concurrence">Fletcher, Presiding Justice,

concurring specially.

Because Monroe never invoked the statute that we have interpreted as providing for two hours of closing arguments in capital felony cases, I find it unnecessary to conduct a harmless error analysis on the issue. Citing the then-existing uniform rule, Monroe requested more time for closing argument at his 1998 trial. Defense counsel argued that the trial court had the discretion under Uniform *205Superior Court Rule 13.2 to extend the time for closing argument beyond one hour, but the trial court declined to grant an extension under the rule. The defendant never argued that he was entitled to more than one hour as a matter of right, invoked OCGA § 17-8-73, or cited our decision in Hayes v. State6 during the brief colloquy with the court. Because the defendant never objected to the one-hour limitation based on the statute or our decision interpreting it or informed the court of any basis for extending the time other than the exercise of its discretion, I would hold that he waived his right to a two-hour closing argument under OCGA § 17-8-73.

Decided March 13, 2000.Gentry & Waldrop, Michael S. Waldrop, for appellant.Richard R. Read, District Attorney, Nancy N. Bills, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this special concurrence.

268 Ga. 809 (493 SE2d 169) (1997).

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