27 Wash. App. 309 - State v. Russell’s Empirical Analysis
1980
Citation profile
10
cited by 10 later decisions
3
states following
November 1994
most recently cited
10 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Chambers v. Mississippi · United States v. Guillette · 89 Wash. 2d 613 - State v. Young · 93 Wash. 2d 510 - State v. Shipp · 9 Wash. App. 260 - State v. Grant
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Second, the juror might believe that, for the purposes of the law, the familiar word "knowledge" is redefined to be different from its ordinary meaning. That is, if an ordinary person in the defendant's situation would have known a fact, then the defendant is deemed to have had "knowledge" under the law, even if he was so unperceptive or inattentive that he did not have knowledge in the ordinary sense. The second interpretation redefines knowledge with an objective standard which is the equivalent of negligent ignorance. If the defendant is ignorant in a situation where the ordinary man would have knowledge, then the defendant would be deemed to have "knowledge" under the law. Such a redefinition is inconsistent with the statutory scheme which creates a hierarchy of mental states for crimes of increasing culpability. . . . This interpretation of the statute, as redefining knowledge, is also unconstitutional. Statutes which define crimes must be strictly construed according to the plain meaning of their words to assure that citizens have adequate notice of the terms of the law, as required by due process.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[T]he State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Russell acted with knowledge that the credit card had been stolen. There was evidence that Russell may have been ignorant of the fact the card was stolen. It is possible the jury may have considered this evidence yet convicted her because, interpreting the instruction impermissibly, it believed that an ordinary person would have known the credit cards were stolen. Thus the knowledge instruction was erroneous in the context of the possession of stolen property charge. State v. Shipp, supra. The conviction for possessing stolen property must therefore be reversed.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.