United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

548 federal appellate · 75 district · 95 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1,271 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition.”

   17 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co. · Atlantic Richfield Company v. Usa Petroleum Company

2. ““Our view of what is a reasonable restraint of commerce is controlled by the recognized purpose of the Sherman Law itself. Whether this type of restraint is reasonable or not must be judged in part at least, in the light of its effect on competition, for, whatever difference of opinion there may be among economists as to the social and economic desirability, of an unrestrained competitive system, it cannot be doubted that the Sherman Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance óf competition.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp. · 105 F. Supp. 670 - United States v. the Times-Picayune Pub. Co.

3. “The alleged errors in receiving and excluding evidence were rightly described by the court below as minor points. The trial lasted four and one-half weeks. A great mass of evidence was taken and a wide range of inquiry covered. In such a case a new trial is not lightly to be ordered on grounds of technical errors in ruling on the admissibility of evidence which do not affect matters of substance. We take note only of some of the objections raised which sufficiently indicate the character of others, all of which we have considered. Respondents called as a witness the manager of a potteries corporation which was not a defendant. On cross-examination, he was asked whether he knew that his concern had pleaded guilty to a violation of the Sherman Act, to which he answered, T don’t know anything about that at all.’ While it may be within the discretion of the trial judge to limit cross-examination of this type, we would not be prepared to say that such a question, when allowed, would be improper, if its admissibility were urged on the ground that it was directed to the bias of the witness, Wabash Screen Door Co. v. Black, [6 Cir.] 126 F. 721, 726 ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.) § 949, or that it was preliminary to showing his implication in the supposed cf. fense, and thus affecting his credibility. But in any case, we do not think the answer given prejudiced the respondents in any such substantial way as to justify a reversal. Davis v. Cob-lens, 174 U.S. 719, 727 , 19 S.Ct. 832 , 4”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Oklahoma ex rel. Nesbitt v. Allied Materials Corp.