Robinson v. Com.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

59 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “a number of federal and state courts have held that a resident of a dwelling impliedly consents to a police officer entering the curtilage to contact the dwelling’s residents. This implied consent has the effect of deeming such an entry into the curtilage a reasonable intrusion into an area otherwise protected by an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903, 909 (4th Cir.1996); Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir.1964); State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143 , 953 P.2d 583, 587 (1998); City of Eugene v. Silva, 198 Or.App. 101 , 108 P.3d 23, 27 (2005). Implied consent can be negated by obvious indicia of restricted access, such as posted “no trespassing” signs, gates, or other means that deny access to uninvited persons. See, e.g., Christensen, 953 P.2d at 587-88 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kim v. Commonwealth · Oprisko v. Dir. of the Dep't of Corr.

2. “[W]e will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. The issue of whether . . . probable cause [existed,] however, is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Com. v. Jackson · Herndon v. Com.

3. “[n]o court has, to our knowledge, attempted to formulate a final and comprehensive list of all exigent circumstances which might justify a warrantless entry, ... some of those considered relevant have been: (1) the degree of urgency involved and the time required to get a warrant; (2) the officers' reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to others, including police officers left to guard the site; (4) information that the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police may be on their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or involves violence; (6) whether officers reasonably believe the suspects are armed; (7) whether there is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of probable cause; (8) whether the officers have strong reason to believe the suspects are actually present in the premises; (9) the likelihood of escape if the suspects are not swiftly apprehended; and (10) the suspects' recent entry into the premises after hot pursuit. We have held that in determining whether exigent circumstances were sufficient to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness and justify a warrantless entry, the court must examine the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the law enforcement officers on the scene. The officers are not required to possess either the gift of prophecy or the infallible wisdom that comes only with hindsight. They must be judged by their reaction to circumstances as they reasonably appear”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Collins v. Commonwealth