Estep v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1979
Citation profile
41 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently July 2008 · most notably Collins v. State (1981), Harris v. State (1981)
41 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Lisenba v. People of State of California · Blackburn v. State · Baum v. State · Carroll v. State · Gilliam v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"The test for determining the existence of a lesser included offense was set forth in Watford v. State, (1957) 237 Ind. 10, 15 , 143 N.E.2d 405, 407 , where it was stated that `* * * to be necessarily included in the greater offense, the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without having first committed the lesser.' "Although the entry incidental to a burglary may be a trespass, under Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (a)(1) (Burns) it does not follow, that it must be. One may never have been denied entry to his neighbor's house, he may even have been expressly authorized to enter it at any time. Yet, if he enters by `breaking,' as that term has been employed in defining burglary, with the intent to commit a felony therein, he commits a burglary although not a trespass, because the entry was authorized. "Defendant's claim that a burglary cannot be committed without committing a criminal trespass under subsection (a)(4) of Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (Burns) is also erroneous. That subsection renders it a criminal trespass to knowingly or intentionally interfere with the possession or use of another's property without his consent, such interference being the equivalent of the entry proscribed in subsection (a)(1). It is not necessary for the break and the entry proscribed by the burglary statute to interfere with the possession or use of another's property. Obviously if an intent to commit a larceny requisite to a burglary came to fruition, the larceny woul”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.