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27 Tex. 355

Peeler v. Guilkey

Texas Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1864

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1864-07-01

Tried below before the Hon. Fielding Jones. This case was formerly before the Supreme Court on appeal, and was reversed and remanded. (See 22 Tex. B., 663.) On the second trial in the court below the pleadings were substantially the same as on the former trial. The evidence introduced by the plaintiff was the same as reported,with the additional testimony of Elizabeth Guilkey, which had been excluded on the first trial.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1864-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently December 1918

4 state decisions

20186418701880189019001910decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Moore, J.

¶1To constitute a valid parol gift, possession of the property must unquestionably accompany the gift. If we take the most favorable view for the appellant, it will be admitted that the testimony on this branch of the case was conflicting. It was fairly submitted to the jury by the charge of the court, and their verdict must, therefore, be regarded as conclusive.

¶2The instructions given by the court to the jury in respect to appellant’s plea of the statute of limitations were correct, and in strict accordance with the rules recognized by this court when this case was before it on a former appeal. (Guilkey, adm’r, v. Peeler, adm’x, 22 Tex. R., 663.) And it cannot be denied that there was testimony before them from which the jury might have drawn their conclusion. If the negro belonged to Rebecca Guilkey at her death, the appellant’s intestate in right of his wife was entitled to possession of him equally with the other heirs, The charge, therefore, in regard to the possession by one coparcener upon the rights of another was not, as is insisted, inajoplicable to the facts of the case. If there were other aspects of the law appropriate to the' facts not embraced in the charge, it was the duty of the appellant to have presented them to the court and invited its action upon them. Failing to do so, she can not complain that they were not brought to the attention of the jury. An inspection of the record, however, does not induce the belief that the substantial merits of the controversy between the parties was not fully covered by the instructions given by the court, or that the result attained is not that justly demanded by the entire law and facts of the case.

¶3The judgment is affirmed.

¶4Judgment affirmed.

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