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27 Ga. 382

Bone v. Ingram

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided January 15, 1859

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1859-01-15

<p>[1.] The defendant asked leave to re-introduce a witness, his counsel stating, that he could prove a material fact by the witness — a thing that he did not know of, when the witness was first examined. The plaintiff’s counsel “ objected to the witness being recalled.” The Court sustained the objection.</p> <p>Held, That the Court erred.</p> <p>[2.] A witness of the plaintiff’s,^swore, that a third person had made a material statement to him. Afterwards, both parties closed their evidence, and the Court adjourned until next morning. Before the argument commenced the next morning, the defendant’s counsel asked leave to examine this third person, himself — stating, that such person would contradict the witness; that he was out of the county, the evening before, when the evidence was closed ,* and, that the defendant was ready to swear, that he did not anticipate, that the witness would testify to any such matter.</p> <p>Helds That the Court ought to have granted the leate asked for.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently June 1922

1 state decisions

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Decided 1859-01-15

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¶1 By the Court.

Benning J.

¶2delivering the opinion.

¶3We think, that the Court below erred, in not allowing the witness, Ramsay, to be recalled, and, the question to be put to him. The excuse for not putting it, at first, was quite sufficient.

¶4This was not denied; but it was said, that what was to be proved by Ramsay, does not appear — and, therefore, that the presumption must be, that it was something immaterial. But we think not. We think, the presumption must be the other way. For, the statement to the Court, by the counsel moving for the reintroduction of the witness, was, that he could prove "a material fact” — by the witness ; and no issue or question, as to whether this statement was true in fact, was suggested by the Court, or by the counsel on the other side. The counsel merely “ objected to the witness being recalled;” they did not object, that what he would say, if recalled would be immaterial.

¶5Besides, when the intention is to rely, or to decide, on a special ground like this, the intention ought to be stated, in the objection, or, in the decision, respectively. Otherwise, it will be considered as having been waived — for the ground of such an objection, might perhaps be removed in a moment, t if the objection were known. In the present case, all that was necessary to be done, to remove or to establish this objection, was, simply, to ask the counsel to state the fact which he expected to prove.

¶6*385[1.] We think, then, that the Court erred in not allowing the recall and re-examination of the witness.

¶7We think too, that the Court ought to have opened the case, and have let in the testimony of the witness, Massey. That that testimony was material is unquestionable; it was not denied. And the excuse for not having it sooner, was ample; unless the law requires, of parties, impossibilities.

¶8Judgment reversed.

McDonald, J. absent.
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