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← 27 N.J. 227 - Corrigan v. Gassert

Corrigan v. Gassert’s Empirical Analysis

1958

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
1
states following
March 2009
most recently cited

56 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently March 2009 · most notably Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert (1962), Douglas v. Harris (1961)

56 state decisions

210195819601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Alexander v. New Jersey Power & Light Co. · Wright v. Vogt · Giles v. Gassert · Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc. · Dixon v. Gassert

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The primary object of the [Fund Law] is to provide a measure of relief for persons who sustain losses or injury inflicted by financially irresponsible or unidentified owners or operators of motor vehicles, where such persons would otherwise be remediless.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “the identity of the motor vehicle and of the operator and owner thereof cannot be ascertained.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[A] statute is to receive a reasonable construction, to serve the apparent legislative purpose. The inquiry in the final analysis is the true intention of the law; and, in the quest for the intention, the letter gives way to the rationale of the expression. The words used may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law. The spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the literal sense of the terms. The particular words are to be made responsive to the essential principle of the law. When the reason of the regulation is general, though the provision is special, it has a general acceptation. The language is not to be given a rigid interpretation when it is apparent that such meaning was not intended. The rule of strict construction cannot be allowed to defeat the evident legislative design. The will of the lawgiver is to be found, not by a mechanical use of particular words and phrases, according to their actual denotation, but by the exercise of reason and judgment in assessing the expression as a composite whole. The indubitable reason of the legislative terms in the aggregate is not to be sacrificed to scholastic strictness of definition or concept. Wright v. Vogt, 7 N.J. 1 [ 80 A.2d 108 ] (1951). It is not the meaning of isolated words, but the internal sense of the law, the spirit of the correlated symbols of expression, that we seek in the exposition of a statute. The intention emerges from the principle and policy of the a”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.