Mobley and King v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

68 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . . Under [the ‘automobile exception’], a motor vehicle, unlike a home, may be searched without a warrant or previous arrest under appropriate circumstances when the officer has probable cause in the constitutional context to believe that the vehicle contains the fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of a crime. See, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., Inc., 391 U. S. 216 , 88 S. Ct. 1472 , 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 69 S. Ct. 1302 , 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 , 59 S. Ct. 174 , 83 L. Ed. 151 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 , 51 S. Ct. 240 , 75 L. Ed. 629 (1931); United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 , 47 S. Ct. 746 , 71 L. Ed. 1202 (1927). Since the rule is justified on the basis that an automobile is so readily movable as to make impracticable the obtaining of a search warrant, the existence of exigent circumstances must be shown in addition to probable cause to validate the warrantless search. . . .” 270 Md. at 80-81 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Daugherty v. State · England and Edwards v. State

2. ““. . . it is implicit in the Supreme Court’s treating of Aguilar-Spinelli problems that the rules set out for establishing an informant’s credibility are aimed primarily at unnamed police ‘informers’ rather than at that broad class of secondary sources who are the victims of crime, the disinterested witnesses of crime, other disinterested civilian sources of information or other law enforcement officers. The members of this broad class are generally, but not universally, named. They are not from the criminal milieu.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 24 Md. App. 128 - Andresen v. State · 22 Md. App. 722 - McCarthy v. State

3. “The [Cjourt [of Special Appeals] also noted that the [N]egro occupants of the vehicle were stopped in a predominantly white neighborhood and that in that demographic setting “they represent a smaller population sample, within which the other identifying factors may concur, than they would in a predominantly Negro neighborhood, where the random chance of such concurrence would have a larger field of possibilities in which to operate.” From this, the court concluded: “To the extent to which their presence in the neighborhood was more atypical than typical, to such an extent is the likelihood of mere coincidence diminished when all other identifying factors do concur.” King and Mobley v. State, ... 16 Md.App. [546,] 551-552, 298 A.2d 446 ... [ (1973) ]. However sound the court’s conclusion may have been, there is no evidence in the record establishing that Sparrows Point is a predominantly white neighborhood and we decline to take judicial notice of that asserted fact.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 177 Md. App. 165 - Madison-Sheppard v. State