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27 Ind. 416

Blake v. Douglass

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided November 15, 1866

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1866-11-15

<p>Replevin Bail.—Judgment.—In an action by one who, as replevin bail, had paid a judgment, to have the same revived; and to have execution in his - favor, an answer of the general denial is well pleaded, and it is error to sustain a demurrer to such answer.</p> <p>Same.—Inpant.—The plea of infancy is a personal privilege, that may bo waived. If not pleaded, a judgment against an infant is binding upon him.</p> <p>Same.—Guardian Ad Litem.—A judgment against an infant by default, without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, is erroneous but not void.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“It was a personal privilege, and having failed to avail himself of it at the proper time, by suffering judgment to be taken against him by default, the judgment is binding upon him.” The court further said:”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cohee v. Baer

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1866-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently July 1968

1 district · 9 state decisions

4018661870188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Elliott, J.

¶1Complaint by Douglass against James A. Blake, the appellant, and John W. Blake, alleging that on the 8th day of October, 1858, Conner Worman recovered a judgment in said Clinton Circuit Court against said James A. and John W. Blake, for the sum of $331 and costs of suit; that he, said Douglass, afterwards, at the request of said James A. and John W. Blake, became replevin bail on said judgment, and afterwards, in January, 1861, by *417reason thereof, was compelled to, and did, pay on said judgment the sum of $101. The complaint prayed that the judgment he revived and that execution issue thereon for the benefit of said Douglass, for said sum of $101, and interest thereon, &c.

¶2James A. Blake appeared and answered in two paragraphs. 1. The general denial. 2. That at the time of the rendition of the judgment referred to in the complaint, and at the time said Douglass became replevin bail thereon, defendant was a minor, under the age of twenty-one years; that he was not a partner of said John W. Blake, and did not appear to said action, either in person or by attorney, but that judgment was taken therein against him by default, and that all of said facts were known to said Douglass at the time he became replevin bail on said judgment; that he did not request said Douglass to become replevin bail, nor did he know that he had done so until about the time of the commencement of this suit; that said Douglass became replevin bail on said judgment solely at the instance and request of said John W. Blake. The court sustained a demurrer to each paragraph of the answer, to which the defendant excepted, and, the defendant failing to answer further, a final judgment was rendered against him The cause was continued as to the defendant John W. Blake.

¶3The question presented here arises upon the ruling of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the answer. The general denial was well pleaded, and the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to it, and for that error the judgment must be reversed. As to the second paragraph of the answer, it is to be observed that the infancy of the appellant might have been a good defense if he had appeared and set it up in the original suit. It was a personal privilege, and leaving failed to avail himself of it at the proper time,, by suffering judgment to be taken against him by default, the judgment is binding upon him. Douglass, by becoming replevin bail and paying a part of the judgment, is; entitled to an execution for his own use, for the amount so. *418paid. It is provided by statute that the judgment, in such cases, shall not be discharged by such payment, but shall remain in force for the use of the replevin bail. 2 G. & H., § 676, p. 309. A judgment taken against an infant by default, without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, to appear for him, is erroneous, but not void.

L. McClurg, for appellant.J. N. Sims, for appellee.'

¶4The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

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