original date to stand, is to destroy the bond as a pre-existing one, and to give it effect only from the time of the alteration; yet the bond may be declared on as bearing its original date, with or without an averment that it was delivered afterwards. Tompkins v. Cor-win, 9 Cow. 255. A bond for performing an award was dated the 19th of September, 1825, and conditioned that the award should be made, &c., on or before the 31st of December then next; and afterward the parties extended the time for the award twice by erasure and inter-lineations: and the last time to the 19th of January, 1826. Held, that the plaintiff might either declare on the bond simply, as both dated and made on the 19th of September, or as dated that day and made afterward. Id. Where the merits of the case are affected by the time when a deed becomes valid, the time of delivery should be stated and shown; for the delivery gives it effect as a deed; otherwise, where time is immaterial. Id. A contract may be set forth in pleading according to its legal effect, though this vary from the precise words. Id. A deed executed on a particular day may, in general, be pleaded as made on any other day. Id. The supreme court have often held that, in pleading time, the words “next,” or “then next,” may be considered as referring to the day of the month, and not to the month itself. Id. Precedent of a declaration in debt on a judgment in a justice’s court. Smith v. Mumford, 9 Cow. 26. It is sufficient to say the party recovered so much (a sum within the justice’s jurisdiction) for such a cause, (being a matter within his jurisdiction,) without setting forth any of the previous proceedings. Id. The declaration on a justice’s judgment averred a recovery for a debt, and also ninety-three cents for the party’s damages, as well by reason of detaining the debts as for his costs, &c. Proof of $50 debt, and ninety-three cents costs. Held,' no variance. Id. The term used in the declaration imported costs only. Id. Form of declaration in debt against the sheriff for suffering an escape from execution, on a surrogate’s decree for distribution. Dakin v. Hudson. 6 Cow. 221. Such a declaration must aver that the surrogate’s court, which made the decree, granted the administration. Id. For, otherwise it has no jurisdiction to decree distribution. Id. In a declaration against the sheriff, for suffering an escape from execution, it is not good cause of demurrer that the judgment appears to be against A- and his wife, and the execution against A. only; nor that the execution appears to have been endorsed with a direction to receive interest, when no interest runs on the judgment; nor that the judgment and execution appear to be in favor of D. and others, without saying what others. Id. Any or all of these defects in the proceedings are no excuse to the sheriff who suffers the escape. Id. Such a declaration must describe the record and proceedings correctly; and if, when produced on the trial, they do not correspond, the objection may then be made on the ground of variance. Id. Such a declaration set out, in the first count, a surrogate’s decree, execution to the sheriff, and a voluntary escape. The second count set out a similar decree, execution, &e., and an involuntary escape. In setting out the decree, this second cohnt said a certain other judgment or decree, but then dropped the word “other,” and referred to the judgment, &c., by the word “said.” It set forth the execution as issued on the last-mentioned judgment, &e., but afterward referred to this execution by the word “said.” On general demurrer to the whole declaration, held well, and that there was no repugnancy ■ between the two counts. Id. In declaring on a bond, conditioned to pay a judgment in three months, or surrender the body of the defendant in execution, at the suit of the plaintiff, in thirty days thereafter, the taking out- execution by the plaintiff within the thirty days is a condition precedent, and must be shown in the declaration. Whitney v. Spencer, 4 Cow. 39. In a declaration upon a bond, conditioned to pay the taxable costs of a suit, licet srnpius requisitus is good on general demurrer. Bacon v. Wilber, 1 Cow. 117. It is not necessary for the plaintiff, in declaring the debt on a recognizance of bail, to allege that a fi. fa. had been issued against the principal previous to the return of the ca. sa. Gillespie v. White, 16 Johns. 117. A declaration on a bond conditioned for the performance of covenants, commencing in debt, after setting forth the condition, and assigning breaches, and. concluding in covenant, and demanding damages, is good, it seems, on special demurrer. Gale v. O’Brian, 13 Johns. 189. It is certainly good on general demurrer. Id. Same case, 12 Johns. 216. A breach of the condition of a bond “to free the land from all legal incumbrances, either by deed or mortgage, now in existence, and binding on the premises by the 20th of February,” is not well assigned by following and negativing the words of the condition, as such assignment does not necessarily amount to a breach, and the plaintiff ought to have shown some existing incumbrance on the 20th of February, or at the commencement of the suit. Julliand v. Burgott. 11 Johns. 6. If, in a declaration on a bond conditioned to pay several sums of money, at several days, the plaintiff assigns two several breaches for the non-payment of two several sums, it will be bad on special demurrer, for duplicity. Taft v. Brewster, 9 Johns. 334.</p>

<p>This was a demurrer to a plea to the jurisdiction of the court</p>

This was an indictment in several counts, [against Ephraim Staly and others,] for a revolt on board the barque John Brown, in Providence river, on the 23d of May, 1846. The respondents pleaded not guilty. It appeared in evidence, that the defendants. and four others shipped on a voyage to Apalachicola, or elsewhere, for a market, and were taken on board the barque the evening previous to the transaction complained of.

<p>Case NTo. 16,375.</p> <p>Violation of Internal Revenue Laws—Lottery Ticket Dealers—Special Tax.</p> <p>[Defendant gave to customers, on payment of a small sum, combinations of numbers, specifying them as being in the Delaware or Kentucky lotteries. He then entered the numbers in his policy book, and, if they came out in the drawings, paid to the customer the required amount of money. He gave no certificate or ticket to the customer, and the latter kept the numbers in any way he chose. Belli, that defendant was a policy dealer, within the meaning of the statute, and was subject to indictment for not paying the special tax.]</p>

<p>[This was an indictment against Solomon Stanley for perjury.)</p>

This action was brought to recover of defendants [William H. Stark and others] the sum of $959.04, the duties on two hundred and sixty-six hogsheads and forty-one barrels of molasses, valued at $3,996, imported by the defendants into the port of Savannah on the 7th day of May, 1861. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and payment of the duties.

<p>[This was a writ of habeas corpus to procure the discharge of Ellis Starr from imprisonment.]</p>

The United States bring this suit to recover a penalty of one thousand dollars against the defendant, for not making or rendering a list or return to the assessor, of its net earnings, income or gains for the period of time embraced between January 1, 1870, and June 30, 1870. A demurrer is interposed by the defendant.

This suit is brought against the defendant to enforce a penalty of one thousand dollars, for failure to make a return of the dividends declared, additions to its surplus fund, and profit and loss accounts. The dividends and additions to the several funds are alleged to be from earnings, income, and gains, made during the period of time between July 1, 1870, and December 30, 1870.

2 [The indictment contains two counts. The first count, drawn under section 3257 of the Revised Statutes charges, that defendant, being a distiller, did, at a certain time and place, defraud and attempt to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits distilled by him.

<p>[This was an information of forfeiture against Steen & Cwergius’ Factory for keeping an unauthorized distillery.]</p>

<p>[Preliminary examination of Emil Steffens on a charge of dealing in counterfeit trademarks with intent to defraud.]</p>

<p>Case XTo. 16,386.</p> <p>Sealed Instruments — Scrawl Seals — Bonds Taken under Federal Statutes.</p> <p>1. To constitute a sealed instrument at common law, it must be sealed with wax or some tenacious substance.</p> <p>2. In this country a scrawl has been generally substituted for a seal, by the legislation of the different states.</p> <p>3. A bond taken under an act of congress is not governed by the local law of the state where it may be executed.</p> <p>4. The bond, m contemplation of law, is given at the seat of the federal government; as at that place the officer must account, for the performance of his duties.</p> <p>5. A bond with a scrawl seal, given under an act of congress, is good.</p> <p>6. A bond reguired to be given by congress, must be presumed to be such an instrument as by general usage, is denominated a bond.</p> <p>7. A scrawl is substituted for a seal, by general usage, both in a popular and legal sense.</p> <p>[Cited in Tolman v. Spaulding, 3 Scam. 13.]</p>

At October term, 1856, James Sterland was indicted for stealing a letter and its contents from the post office at Wytheville, Va., he being a clerk employed in said office. He was put upon trial at that term, but the jury failed to agree. He was again tried, with the like result, at May term, 1857; and now was put upon trial before a third jury, at this term.

This was a demurrer to the return to an alternative writ of mandamus.

<p>Case lío. 16,389.</p> <p>Bribery—Interval Revenue Laws.</p> <p>The words, “and shall be thereof convicted,” in the 62d section of the internal revenue act of July 13th, 1866 (14 Stat. 168), which makes it an indictable offence to bribe an officer of the United States, are to be treated as surplusage.</p> <p>[Cited in Edwards v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. (Colo. Sup.) 21 Pac. 1012; Gould v. Wise (Nev.) 3 Pac. 33; Henderson v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 81 Mo. 60S.]</p>

The respondent [Matthew Stetson] had been indicted and tried at the first session of this term, for a charge of piracy, in one count, for running away, piratically, in July, 1845, with a cargo of whale oil, at Sidney, in New South Wales, in the barque La Grange, a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, of. which he was commander, and which had sailed from New Bedford. In another count he was charged with larceny of the same oil.

Indictment for conspiring to obstruct the United States mail. The defendants [George W. Stevens, George W. Kent, Warren H. Walker, Charles Stevens, Taylor L. Dodge, and Henry G. Mills] were members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, -and with their fellows, engine drivers on the Boston & Maine Railroad, sixty-seven in all, struck, and by concert of action, quit work at four o’clock in the afternoon.

<p>Case Mo. 16,893.</p> <p>Internal Revenue — Manufacturers of Knapsacks.</p> <p>[Persons who, by a special agreement with a government contractor engaged in manufacturing knapsacks, supplied and sewed upon each knapsack two small buckles and straps, without any other connection or participation in the production thereof, were • not “manufacturers,” within the meaning of the 75th section of the act of July 1, 1862 (12 -Stat. 462), and are not liable to pay the tax thereunder. Reaffirming Cases Nos. 16,393a and 16,393b.]</p>

This was a motion for a new trial on a ease. The action was in assumpsit [against William S. Stevens and Bernard Carples] for the recovery of taxes to the amount of 816,000.

The first count in the indictment was for confining the captain, and the second for an assault on board of a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, with a dangerous weapon. Both offences are charged to have been committed on the hign seas, in the outer road off the port of St. Domingo.

<p>Case 3So. 16,395.</p> <p>Process Acts—Following State Practice—At-tacbmexts-—Rules op Court.</p> <p>1. An information prosecuted in a district court must be regarded and treated as a common law proceeding; except in that aspect a district court can have no jurisdiction of it.</p> <p>2. The forms of process (except style) and modes of proceeding in the United States courts, sitting within the thirteen states which originally composed the Union, in actions at common law, are the same as those which were employed in the supreme courts of the states, respectively, on Hay 8, 1792; except so far as the United States courts may have prescribed alterations.</p> <p>3. Section 1 of the act of May 19, 1828 (4 Stat. 278), relative to process of the United States courts, does not apply within states which were members of the Union before September 29, 1789. And the act of May 8. 1792 [1 Stat. 275], does not adopt, prospectively, laws which may have since been passed by the states (though it enables the several courts to adopt them), but only adopts those then existing.</p> <p>4. It is not necessary, in order to establish that a particular mode of proceeding has been adopted by a United States court, that there should be found a written rule declaring such adoption. The practice of a court may be established without the existence of a positive written rule.</p> <p>5. Under the practice which has prevailed in the district court for the Southern district ot New York, an attachment may be issued in aid of a common law information prosecuted by the United States.</p>

<p>This suit was a suit in trover brought by the government against the defendant [Vernon K. Stevenson], to recover the value of 1,000 bales of cotton, alleged to have belonged to the government and to have been converted by the defendant to his own use. The ground taken by the government was, that the defendant, being president of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, came into possession of the cotton, which had belonged to the Confederate government, and thus, by right of forfeiture, to the government of the United States, and that he brought the cotton to New York and there disposed of it and kept the proceeds. 2</p>

<p>Case No. 16,398.</p> <p>Practice—Postponement of Trial—Court Rules —Amendment of Pleadings.</p> <p>[1. Where the plaintiff in a common-law case, which has been placed on the calendar, and is called in its regular order for trial, desires a postponement until the next term for the purpose of obtaining the testimony of new witnesses, it is not the proper practice to move on affidavits for such postponement. The practice in such case is (by district court rule 240) regulated by the rules of the circuit court, under which (rules 38 and 51) the plaintiff alone can notice a jury case for trial, and if, when it is called, he is not ready, all that is required is that he shall fail to respond, in which case it is marked as “Passed.” After the jury for the term has been discharged, defendant may move for a judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff in answer thereto may show his excuse, and if it be deemed sufficient, the court can permit him to stipulate to try the cause at the next term.]</p> <p>[2. In an information at law against defendant for removing and converting to his own use certain cotton belonging to the United States, held, that certain newly-discovered evidence, showing new transactions, in relation to the cotton, and in respect to which plaintiff showed that he was guilty of no laches, was sufficient ground for allowing a postponement of the trial until the next term, and for permitting an amendment to the information, even after the case was called for trial on the calendar.]</p>

This was an action of debt on behalf of the United States against Stewart and his sureties upon his transportation bond.

This was a habeas corpus, addressed to Commodore [Charles] Stewart, as commanding the navy yard at Philadelphia, requiring him to produce the body of Bishop Priest, alias Lewis Johnson, alleged to be a minor Improperly enlisted in the navy. The proof of minority wholly failed, and the petitioner was remanded.

<p>After the close of the testimony on the part of the United States and the prisoners [Dan Stewart and others], Mr. Key asked two instructions of the court to the jury, which he read to the court as follows: If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the mayor of Washington made an application to the president of the United States and the secretary of the navy to order out the United States marines to assist him in preserving the public peace, and the said marines were accordingly ordered by • the secretary of the navy, and were marched by the direction of the mayor to the place of disturbance, to wit: to the first precinct of the Fourth ward, then the said mayor and the said marines were there legally. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the commissioners of election of the said first precinct of the Fourth ward closed the polls of said precinct for no other reason than the one given, that is, the presence of the said marines, then the act of said commissioners in closing said polls was an illegal act, and the said mayor, by virtue of his office, and in execution thereof, possessed full power and authority to order the said polls to be opened, and all persons who in a violent and turbulent manner, acting together, either by previous concert or by concert springing up at the time, opposed the efforts of the said mayor, either to have the said polls opened or to preserve the public peace, are guilty of a riot.</p> <p>Mr. Scott said .that he could not admit such a point to be allowed, of the right of the secretary of the navy to call out the military under arms, and give the discre-tionate authority to the mayor to use them as he might think best. The president had no right to use the military force of the United States in a proper case, to quell or prevent a riot; he might use • the means which were provided by law, and such means only; he contended that the constructions of the court of the article in the constitution in relation to the execution oí the laws had an important qualification. A justice of the peace had authority to make others keep the peace; sheriff’s, constables, marshals are peace officers, all have the like authority; a sheriff charged with the process of a court has authority to summon his posse to aid him; but all this authority pertains to all these officers only in certain cases; these means provided by the law are only to be resorted to when these means are necessary. If the marshal of this district receives authority to summons or execute upon citizens of this district, has he power to go into the streets to summons a posse to assist him to execute? With certainty does that authority belong to him only when resistance is made to such execution of the laws. Yet if the act of the president or secretary is beyond question; if the act of the mayor is beyond question; if the discretion of the parties is to be the law on that occasion, bow long will it be before military rule fixes its iron grasp upon us? The laws of congress give a municipal charter to this district. It confers upon them legislative powers. It provides for stated elections; time and place is prescribed for the election, and to prepare the points or places of election, and of giving the votes. Has the president the right; or any subordinate member of the cabinet, of their own heads, or at the suggestion of the mayor, to march the military to these places and make the citizens vote through a file of marines? If they have the right at their will, there must be a call existing to justify the ordering out—there must be something to make the act necessary. Now, what circumstances can make such an act necessary, or excuse it? If the peace is disturbed, if riots occur, or affrays, the law imposes the duty on the civil authority of that community to suppress it, and imposes the means of discharging that duty. The mayor has his police, his auxiliary guards. He has power to increase this force by especial appointment. The law imposes the duty on them of suppressing, and providing for the means of suppressing, those riots or disturbances. If all this is not so, your marshal may go with a file of marines to execute a summons—the United States military may be used for almost any peaceable purpose in the walks of life. When this military was called out there was no justifiable cause, there was absolutely none. It is> necessary that it should be shown in this case that there was a lawful necessity existing at the time before calling out the military. As to the point raised in the second instruction, Mr. Scott asked whose duty it was to open the polls and conduct the elections? He apprehended it would be found that the duty was conferred upon those commissioners who were judges of the election; that to their honor, integrity and discretion the law confided the faithful conduct of that election; that they were the judges of the manner and the time for receiving votes, with no appeal from their decisions, which were such as the law provides, peaceably engaged in the performance of their duty; when peace and quiet prevailed around them, and the citizens engaged in the exercise of their rights, a portion of the United States military parades upon the ground, with loaded muskets and flashing bayonets, to participate in the business of election.</p> <p>The district attorney exalts the mayor into an officer in command of a military force, to dictate to the judges; the proposition is confined to the simple fact of opening the polls, but he goes further, and says that he has the power to open the polls, and to proceed with the election; and it is but one step further to command how they shall proceed with the election, and to say, if the peace was disturbed, who disturbed it; if a riot occurred, who occasioned it; he apprehended, the military. If the mayor, with his army in array, transcended his right, have the people not the right to express disapprobation; to resist his assumed dictation?</p> <p>As to the second proposition of the district attorney, they asked the court in effect to say that these commissioners were guilty of a riot; he assumes as a fact what is a matter of proof, to be expressed at the termination of the trial. The mayor had a right, for a proper reason, and for sufficient cause, to call out the military; but in no case is this to be done in the absence of that cause, or the president to be marshal of this district He closed by saying that he apprehended that he had pointed out in a lucid manner the reasons which the counsel for the defence had for refusing to accede to the extraordinary proposition of the district attorney.</p> <p>Mr. Key proceeded to read to the court, from the charter, the laws governing the conduct of municipal elections.</p> <p>Mr. Bradley proposed to offer law authorities in relation to the points contained in the proposition of the district attorney. He entered his protest against those propositions in a most emphatic manner; that no irresponsible discretion was vested in the mayor or any other civil officer, either by the laws of this country or of England; he referred to the case, among others, of the British rioters, as reported in the Common Law Reports of England, in support of his position. Mr. Bradley went on to say that the hirst thing to he considered by the jury was: was it an unlawful assemblage? Was there a breach of the peace? If there was none, then the marines were unlawfully called out. it might be an unlawful assembly in a very slight degree, then there was no pretence for calling out the military. Such cases must depend upon their own circumstances. The jury was to judge, under the particular circumstances, whether the mayor used more violent means than were necessary to disperse the mob. He apprehended that it would not be determined that the discretion of the magistrates in this country went further than it did in England. If there is no law to justify the mayor in his course, then we are .justified, and could to all intents and purposes, resist any unjustifiable and irresponsible exercise of such discretionary power.</p> <p>Mr. Key replied, contending, in the course of his remarks, that xhe act of the mayor was just and legal; and that the act of the president in acceding to his application for the marines, fortified by an affidavit which was sworn to by a respectable citizen of Washington, and granting him discretionary power to use them according to the exigencies of the case, was a proof of the confidence reposed in him by the president, to do and act as the danger and peril of the citizens thus disturbed might in the case seem to warrant. He said that it was contended by the other side, that the riot had ceased when the mayor first went to the polls; what did the mayor find to be the case when he arrived there? He found the barricades broken and the polls closed. All was quiet, said the counsel for the defence, but it was the quiet that prevails on the battle-field after the fight is over, and no victim is left to make resistance. Was it not manifestly the mayor’s duty, under these circumstances, to employ such force as had been placed in his hands and at his command? He did employ that force, and legally too; he used those means for the maintenance of the public peace and good order in the community, which peace has been flagrantly violated. Was it not remarkable that the judges of election had taken the unwarrantable responsibility of closing the polls in violation of all law, at a time when, according to the testimony which had been given on the part of the defence, all was quiet, and the voting was proceeding peaceably? And upon what plea, then, did they do this? It was upon the vapory excuse springing out of a sickly and absurd sentimentality that they would not receive votes with the flashing bayonets of the marines directed towards their breasts. What right had they to refuse compliance with the express provisions of the law, when all was peace and quietness around them? The marines were a square off; they could not have been afraid of them at the time the polls were closed. He contended that the conduct of the judges ought to be held up to universal opprobrium, and they consigned to everlasting shame.</p> <p>Mr. Key quoted from the act of congress of 1S12, contained in [2 Stat 721], to show “that the mayor shall see that the laws of the corporation shall be duly executed, and that he shall punish any disobedience of those laws on the part of its officers.”</p> <p>Mr. Key cited many other authorities to sustain the action of the mayor and in support of his instructions. He contended that the commissioners had violated the laws by closing the polls, and that it was but proper, under the existence of all these facts, to ask the court to instruct the jury that the marines were on the ground legally and for the exercise of a legal purpose.</p> <p>Mr. .'Ellis said that Mr. Key had referred to the constitution of the United States to show the authority of the president to call out the marines and interfere in the ease now before the court. The argument was that this portion of the constitution gave the president the power. He contended that it gave no such authority to the president. At the present time the president is not the United States— not quite. His power then is not here, but in the legislation of congress on the constitution. He quoted from the law to show in what cases the president may call out the military. He contended that there were but three cases in which the president may call out the military; they were only in case of an insurrection, an invasion, and when necessary to the sustaining of the law. He contended that the authorities cited by the district attorney were not applicable to the matter now pending, that the law did not authorize the mayor to do what the district attorney contended to authorize him to do.</p>

[This was an indictment against Charles Stewart upon the charge of counterfeiting, under the act of congress incorporating the Bank of the United States.]

<p>Case No. 16,403.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Forfeiture of Recognizance— Fugitive from Justice.</p> <p>A defendant in an indictment moved to set aside a forfeiture of a recognizance given by him for his appearance to answer the indictment, on the ground of irregularities as to the time and place of calling him to appear, and of entering the forfeiture. He had absconded to avoid a trial on the indictment, and was a fugitive from justice. Held, that the motion must, for that reason, be denied.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Evans, 2 Fed. 150.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,404.</p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyances—Jurisdiction ofFed- • eral Courts—Creditor’s Bill.</p> <p>1. An intent to defraud subsequent creditors is sufficient to avoid a conveyance, at the suit of such creditors, if it was either voluntary or not made in good faith.</p> <p>2. Under the 11th section of the judiciary act of September 24th, 1789 (1 Stat. 78), this court has jurisdiction of a creditor’s bill, brought by the United States, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars.</p> <p>[Cited in Winter v. Swinburne, 8 Fed. 52.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,405.</p> <p>Biot—Proof op Intent—Declarations—Trial— • Arguments of Counsel—Province op Court and Jury.</p> <p>1.Upon an indictment for a riot it is not necessary to prove an agreement or proposal to do the unlawful act before it was done, or at the time of doing it: but from the doing of the act, accompanied by declarations of an intent to do it, the jury may infer a. previous intent and agreement to do it, and mutually to assist each other in doing it; and in the absence of all contradictory evidence they ought so to infer.</p> <p>2. After an instruction has been given by the court to the jury, at the request of either party, and argued by counsel on both sides, the court will not permit counsel to argue the same question of law to the jury in contradiction to the opinion of,the court.</p> <p>3. The right of the jury to decide the law, as well as the fact, in a criminal case, results only from their power to find a general verdict.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Taylor, 11 Fed. 473.]</p> <p>[Cited in Territory v. Kee (N. M.) 25 Pac. 926.]</p> <p>4. The question whether one fact can be inferred from another, is a question of law, and to be decided by the court; and if, in law, the inference can be drawn, it ought to be drawn, if there be no contradictory evidence.</p>

Petition by several persons that the informer’s share of penalties in the registry of the court be decreed to be paid to them severally as the persons giving the information which led to the prosecution.

This was a motion to quash an indictment against Martin Stowell, for obstructing the marshal in the service of legal process. The obstruction complained of occurred during the proceedings for the rendition of Anthony Bums, in the year 1854.

<p>Case 3STo. 16,413.</p> <p>Examination’ or Witness.</p> <p>Upon an indictment for a nuisance, in keeping a public gaming-house, the question, Who dealt the cards’' is too general. Witness not bound to answer it.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,413.</p> <p>Indian Resekvations—Intrusion op Whites.</p> <p>The president having set apart the Pyramid Lake reservation for the use of Indians, the whites who go upon the reservation to fish, do so “contrary to law,” within Rev. St. § 2147.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Bridleman, 7 Fed. 903; U. S. v. Martin, 14 Fed. 821; Id., 17 Fed. 153; U.’ S. v. Howard, Id. 641.]</p>

<p>Case 3STo. 16,414.</p> <p>Mortgages — Trusts—Creditor's Bill—Assignments op Mortgages — Notice op Equities — Pleading—Waiver op Defects—Discharge op Imprisoned Debtor—Release op Sureties.</p> <p>1. Where a mortgage is given by a debtor to his co-debtor to secure the latter against the debt of their creditor, equity considers the mortgagee as a trustee for the creditor, and where a judgment has been recovered, will apply the mortgaged property in satisfaction of the judgment. or remove the encumbrance, so that it may be subjected to execution.</p> <p>[Cited in Warner v. Helm, 1 Gilman, 231.)</p> <p>2. The principle which governs such cases is, that the collateral security is a trust created for the protection of the debt, and that it is the duty of a court of equity to see that it fulfils the purpose for which it was intended.</p> <p>3. A judgment creditor who applies to a court of equity for its aid to enforce a judgment at law, if he asks its aid to reach a chattel, must show that he has taken out execution at law, and pursued it to every available extent, in order to show a lien upon the chattel; but if the aid is sought as to land, it is enough to show a judgment creating a lien upon the land.</p> <p>4. Although a mortgage be absolute upon the face of it, a court of equity will inquire into the real purpose for which it was given, and apply it to that use.</p> <p>5. It is a rule of equity that a judgment creditor at law is entitled to redeem an encumbrance upon land, and thereby secure his legal priority.</p> <p>6. The assignee of a mortgage or other chose in action, takes it subject to the same equity that it was subject to in the hands of the assignor.</p> <p>[Cited in Upham v. Brooks. Case No. 16.797; Corbett v. Woodward, Case No. 3,223.]</p> <p>7.And the rule that it is only an equity residing in the original debtor, and not the equities of third persons, against the assignor that have this effect, does not exclude a judgment creditor, claiming to redeem: He stands in the place of the debtor, and has his equity,</p> <p>8. An assignee who might have obtained notice, and ought to have sought it, stands in no better situation than if he had actually obtained it.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Hook, Case No. 6,672.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Digby v. Jones, 67 Mo. 105.]</p> <p>■ 9. A mortgage was given in reality to indemnify the mortgagee, but purporting to secure a sum of money payable m one year, and five years afterwards it was assigned, the whole sum appearing from the instrument to be unpaid. held, that the circumstances of the case should have put the assignee upon an inquiry, from which he would have learnt the true consideration of the mortgage.</p> <p>10. An objection to the equity of the bill. which might have been taken advantage of on demurrer, is not favourably received at the hearing of the cause after answer.</p> <p>11. A discharge from imprisonment by the secretary of the treasury, of a debtor to the United States, under the act of 1798, does not discharge his co-obligors and sureties in the bond from their liability.</p>

In the ease of the United States against Ferdinand Sulzberger, George Strauss, Charles Hartman, Jacob Fleischauér and Jacob Hess, for conspiring to remove whisky without paying tax, tried before Judge Blatchford in the United States district court, Mr. Phelps, for the government, argued from the evidence that there was abundant proof of. the conspiracy charged.

<p>Case No. 16,418.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Undervaluation—Rights of Innocent Purchasers.</p> <p>1. Where property subject to duty is imported into the United States at a fraudulent undervaluation, a bona fide purchaser before the government has instituted any proceedings, or made its election to proceed in rem for a*forfeiture, or to sue for the value of the property, obtains a good title, unaffected by the fraud in the entry.</p> <p>2. The government, in such case, has no lien on the property in the possession of such purchaser, for the deficiency in the duty paid.</p> <p>3. If such a lien existed in this ease, a forfeiture could not be claimed, as that ground is not set up ip the information.</p> <p>[See Case No. 15,098.] •</p>

<p>Official survey of the rancho known as “El Valle de San José.” in Alameda county. Rejected February 21, 1863.</p>

<p>Case No. 16,423.</p> <p>[The trial of Mrs. Mary E. Surratt and others for the murder of Abraham Lincoln, president of the United States, was by military commission sitting in Washington, D. C., in May, 1865. The trial of John H. Surratt was by the criminal court of the District of Columbia, in June, 1867.]</p>

[Claim of Antonio Suñol and others for the Rancho El Valle de San José, supposed to contain eleven leagues, .in Alameda county; confirmed by the hoard, and appealed by the United States.]

<p>Case No. 16,421.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants.</p> <p>[Indians had a right to receive grants of land under the Mexican laws.]</p>

<p>Case No. 16,424.</p> <p>California Land Grants—Location of Quantity in Large Tract—Conveyances— Estoppel—Surveys.</p> <p>[1. When a certain quantity has been granted within, limits which embrace a much larger tract, the quantity granted is to be located within the exterior limits, at the election of the grantee. Following U. S. v. Fossatt, 21 How. (62 U. S.) 445.]</p> <p>[2. As a general rule the conveyance by the grantee to third persons of portions of the lands within the exterior limits may justly be considered as an election of the location, and as estopping him to make any subsequent election inconsistent with it. Yet the building of a house and other permanent improvements by the grantee himself would seem to afford as decisive evidence of an election as the conveyance to some other person, and that a subsequent purchaser of the house and improvements might justly claim that the election was made and the location fixed, so as not to be affected by conveyances made after the making of the improvements.]</p> <p>[3. Therefore the court will treat the building of a house, and surrounding buildings, as locating the grant upon the site thereof to such an extent as, while it satisfies the latter principle, will at the same time protect the right of early grantees, by treating their grants as successive locations of portions of the tract according to their dates.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the district court confirming the survey and location of 11 square leagues to Sutter, approved May 11, 1863, was reversed and set aside, and the survey and location of the grant by A. W. Von Schmidt, approved February 18, 1860, substituted in place thereof. The case was remitted to the district court, with directions to confirm the survey as to the location of the said grant. 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 562.] - - —</p>