Nelson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"An attorney is presumed to have rendered competent representation, and only a strong showing to the contrary will rebut that presumption. E.g., Robertson v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 562 , 319 N.E.2d 833 . We must look to the facts of each case in order to determine whether coun- | sel has provided his client with effective representation. Eg., Roberts v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 72 , 360 N.E.2d 825 . We will not second-guess counsel's trial tactics or strategy. E.g., Loman v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 255 , 354 N.E.2d 205 . An isolated mistake or instance of poor strategy does not render representation ineffective or inadequate; and representation is deemed to be adequate, unless the ree-ord reflects that the trial was reduced to a mockery of justice.: E.g., Merida v. State, (1979) [ 270 Ind. 218 ], 383 N.E.2d 1043 ."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Carlyle v. State · Kimble v. State

2. “"There is nothing in the record to suggest that [Defendant] Charles' failure to relate potentially exculpatory information was an exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, we conclude that the omission, in the context of his post-arrest explanation, was probative upon the question of whether the exculpatory testimony was a recent fabrication."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Yurina v. State · 585 F. Supp. 462 - Nelson v. Duckworth

3. “(“In Doyle , the Court stated that Miranda warnings contain an implied assurance that a defendant’s silence “will carry no penalty.” 426 U.S. at 618 , 96 S.Ct. at 2245 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 98 . The Court reasoned that silence following the Miranda warnings is “insolubly ambiguous” because it may constitute a reliance upon those rights rather than a tacit admission that he has an insufficient defense or explanation for his conduct. 426 U.S. at 617 , 96 S.Ct. at 2244 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 97 . Thus, the Court held that impeachment use of Doyle’s post-arrest silence violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We agreed in Jones, supra, and stated that “(the) use of an accused’s post arrest silence to impeach his trial testimony is fundamentally unfair.” 265 Ind. at 450, 355 N.E.2d at 404. There is however, a crucial distinction between those cases and the instant case. Jones remained silent after arrest and advisement of his rights. Doyle’s silence was not absolute, but his statements to arresting officers were tantamount to silence: he merely inquired, “What’s this all about.” 426 U.S. at 615, note 5 , 96 S.Ct. at 2243 , 49 L.Ed.2d at 96 . Charles, in the case before us, did not remain silent. Instead he elected to give an account, albeit brief, of his participation in the events. Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed similar issues and have concluded that there is no Doyle violation where a defendant chooses to give police a selected account of an incident rather ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Carlyle v. State