Mathis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It is true that the court did not use the precise language set out in the statute. However, the court did advise the petitioner that he was giving up his right to a public trial and his right to subpoena witnesses as well as other rights enumerated above. These facts, along with the record of petitioner's extensive involvement with pretrial motions for a speedy trial and depositions of witnesses, including the complaining witness, were adequate to show that petitioner had been meaningfully informed of his rights to a speedy trial and to confront the witnesses against him. We find that under these cireumstances and on the basis of the entire record the guilty plea was freely and voluntarily given.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Seybold v. State · Gresham v. State

2. “this Court has consistently held that the “essence of Boykin [Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238 , 99 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] is that the record must affirmatively show that a defendant entering a guilty plea does so voluntarily and intelligently.” This means that the record must provide a sufficient basis for the conclusion that [the] defendant was meaningfully informed of the specific rights enumerated in Boykin and detailed in West’s Ann.Ind.Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (1978). [Citations omitted.] In Neeley v. State, [(1978) Ind., 382 N.E.2d 714 ], this Court held that, while a strict following of West’s Ann.Ind.Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (1978) would be the preferred practice, this Court will look to the entire record of the guilty plea proceedings to determine if a defendant was fully advised of and understood his constitutional rights. In applying the rule of Neeley , this Court has held that when the record shows that a plea agreement was entered into which adequately informed the defendant of his constitutional rights, reversal is not required merely because the trial judge inadvertently failed to orally inquire whether appellant understood his right to compulsory process. [Citation omitted.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. White v. State