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270 Ga. App. 397

606 S.E.2d 615

Frederick v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Decided November 9, 2004

Court of Appeals of Georgia · decided 2004-11-09

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently May 2016

16 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[t]o arrest a suspect for driving under the influence, an officer need only have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect was actually in physical control of a moving vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders him incapable of driving safely.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Durrance v. State, 273 Ga. App. 792 - Hendrix v. State

Relies on Vansant v. State · 223 Ga. App. 690 - Cann-Hanson v. State · Termnet Merchant Services, Inc. v. Phillips

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2004-11-09

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Miller, Judge.

¶1 Following a bench trial, Nicky Joe Frederick was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. On appeal he contends that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him for DUI. We disagree and therefore affirm.

¶2 Where, as here, the salient facts relating to the traffic stop are undisputed and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is *398 presented, the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review. Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) (443 SE2d 474) (1994). Moreover,

Decided November 9, 2004. Head, Thomas, Webb & Willis, Allison E. McCarthy, for appellant. Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor-General, Sharon C. Dickson, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee.
The test of probable cause requires merely a probability — less than a certainty but more than a mere suspicion or possibility. To arrest a suspect for driving under the influence, an officer need only have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect was actually in physical control of a moving vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders him incapable of driving safely.

¶3 (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) State v. Sledge, 264 Ga. App. 612, 614 (591 SE2d 479) (2003).

¶4 Here, the evidence reveals that Frederick was stopped at a police roadblock and admitted to the officer there that he had been drinking. The officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Frederick, and further observed that his eyes were glossy. The officer administered field sobriety tests, but at the time he testified in court did not have any independent recollection of the results of those tests. The officer, who had extensive experience with DUI cases, was of the opinion that Frederick was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive, and arrested him.

¶5 The trial court properly concluded that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Frederick for DUI. Indeed, even without the field sobriety tests, the experienced officer’s undisputed testimony that Frederick smelled of alcohol, admitted that he had been drinking, and had glossy eyes sufficed to create probable cause for the arrest. See Cann-Hanson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 690, 691 (1) (478 SE2d 460) (1996) (“Even in the absence of the field sobriety tests, the officer’s observation that [the defendant] had bloodshot, watery eyes and exuded an odor of alcohol was sufficient to show probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence.”) (citations omitted). Frederick’s enumeration of error is without merit.

¶6 Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur.
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