¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent. I part with the majority only as to Issue IV: whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence in a search of defendant’s suitcases.
¶3The Court gives substantial weight to the United States Supreme Court’s approval of an automobile search in South Dakota v. Opperman, (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. *1743092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000. While the court emphasized the reasonableness standard for searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (and, I might add, the same holds true for Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution), the Oppermancase must be viewed in light of the fact that courts have consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles in lawful police custody. Chief Justice Burger pointed out that:
“the inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.” 428 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1004.
¶4He also noted the low expectation of privacy associated with automobiles because of the public nature of auto travel.
¶5Automobiles aside, it is still the law that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fit into one of the narrow judicially defined exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.
“In determining the reasonableness of warrantless searches, the central requirement is to examine the totality of the circumstances in light of established fourth amendment principles to determine if the rights which those principles embody have been violated.” United States v. Sink, (5th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 1041, 1047.
¶6Among the exigent circumstances to be considered are the state interests advanced in support of inventory searches as set forth in the majority opinion. Against these interests a reviewing court must weigh the citizen’s interest in the contents of the container searched. J. Powell concurring in South Dakota v. Opperman, supra.This balancing, however, must still be conducted with an eye toward the general rule outlined in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
“The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency. . If it is to be a true guide to constitutional police action, rather than just a pious phrase, then ‘[t]he exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule.’ ” 403 U.S. at 481, 91 S.Ct. at 2046, 29 L.Ed.2d at 592.
¶7And the exceptions must be confined to their appropriate scope. Ibid.
¶8In the case at bar the police opened defendant’s suitcases in a so-called “inventory search.” The majority gives a just representation of cases in which courts have established that a greater expectation of privacy attends pieces of personal luggage. United States v. Chadwick, (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538; People v. Hamilton, (1979) 74 Ill.2d 457, 24 Ill.Dec. 849, 386 N.E.2d 53. I would add United States v. Neumann, (8th Cir. 1978) 585 F.2d 355; United States v. Stevie, (8th Cir. 1978) 582 F.2d 1175; United States v. Berry, (7th Cir. 1977) 560 F.2d 861, and especially Arkansas v. Sanders, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235.
¶9In the Sanderscase, the Supreme Court upheld the Arkansas Supreme Court’s reversal of a trial court conviction because of a warrantless search of a suitcase seized from a taxi. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court saying:
“The only question, therefore, is whether the police, rather than immediately searching the suitcase without a warrant, should have taken it, along with respondent, to the police station and there obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a warrant. . [Ljuggage is a common repository for one’s personal effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.” - U.S. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2592, 61 L.Ed.2d at 243-4.
¶10Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, was equally emphatic.
“Whether arrested in a hotel lobby, an airport, a railroad terminal, or on a public street as here, the owner has the right to expect that the contents of his luggage will not, without his consent, be exposed *175on demand of the police. . . . The warrant requirement is not so onerous as to command suspension of Fourth Amendment guarantees once the receptacle involved is securely in the control of the police, as it was here after Sanders’ arrest.” - U.S. at -, 99 S.Ct. at -, 61 L.Ed.2d at 247.
¶11In light of the recognized expectation of privacy, particularly as sanctioned in Sanders, I am of the opinion that the majority has erred in balancing the interests of defendant and the interests of the state. That inventories are standard police procedures does not in and of itself justify the search of defendant’s suitcases. Police procedures are not necessarily well known to the public and, therefore, defendant’s request to the police officer to secure his belongings no more diminished defendant’s expectation of privacy than would handing the suitcases over to a bus station attendant. Besides, whether the instant case involves “normal and reasonable custodial procedures” or “normal property room policy” is open to question. The inventory search was not conducted in the property room at all, but in the Indianapolis bus station, hardly a “normal” procedure.
¶12The majority suggests that the nature of defendant’s crime entitled the officer to be somewhat “wary” of the contents of the suitcases. The meaning of this reference is not clear. Was the officer “wary” in that he believed the suitcases contained evidence? If so, this fact might provide probable cause sufficient to obtain a warrant, but would not eliminate the need for obtaining a warrant. Was the officer “wary” in that he believed the police were in some danger because of the presence of the suitcases? I find no support for this proposition in the record.
¶13Clearly, the warrant requirement is the rule and not the exception. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.Therefore, the burden of showing exigent circumstances should properly rest upon the state. I do not find that the state has carried this burden, especially in light of the well established expectation of privacy in personal luggage.
¶14I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.