White v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 42 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““From and after July 1, 1969, every person who claims damages from any municipality owning and operating a municipal liquor store or from the licensee of any licensed liquor establishment for or on account of any injury within the scope of Minnesota Statutes, Section 340.95, shall give a written notice to the governing body of the municipality or the licensee of the liquor establishment, as the case may be, stating: (1) The time and date when, and person to whom such liquor was sold, bartered, or given; (2) The name and address of the person or persons who were injured or whose property was damaged; (3) The approximate time and date and the place where any injury to person or property occurred. No error or omission in the notice shall void the effect of the notice, if otherwise valid, unless such error or omission is of a substantially material nature. This notice shall be served within 120 days after the injury occurs, and no action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has been given, and unless it is commenced within three years after such injury. The time for giving the notice shall not include any period of time next succeeding the occurrence of the injury during which the person injured is incapacitated from giving such notice by reason of the injury sustained. Actual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put the governing body of the municipality or the licensee of the liquor establishment, as the case may be, or its' insurer, on notice of a possible claim”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hammerschmidt v. Moore

2. “the tortfeasor against whom contribution [was] sought escaped because of a special relationship between himself and the injured plaintiff. For instance, a husband, even though a joint wrongdoer, cannot be required to contribute to the damages of his wife. Nor may a joint tortfeasor father be required to contribute to the damages sustained by his son.... Whether the policy of exempting the husband or parent from action by the wife or child is expressed in terms of the absence of common liability to the injured plaintiff or otherwise, the decisive factor is the special relationship which gives rise to the policy.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Individual 35w Bridge Litigation

3. “We have held that a covenant not to sue secured by one wrongdoer does not destroy the common liability necessary for contribution. And the majority of the courts hold that running of the statute of limitations against one defendant on the plaintiffs claim does not bar a suit for contribution against him. The reasoning underlying these decisions is that joint liability arises the moment the tort is committed and these defenses come into being after the conduct which creates that liability.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Individual 35w Bridge Litigation