Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy District’s Empirical Analysis
1971
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 370 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 377 later decisions — most recently February 2026 · most notably State v. Jones (Slip Opinion) (2020), 32 Ohio St. 3d 1 - City of Lakewood v. Papadelis (1987)
3 federal appellate · 370 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 93 Ohio App. 139 - General Electric Co. v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft, & Agricultural Implement Workers · State ex rel. Mitman v. Board of County Commissioners · 105 Ohio St. 434 - Spaulding v. Wickham · 114 Ohio St. 212 - State Ex Rel. Tague v. Klinger · 127 Ohio St. 336 - State Ex Rel. Wendling Bros. v. Board of Education
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 377 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The character of a statute, as mandatory or permissive, is commonly determined by the manner in which particular terms used therein are construed. “In determining whether a statute is mandatory or permissive, it is often necessary, as in this case, to trace its use of the terms ‘may’ and ‘shall.’ “The statutory use of the word ‘may’ is generally construed to make the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary * * *, at least where there is nothing in the language or in the sense or policy of the provision to require an unusual interpretation * * *. “The word ‘shall’ is usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained mandatory * * *, especially if frequently repeated * * *. “Ordinarily, the words ‘shall’ and ‘may,’ when used in statutes, are not used interchangeably or synonymously. * * * “However, in order to serve the basic aim of construction of a statute — to arrive at and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly — it is sometimes necessary to give to the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as used in a statute, meanings different from those given them in ordinary usage * * *, and one may be construed to have the meaning of the other * * *. “But when this construction is necessary, the intention of the General Assembly that they shall be so construed must clearly appear * * * from a general view of the statute under consideration * * *, as where the manifest sense and intent of the statute require the one to be substituted fo”
12 later decisions quote this exact passage“[t]he word 'shall' is usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained mandatory”
10 later decisions quote this exact passage“Ordinarily, the words `shall' and `may,' when used in statutes, are not used interchangeably or synonymously.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.