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← 273 Pa. Super. 492 - Commonwealth v. Barren

273 Pa. Super. 492 - Commonwealth v. Barren’s Empirical Analysis

1979

Citation profile

37
cited by 37 later decisions
1
states following
February 1989
most recently cited

33 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Quercia v. United States · Commonwealth Ex Rel. Washington v. Maroney · Rosche v. McCoy · Commonwealth v. Mabie · Commonwealth v. Cliff

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(Mabie) should not be indiscriminately expanded to require defense counsel upon threat of being declared ineffective, to interview all conceivable witnesses irrespective of the nature or extent of their potential information. Trial counsel’s failure to interview potential witnesses will not be equated with ineffective assistance in the absence of a showing that his or her testimony would have advanced the fact finding process.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “During closing argument the prosecutor may refer to all facts properly in evidence and may argue all reasonable inferences from such evidence. Commonwealth v. Graham, 467 Pa. 417 , 358 A.2d 56 (1976). However, it is improper to argue facts not proved or to misstate the evidence. Commonwealth v. Toney, 474 Pa. 243 , 378 A.2d 310 (1977); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 247 Pa. Super. 527 , 372 A.2d 1214 (1977): Sections 5.8(a) and 5.9 of the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function. This is peculiarly so where facts not of record are used to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. Commonwealth v. Patterson, supra. Moreover, there is no longer any room for doubt that it is improper for a prosecutor to express his personal belief as to the credibility of either prosecution or defense witnesses. Commonwealth v. Kuebler, 484 Pa. 358 , 399 A.2d 116 (1979); Commonwealth v. Pfaff, 477 Pa. 461 , 384 A.2d 1179 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bullock, 266 Pa.Super. 526 , 405 A.2d 943 (1979); Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 245 Pa.Super. 27 , 369 A.2d 276 (1976); ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, § 5.8(b). “In determining whether the established bounds of propriety have been exceeded in closing argument, we must ever be mindful of the ‘possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments, not only because of the prestige associated with his office, but also because of the fact-finding facilities presumably availab”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “It is apparent that the adversary process in criminal trials, when left to the actions and judgment of trial counsel alone is not sufficient to protect the rights of both society and defendants. 1 Time and again we see the sorry spectacle of the failure of defense counsel to object to improper remarks of the prosecuting attorney, which failure, though waived on direct appeal, finally comes back to háunt us on ineffectiveness of counsel contentions. The trial judge, in jury cases, “is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law.” Querica v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 , 53 S.Ct. 698, 699 , 77 L.Ed. 1321, 1324 (1932). See also Commonwealth v. Claiborne, 175 Pa.Super. 42, 50 , 102 A.2d 900 (1953). 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial S.87. It has long been recognized in this Commonwealth that the trial judge not only has the power, but in proper cases the duty as well to “supervise the addresses of counsel so far as may be necessary to protect prisoners or parties litigant from injurious misrepresentations and unfair attack, and the jiiry from being misled. When this power should be exercised must be left to the sound discretion of the judge and he should not hesitate to act where the fair administration of justice requires him to do so.”' Commonwealth v. Mudgett, 174 Pa. 211, 257 , 34 A. 588, 592 (1896). “The trial judge may, and should, confine argument within the limitations of legitimate advocacy.” C”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.