Iovino v. Waterson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

37 federal appellate · 2 district · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We need not go so far as to hold that an attorney appearing in the courts of this Circuit is under a duty to keep himself and his adversary informed of his continued authority at all times. We do hold that an attorney so appearing must assure himself of the continued existence of his client before he takes affirmative steps in the client’s behalf; that, in the absence of knowledge to the contraiy, his adversary may properly assume he has done this; that a client who authorizes an attorney to represent him has impliedly so informed the adverse party; and that no advantage may be taken by the client’s personal representative of the attorney’s failure to ascertain the fact of the client’s death.” Both Iovino and Simmons dealt with the application of rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (as said rule then read) pertaining to the substitution of a personal representative of a deceased defendant into the action within two years after the date of death. In each of these cases counsel continued to represent the defendant after his death, and under such circumstances the court in both matters held that the personal representative was estopped from asserting rule 25(a)(1) to preclude the substitution of a personal representative after the two-year period. Of course these cases have nothing to do with the statutory scheme established by the California Legislature for the orderly presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate. Each said case dealt with an older made”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Factor v. Superior Court

2. ““We are dealing with a subject-matter which, though ‘outcome de terminative’ has long been regarded as procedural by lawyers, by legislators and by the Supreme Court itself, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Joy, supra. We believe revivor falls in what Judge Magruder called, although, to be sure, before Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York [ 326 U.S. 99 , 65 S.Ct. 1464 , 89 L.Ed. 2079 ], ‘a twilight zone * * * where a rational classification could be made either way, and where ■Congress directly, or the Supreme •Court under the authority of the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 , 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 723b, 723c, would have power to prescribe a so-called rule of procedure for the federal courts.’ Sampson v. Channell, 1 Cir., 110 F.2d 754, 756-757 , 128 A.L.R. 394 , certiorari denied 1940, 310 U.S. 650 , 60 S.Ct. 1099 , 84 L.Ed. 1415 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pritchard v. Downie

3. “[I]n this limited area Congress may use its power to provide for service of process anywhere in the United States in such a manner that in all suits properly in the Federal courts by or against United States citizens, including diversity suits, substitution of their personal representatives may be had on their decease.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ransom v. Brennan