United States v. Sattar’s Empirical Analysis
2003
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 2 district ·
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990) · 18 U.S.C. § 1014 · 18 U.S.C. § 2332 · 18 U.S.C. § 2332B (§ 702 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (§ 120005 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (§ 303 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 18 U.S.C. § 371 · 18 U.S.C. § 373
Relies on Bruton v. United States · Kotteakos v. United States · Broadrick v. Oklahoma · Kolender v. Lawson · Zafiro v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The First Amendment concerns raised by the use of “personnel” in § 2339B, as applied to persons who provided themselves as “personnel” to an organization, are simply not present in this case. Section 2339A is being applied to persons who allegedly provided other personnel “knowing and intending that [it is] to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” a violation of specific statutes, in this case a conspiracy to kill or kidnap persons in a foreign country. The allegations in this case do not concern the scope of membership in an organization or the permissible extent of advocacy.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The designation of [the Islamic Group] as an FTO had no effect on the defendants. While the defendants can challenge the allegation that they violated § 2339B by providing material support to an FTO or could contest that IG was, in fact, designated as an FTO, they cannot assert the due process claims of the FTO and challenge the underlying designation. The element at issue in this case is simply whether IG was designated as an FTO, and the defendants there after knowingly provided, or conspired to provide, material support or assistance to it, not whether the Secretary of State correctly designated IG as an FTO.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Government argued in its brief that the defendants are charged not merely with using their own phones or other communications equipment but with actively making such equipment available to IG and thus 'providing' IG with communications resources that would otherwise be unavailable to the FTO. That argument, however, simply ignores the reality of the facts charged in the Indictment in which various defendants are accused of having participated in the use of communications equipment.” Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d at 358 . This excerpt does not amount to a rejection of”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.