¶1(dissenting).
¶2I am impelled to the conclusion that the bill of complaint in this case is multifarious and the trial court was in error in overruling the ground of demurrer specifically pointing out that defect.
¶3In the case of Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 245 Ala. 113, 16 So.2d 416, 420, it is stated:
“As to the Railroad Company, the complaint rests upon a charge of conspiracy between the Road and the Brotherhood to defraud complainant of his seniority rights. Of course, the charge of conspiracy or fraud in general terms is insufficient. Facts must be alleged which would justify the legal conclusion of an unlawful conspiracy. ‘The illegal purpose or means, which the conspirators meant to accomplish or to resort to must be described accurately, for unless the object is illegal, or the means agreed upon illegal, there is no actionable wrong.’ National Park Bank of New York v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 199 Ala. 192, 74 So. 69, 73.”
¶4We think the instant bill is clearly multifarious under the cases of Birmingham Bar Association v. Phillips & Marsh, 239 Ala. 650, 196 So. 725, and Lee v. City of Birmingham, 223 Ala. 196, 135 So. 314.
¶5In the case of Birmingham Bar Association v. Phillips &; Marsh, supra, there was a proceeding to suppress the alleged practice of law by a number of unlicensed individuals, associations and corporations. Demurrers to the bill of complaint were sustained, and on appeal, this Court treated the proceeding in the alternate aspect of one in equity and also as a quo warranto proceeding. It was held that under either aspect the demurrer for misjoinder was well taken. It was there said:
“Such joinder of separate and distinct causes of action against numerous parties, combining many suits into one, wherein one defendant is wholly unconcerned with the facts as to the others, is a misjoinder of parties and causes of action in any and all proceedings at law and renders a bill in equity multifarious. That such practice does not contribute to the administration of justice, but to delay, confusion, and oppression is the experience of jurists written into procedural law here and elsewhere. That the several defendants are charged with a violation of the same law, and are sought to be dealt with by like remedial measures is not the test.” 239 Ala. 655, 196 So. 730.
¶6*242In Lee v. City of Birmingham, supra, there was a proceeding in equity to condemn certain slot machines which were alleged to be gambling devices. The Court there stated:
“The question of multifariousness is presented by the demurrer in this case. There are two individuals with no connection in respect to their transactions. Each is alleged to have operated machines alleged to be gambling devices. The machines have different names, are not alleged to have any similarity except that they are both gambling devices. Those of one were seized January 12, 1929, and of the other November 1, 1929. Each defendant has filed a separate suit in detinue for the recovery of his alleged property. The injunction bonds and writs are each separate, as though there was no connection. In fact, no connection is alleged or shown, except that each is charged with operating at a different time and place a nuisance consisting of a machine which is a gambling device. They are both controlled by the same principles of law. But the facts and transactions are not the same, and have no connection with each other. The machines of one may be shown by the proof to constitute a nuisance, and those of the other may not. Each is an entirely separate, distinct transaction between different parties, with no community of interest, except in the legal principles which are applicable. Multifariousness ‘is described, generally, as the joinder of distinct and independent matters, thereby confounding them, or the uniting in one bill of several matters, perfectly distinct and unconnected, against one defendant, or the demand of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants in the same bill.’ ” [223 Ala. 196, 135 So. 315.]
¶7See, also, Stamey v. Fortner, 230 Ala. 204, 205, 160 So. 116.
¶8The only attempt made in the bill of complaint to show concert of action or any concern on the part of one respondent with the activities of any other respondent is made in Paragraph XIX of the bill of complaint, which reads as follows :
“Complainant further alleges that the respondents have contrived, combined, confederated, and conspired among themselves to do the acts hereinbefore described and to bring about the public nuisance herein complained of.”
¶9The above paragraph does not aver, even in general terms, what the nature of the agreement was between respondents that might constitute the conspiracy. The bill is not made any more specific when it says that the respondents have conspired to do “the acts hereinbefore described,” for the reason that the wrongful acts of respondents set out in the prior paragraphs fail to show a common connection of the respondents with any such acts; and for aught appearing, one respondent is wholly unconcerned with the facts as to the others. Stated another way, for aught that appears from the bill, the wrongful acts charged in the prior paragraphs are charged as separate acts of each respondent, separately done. It is true that Paragraph XIII of the bill averred a “loan exchange” agreement between respondents, but such an arrangement is not in itself illegal, nor does it appear that the arrangement was a substantial factor in accomplishing the illegal objective of charging exorbitant interest rates. Consequently, the general averments of the conspiracy, alleged as a conclusion, do not save the bill from multifariousness. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.