Ryan v. Ryan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"* * * [A] claim of the husband for money had and received is not available as a setoff to satisfy or extinguish the decree for alimony, because to allow such a setoff would be to deprive the wife of her maintenance and support." "* * * We do not consider that a decree for alimony in favor of the wife against the husband is a debt due from the husband to the wife within the meaning of this statute of setoff. The judgment or decree for alimony is duly imposed by law upon the husband to pay the amount of such alimony awarded for the support of the wife. "Alimony is awarded upon considerations of equity and public policy. Since it is thus founded upon public policy and created in equity, it cannot be diverted from the purpose of support without public injury. * * * The courts which created this fund should see that it is not subjected to the payment of preexisting debts, whether claimed by the husband or by some third party." "Lest we be misunderstood we point out that the mere existence of mutual and independent demands does not authorize an equity court to set them off against each other, unless the allegations of the bill show an intervening equity, which renders it necessary for the protection of the demand sought to be set off." (Emphasis supplied.)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. City National Bank of Dothan v. Brice · 253 So. 2d 281 - Chappell v. Chappell

2. ““According to the general rule, since alimony is intended solely for the future maintenance of the divorced wife, it cannot be subjected to the payment of debts of the wife contracted prior to the decree granting the alimony, even though the debts may be of such nature that the husband is liable therefor.5 To permit the application of alimony to such debts would be to pervert the decree from its definite and intended purpose of providing support for the wife.6 The divorce, with its incidental allowance of alimony, simply continues the duty of the husband to support the wife and compels him to perform it, but does not change its nature. Although the courts in fixing the amount of alimony may pay more or less attention to the condition, habit of life, and social position of the parties, alimony never loses its distinctive character of being an allowance solely for support and constitutes a debt only in the sense that the general duty over which the husband had a discretionary control has been changed into a specific duty over which not he, but the court, presides. Creditors who contracted debts with the wife before the divorce decree can have no cause for complaint, for it cannot be said that they made advances upon the credit of alimony.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. City National Bank of Dothan v. Brice

3. ““A judgment for alimony, being based upon the obligation imposed by law upon a husband to support his wife, cannot be extinguished or satisfied by setting off a claim in his favor against his wife, since the setoff would, in fact, deprive her of support. The rule applies even where the wife has been awarded alimony in a lump sum, and even though the wife is a nonresident and is insolvent, so that the husband has no other means of enforcing his claim. A statute providing that mutual ‘debts’ may be set off does not authorize a husband to set off a debt of his wife against her award for alimony in a lump sum, since the alimony is not a debt within the meaning of the statute.” 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 530, pp. 654, 655.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bosch v. Bosch