Neal v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 77 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 89 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Neal and his attorneys also seem to have a total misconception of the purpose and role of Rule 37. It is not meant to function as a substitute for appeal, as a method of review of mere error in the conduct of the trial, or as a second opportunity to petition for a rehearing. Hul-sey v. State, 268 Ark. 312 , 595 S.W.2d 934 [(1980)]; Austin v. State, 264 Ark. 318 , 571 S.W.2d 584 [ (1978) ]; Clark v. State, 255 Ark. 13 , 498 S.W.2d 657 [ (1973) ]. It is not intended to permit the petitioner to again present questions which were passed upon on direct appeal. Hulsey v. State, supra. Nor does it permit a petitioner to raise questions which might have been raised at the trial or on the record on direct appeal, unless they are so fundamental as to render the judgment void and open to collateral attack. Hulsey v. State, supra. One point that was raised and disposed of on the first appeal was that jurors were excused by the trial court in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). We considered this question on direct appeal and held against appellant in Neal v. State, 259 Ark. 27 , 531 S.W.2d 17 [ (1975) ], so this point is not a ground for relief under Rule 37. The basic question raised [now] is not different, but petitioner seeks to make the argument that a “death qualified” jury is per se unconstitutional, relying upon Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F.Supp. 1372 (E.D.Ark.1980), now pending on appeal in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Wi”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Woodard v. Sargent · Swindler v. State

2. “The Ohio statute considered in Lockett was quite unlike the Arkansas statute applied in Neal’s trial. That Ohio law required a trial judge to impose the death penalty unless he found by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the victim had induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have committed the offense but for the fact that she was under duress, coercion or strong provocation, or (3) the offense was primarily the product of the accused’s psychosis or mental deficiency. The statute under which appellant was tried was materially different. It permitted evidence in the sentencing stage as to any matters relevant to sentencing. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-4710 (c) (Supp. 1973). Under that Act (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-4701 et seq. [Supp. 1973]), the jury was not compelled to impose the death sentence whenever it found aggravating circumstances but no mitigating circumstance, unless it also found, that sufficient aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt to justify a sentence of death. Neal, 270 Ark. at 449-450 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Collins v. State