Johnson v. Hill’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * There is no showing of intentional deception on the part of the juror; the involvement of the juror’s son in prior litigation having its origin in an automobile collision does not, in and of itself, furnish adequate legal basis for us, as a reviewing court, to interfere with the considered action of the court in permitting the judgment to stand. The trial judge, in the first instance, has the responsibility and duty to so supervise and conduct litigation proceedings as to afford all parties a fair and impartial trial to the end that justice is served. The record satisfies us that the trial judge followed this mandate. He made an investigation of the alleged misconduct of juror Strege and reached the conclusion that the verdict was not improperly influenced. Our rule is that ‘ (a) motion for a new trial is always directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It is only for a clear abuse of that discretion that an appellate court will reverse.’ Stofer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 8 Cir., 249 F.2d 285, 288 . As we have seen, the verdict finds ample support in the evidence that was presented to the jury, and we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of a new trial.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 343 F. Supp. 1319 - Morrison v. Ted Wilkerson, Inc. · 237 F. Supp. 524 - Laugherty v. Newcomb

2. “The right to challenge the panel or to challenge a particular juror may be waived, and in fact is waived by failure to seasonably object. It is established that failure to object at the time the jury is empanelled operates as a conclusive waiver if the basis of the objection is known or might have been known or discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, or if the party is otherwise chargeable with knowledge of the ground of the objection.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Parse · 867 F. Supp. 2d 445 - United States v. Daugerdas

3. “In North Dakota the driver of a motor vehicle is under a statutory duty not to stop or suddenly decrease the speed of his vehicle “without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal.” (Emphasis added [by the court in Johnson].) § 39-1038, N.D.R.C.1943, 1957 Supplement. Section 39-1039 of the North Dakota statute provides that a stop signal shall be given either by means of the hand and arm or by a signal lamp or lamps or mechanical signal device. In construing nearly identical statutes of Utah and Minnesota, under facts analogous to the instant situation, it was held that a jury question was presented as to whether the driver of the lead vehicle had warned the driver of the vehicle following closely behind, by appropriate signal, of his intention to stop or suddenly decrease his speed. See United States v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 10 Cir., 208 F.2d 424, 429 , 42 A.L.R.2d 951 ; Benson v. Hoenig, 228 Minn. 412 , 37 N.W.2d 422, 425 . Compare also Ryan v. Griffin, 241 Minn. 91 , 62 N.W.2d 504, 507 . It is to be noted that giving a signal is not in itself sufficient statutory compliance. It must be an appropriate signal. * * * (emphasis added by the court in Johnson) Johnson v. Hill, 274 F.2d 110, 114 (8th Cir. 1960).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Koland v. Johnson