State v. Kleypas’s Empirical Analysis
2001
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 134 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 152 later decisions (12 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2024 · most notably State v. Ward (2011), Kansas v. Marsh (2006)
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 134 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Gregg v. Georgia · Lockett v. Ohio · Woodson v. North Carolina · Zant v. Stephens · Proffitt v. Florida
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 152 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"(5) If, by unanimous vote , the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4625 and amendments thereto exist and, further, that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4628 and amendments thereto; otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced as provided by law. The jury, if its verdict is a unanimous recommendation of a sentence of a mandatory term of imprisonment of 40 years , shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. ..." (Emphases added.)”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. State v. Scott · State v. Alford““The Arizona statute is explicitly mandatory: it provides that the sentencer ‘shall’ impose a death sentence whenever a single aggravating circumstance is found and the defendant fails to meet his statutory burdens of proof. . . . “. . . While the statute does require balancing, it nonetheless deprives the sentencer of the discretion mandated by the Constitution’s individualized sentencing requirement. This is because in situations where the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are in balance ... the statute bars the court from imposing a sentence less than death. Thus, the presumption can preclude individualized sentencing as it can operate to mandate a death sentence. . . . Adamson v. Rick-etts, supra, 865 F.2d at 1043 (footnotes omitted).” (Emphasis added.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. State v. Marsh““In Walton, five justices agreed the Arizona death penalty statute did not create an unconstitutional presumption in favor of the death penalty. The statute at issue in Walton required imposition of the sentence of death if any aggravating circumstances were established and there were ‘ “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial” ’ to warrant leniency. 497 U.S. at 644 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 [E] [1989]). Although the language chosen by the Arizona legislature does not include the terms weigh’ or ‘outweigh,’ what the statute prescribes is a weighing process that results in imposition of the death penalty if the mitigating circumstances are not of sufficient weight to tip the balance toward leniency.” (Emphasis added.) 269 Kan. at 59 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. State v. Marsh
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.