Lynk v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “During the trial the witness Ervin Hall was held in jail, and was found to be in possession of marijuana. Debbie Hall, his sister and also a prosecution witness, was suspected among others of having slipped the contraband to him. During the direct testimony of Debbie Hall the trial court was advised of these developments and upon motion of the prosecution the trial court ruled that the defense could not inquire of Debbie Hall during cross-examination whether she had smuggled marijuana to her brother. Appellant contends that proof of her willingness to perform illegal acts for her brother would show a great love and affection for him and a consequent bias. Appellant argues that the ruling was error in that it prevented him from showing that bias. In Clark v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 524 , 348 N.E.2d 27 , we observed that courts should be liberal in criminal cases in permitting the bias of witnesses to be delved into for the purpose of impeachment, but that the trial judge has considerable authority in regulating the process. Here the defense sought an admission by a witness of prior illegal activity which had not resulted in a conviction. The probability that she would deny the charge was very great as there was little evidence of her guilt, and as any admission of guilt would be against her interest and that of her brother. Therefore, in all likelihood the jury would be left to deal with the false and confusing residual impression that illegal activities had taken place under t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lynk v. Duckworth

2. “Appellant next contends that there was a plea agreement between the witness Ervin Hall and the State which was not disclosed to the defense and that such non-disclosure denied him due process of law. In order to support the factual contention that such an agreement exist ed, Appellant established in his motion to correct errors that a charge of possession of marijuana had been filed against Hall during the trial below, and dismissed thereafter, and that the filing of such charge was not disclosed. In Bírlela v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 37 , 323 N.E.2d 645 , this Court held that when a prosecution witness testifies in return for favorable treatment by the State, the prosecution must disclose the agreement and its terms. In the case at bar the prosecution disclosed the events surrounding the alleged possession of marijuana in a timely fashion during the trial as they were developing. The trial prosecutor stated that an investigation into the events was in progress and might or might not lead to formal charges. The filing of the formal charge, the lone formative event of which defense counsel clearly stood ignorant during trial, did not occur until after Hall had completed his testimony. In addition to these considerations it is evident that the charge was a mere misdemeanor filed in county court, and was minor when compared with the offense for which Hall was already confined in prison. The penal interest of the State was not great in seeking a conviction on that charge. We agree”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lynk v. Duckworth