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← 273 Ill. App. 3d 893 - Williams v. Dorsey

273 Ill. App. 3d 893 - Williams v. Dorsey’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

66
cited by 66 later decisions
1
states following
September 2023
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 60 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 66 later decisions — most recently September 2023 · most notably 299 Ill. App. 3d 1028 - State Farm Insurance v. Kazakova (1998), 315 Ill. App. 3d 77 - Schmidt v. Joseph (2000)

3 federal appellate · 60 state decisions

2501995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 99 Ill. 2d 389 - Foutch v. O'BRYANT · 141 Ill. 2d 528 - People v. Rivera · Smith Case · 153 Ill. 2d 550 - Kwasniewski v. Schaid · 213 Ill. App. 3d 242 - Gardner v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Based upon these recent changes in the rules governing mandatory arbitration, which were in effect at the time of the instant case, defendants are correct in claiming that they did not waive the right to reject the award by not appearing personally at the hearing, because their attorney was present. However, that fact does not preclude the trial court’s entry of an order debarring them from rejecting the award as a sanction for failure to comply with Rule 237(b).” Williams, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 900 , 652 N.E.2d at 1291 .”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “"[T]he rules governing mandatory arbitration do not foreclose a litigant's access to court and to a jury trial. * * * [A] party may reject an arbitration award for any reason. However, in the context of an arbitration proceeding, just as at trial, a party may lose the right to proceed with a jury trial as a sanction for violating certain rules." Williams, 273 Ill.App.3d at 904 , 210 Ill. Dec. 310 , 652 N.E.2d 1286 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “"We agree with defendants that the right to a jury trial is 'jealously guard[ed]’ by courts. [Citation.] However, the rules governing mandatory arbitration do not foreclose a litigant’s access to court and to a jury trial. *** [A] party may reject an arbitration award for any reason. However, in the context of an arbitration proceeding, just as at trial, a party may lose the right to proceed with a jury trial as a sanction for violating certain rules. 134 Ill. 2d Rules 219 (c), 237(b); 145 Ill. 2d R. 90(g); [citation]. Other jurisdictions have found similar mandatory arbitration procedures constitutional. [Citations.] The determinative criterion of mandatory arbitration’s constitutionality is the preservation of the right to a jury trial through the parties’ ability to reject or appeal the award. [Citations.] Under Illinois’ rules, parties have the right of rejection — unless they are subjected to a sanction debarring rejection. Accordingly, in light of the above-cited authorities and the fact that, in Illinois, the supreme court itself promulgated the rules governing arbitration, it would appear to be all too sanguine for defendants to urge that Rule 90(g) is an unconstitutional infringement upon the right to a jury trial.” Williams, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 904-05 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.