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273 F.2d 420

Docket No. 13878.

Raslich v. Bannan

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1959-12-09

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“acquiesced in, and in substantial effect consented to,”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Camden v. Circuit Court of Second Judicial Circuit Crawford County Illinois F, United States v. DiPietro

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Per Curiam · Decided 1959-12-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 23 later decisions — most recently March 2002

18 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

90195919601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Joseph R. Joseph (of Joseph & Joseph), James Pearson, Flint, Mich., for appellant.

Perry A. Maynard, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Samuel J. Torina, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for appellee.

Before MARTIN and WEICK, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAM E. MILLER, Cistrict Judge.

PER CURIAM.

¶1

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

¶2

Upon consideration of the record, the briefs of the respective parties, and the argument of counsel in open court, we are of the opinion that appellant's constitutional rights were not infringed by the action of the Circuit Court for the County of Genesee, Michigan, in denying appellant's plea of double jeopardy and in requiring him to stand trial upon the charge of murder after a fourteenmember jury in a former trial of appellant had been discharged by the Court and a mistrial declared. This is true for two reasons. First, the record makes it altogether clear that appellant and his attorney acquiesced in, and in substantial effect consented to, the action of the state trial court in discharging the jury; and second, from all of the circumstances established and appearing to the state trial court, it was a proper exercise of his discretion to conclude that appellant could probably not receive a fair and impartial trial before the jury as then constituted and that the jury should therefore be discharged. This action of the trial court was taken to safeguard appellant's rights, and, under the circumstances, the later trial of appellant before the Court upon the same charge did not constitute double jeopardy.

¶3

The order of the District Court denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is, accordingly, affirmed.

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